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"A STUDY OF THE IRISH PARADIGM OF DISCLOSURE OF FINANCIAL 
INFORMATION TO EMPLOYEES"
Patricia C. Barker
ABSTRACT
This study examines the case for the disclosure of financial 
information to employees of enterprises in the Republic of 
Ireland. A case for the justification of such disclosure 
within the Decision Usefulness approach is established.
Through literature review, analysis and empirical study, the 
Irish paradigm of disclosure to employees, insofar as it has 
developed to date, is described. Current disclosure practice 
in major Irish enterprises is established, and 'local' 
characteristics are identified.
It is hypothesized that local characteristics have a 
significant relationship to the disclosure/non-disclosure 
patterns of financial information to employees by Irish 
enterprises.
Factors which emerge as having a significant relationship to 
disclosure of financial information to employees are the 
existence of employee participation in the enterprise and the 
holding of a positive attitude to disclosure by the 
enterprise's financial accountant.
The conclusion of the study is that in order to promote the 
development of Ireland's paradigm of disclosure, the attitude 
of the financial accountant should be strengthened and the 
creation of a participatory environment should be advanced and 
supported. Because of the nature of the accountants' attitude 
towards disclosure of financial information to employees, the 
educators and trainers of accountants are in a strong position 
to strengthen attitudes of accountants, and thereby to 
contribute to the advancement of disclosure to employees in 
Ireland.
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CHAPTER 1
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SCOPE AND BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY
1.1. INTRODUCTION
This study focusses on the disclosure of financial information 
to employees in the Republic of Ireland. It provides an 
analytical scrutiny of the topic, together with a report on the 
findings from empirical investigation undertaken in an Irish 
context as part of the overall research project.
The purpose of this Chapter is to:
Explain the background to the topic (1.2.);
State the objectives of the study (1.3.);
State the limitations of the study (1.4.);
Summarize the need for the research and to indicate 
the contribution which this study will make (1.5.);
Outline the methodologies used in the study (1.6.);
State the critical definitions used in the study (1.7.); and 
Outline of the remaining chapters of the study (1.8.).
1.2. THE BACKGROUND TO THE TOPIC
The choice of this topic is based on an interest in the current 
developments in Financial Accounting with particular reference 
to the disclosure of financial information to employees, and to 
the legitimacy of considering the Irish employee as a "user" of 
financial information of his employing enterprise.
Over the past two decades, the major developments in financial 
accounting practice in Ireland have emanated from two main 
sources, accounting standards and company law.
1.2.1. Accounting Standards
Accounting standards (SSAPs and FRSs) were developed in Ireland 
in response to severe and widespread criticism of accounting 
methods and to a belief, voiced in the UK by Bromwich (1985 p 
15), that Government would intervene if the profession did not 
act to standardise the accounting methods. The Accounting 
Standards Committee (ASC) was established in 1970. Its work 
was taken over in 1990 by the Accounting Standards Board (ASB).
Although Ireland participated fully, through CCAB, in the ASC 
structure, the Republic of Ireland does not officially adhere 
to the ASB structure. The Irish Government has appointed the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland (ICAI) a s  the 
official standard setting body for the Republic of Ireland. The 
ICAI has indicated that it will endeavour to adhere insofar a s  
possible to the standards issued by the ASB in promulgating 
standards for the Republic of Ireland.
The standard setting process set in motion by the ASC has been 
criticised for its emphasis on a "fire fighting" technique for 
dealing with accounting crises as they arise. Stamp and Marley 
(1972 p 17) have articulated a generally agreed weakness of the 
standard setting mechanism that standards are not founded on 
the objectives of accounting and that standards are not derived 
from underlying theoretical concepts of accounting.
The accounting standards are not, therefore, set in the context 
of an overall philosophy, or conceptual framework of 
accounting. The ASC made no statement of the objectives of 
financial accounting which would have, inter alia, included an 
an identification of the "users" of financial statements.
However, the ASB, in its second Bulletin, indicated its 
intention to consider basic principles of financial reporting. 
There was an emphasis in the Terms of Reference of the ASC on
the aim of narrowing areas of difference and variety in 
accounting practice by incorporating generally accepted best 
accounting practice into standards. Attempts were made by the 
ASC to issue its own Conceptual Framework of Accounting (for 
example the Macve Report (1981) and the Solomons Report (1989))
, but such attempts proved unsuccessful. At the date of 
writing, the ASB has issued exposure drafts of the first 
chapters of its conceptual framework, "The Objective of 
Financial Statements", "The Qualitative Characteristics of 
Financial Statements" and "Presentation of Financial 
Information" and has outlined its intentions in regard to other 
chapters.
The exposure draft on Objectives of Financial Statements 
identified the shareholder as a 'primary user' of financial 
statements and other users, including the employee, as 
secondary users. In its response to this document (1991, p2)
the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland disagreed 
with this award of primacy to the shareholder only, indicating 
its concern that :
"..primary users are defined too narrowly and (we) suggest 
the primary user category should include:
- investors, present and potential
- employees, present and potential."
On the other hand, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in
England and Wales (1992), in its response to the exposure 
draft (TR860), recommended placing more emphasis on the primacy 
given to the interests of shareholders over other users.
This different approach by the Irish representative body 
(described as 'association') leads one to consider the 
possibility that there may be a different or 'local' "paradigm" 
in the Republic of Ireland, as evidenced by the divergent 
views in the Republic of Ireland and the UK regarding the 
classification of the employee as "user" of financial 
statements. (The context in which "paradigm" is used for the 
purposes of this study is discussed in detail in Chapter 3.) 
The hypotheses to be considered in this study will centre on 
the variables which are uniquely Irish in the disclosure of 
financial information to employees. This study will 
hypothesize that the characteristics which are uniquely Irish 
explain the propensity of enterprises to disclose or not to 
disclose financial information to their employees. If this 
should prove to be the case, then in the future development of 
financial disclosure to Irish employees, attention should be 
directed more towards the uniquely Irish characteristics than 
towards any which may be imported from a foreign paradigm. 
These Irish characteristics are referred to in more detail in
1.3.2.
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In summary, the standard setting mechanism has been slow to 
identify the 'users' of financial statements. It is now 
proposed by the ASB that the employee should be regarded as a 
secondary user. This may not be appropriate in Ireland.
1.2.2. Company law
Recent developments in company law in Ireland have, in the 
main, come to us through European Community (EC) Directives. 
The Companies Act, which governs the contents of financial 
statements, remained unaltered from 1963 until the 1983, 1986 
and 1990 Companies (Amendment) Acts and the 1990 Companies Act 
were enacted.
In relation to the identification of the 'users' of financial 
statements, the 1963 Companies Act identifies the shareholder 
and the debenture holder as recipients of all annual financial 
accounts.
The 1983 Companies (Amendment) Act enacted the EC Second 
Directive and related (inter alia) to the calculation of 
distributable profit, and gave statutory standing to the 
application of generally accepted accounting principles, but 
made no reference to the recipients of financial accounts.
The 1986 Companies (Amendment) Act enacted the EC Fourth 
Directive and stipulated disclosure requirements and formats 
for accounting statements, but, again, made no reference to 
the recipients of financial accounts.
The 1990 Companies (Amendment) Act provided for the appointment 
of examiners and inspectors and tightened the provisions 
relating to directors and insider dealing. The 1990 Companies 
Act included provisions relating to the disclosure of 
directors' interests and introduced a statutory duty (S.52) 
requiring directors to have regard to the interests of their 
employees.
It is expected that, by the Summer of 1992, the Minister for 
Industry and Commerce will introduce a Ministerial Order
embodying the requirements of the EC Seventh Directive
regulating the preparation and publication of group accounts.
The legislation is expected to refer to the requirement (based
on the Seventh Directive) for the group accounts to give a true 
and fair view only to the shareholders of the parent company.
Thus, legislation refers to the requirements for the directors 
of limited liability companies to lay the Annual Financial 
Statements before the shareholders at Annual General Meeting. 
It also requires the filing of modified information with the
Registrar of Companies. Therefore, as yet there is no legal 
recognition of the employee as a recipient of the annual 
financial statements or, indeed, of any other financial 
information.
Thus, at the time of writing, neither our accounting standards 
nor our company law have addressed the issue of identifying the 
legitimate recipients of financial reports, other than to 
assume that the shareholder, debenture holder and (in limited 
cases) the Registrar are the only such legitimate recipients. A 
proposed change to our accounting standards (emanating from the 
UK) recognises the employee as a "user" of financial 
information, but only as a secondary user. The Irish 
position, in relation to the latter, is that the employee 
should be regarded as a primary user.
1.2.3. Possible Future Developments
In addition to the proposed changes to accounting standards 
referred to in 1.2.2. above, there have been other signs of 
change. Research reports commissioned by the ASC, including the 
Corporate Report (1975), the Macve Report (1981) and the 
Solomons Report (1989) on the Conceptual Framework of Financial 
Accounting, all addressed the issue of the users of financial 
reports. Nothing was actually done by the ASC to adopt any of 
these reports, although the ASC adopted the International
Accounting Standards Committee's (IASC) "Framework for the 
Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements" (1988), 
as the basis for its Conceptual Framework. The IASC document 
refers to the employee as a user of financial statements. 
Additionally, research reports such as McMonnies' (1988) and 
Arnold, Boyle, Carey, Cooper & Wild's (1991) advert to the 
employee as a user of financial reports. However, none of 
these studies explores the right of the employee to demand and- 
receive financial information.
Within the context of the Decision Usefulness approach 
(referred to in Chapter 2), one of the principal factors to be 
addressed, in the development of a conceptual framework upon 
which developments in practice may be hung, is the 
identification of the users to whom financial reports should be 
addressed, and for whose decisions financial reports should be 
useful. Other factors, such as the true and fair view, the 
information content of the report, the relevance of the 
information and the needs of users, are issues which may be 
addressed once the issue of identifying legitimate users of 
financial reports has been accepted.
The EC is taking active steps in this area. The employee has 
not explicitly been identified as a legitimate recipient of 
financial statements; but it may be inferred from the 5th and 
Vredeling Directives that the employee has been so identified.
The 5th and Vredeling Directives on Employee Participation and 
Disclosure of Financial Information to Employees, respectively, 
are currently subject to final agreement. They both suffered an 
initial set-back due to UK government opposition to their 
proposals; however, the European Commission approved, in 
December 1989, a programme of social and employment 
regulations (The Social Charter) which it will seek to 
implement during the four years to 1993. It is expected that 
the directives which will emerge from the Social Charter 
process will include directives based broadly on the 5th and 
Vredeling Directives. The Irish Government confirmed its 
acceptance of the Social Charter as part of the Maastricht 
Treaty of 1991, although the UK government declined to accept 
this chapter.
The "social dimension" of the EC's internal market, which the
Commission's programme aims to create, may provide one of the
distinctive flavours of the coming phase of the European
integration, and is strongly supported by the President of the 
Commission, Jaques Delors.
The development of Irish financial accounting is heavily 
reliant on developments in accounting standards and company 
law. Much of our recent legislation relating to financial
accounting has emanated, and will continue to emanate, from the 
European Community. The "Social Dimension" in the form of the
10.
Social Charter will have a major impact on our company law and 
accounting practice. Up to the present date the employee has 
not been considered as a justified recipient of financial 
information, either by accounting standards or by Irish company 
law. But the EC requirements will, if the Maastricht Treaty is 
adopted, require disclosure to employees within the next five 
years. Ireland's Financial Accounting practice is, therefore, 
at a cross road and the issue of disclosure of financial 
information to employees in Ireland warrants consideration at 
this juncture. It is a topic of current interest which has 
received little attention in the Irish literature and a topic 
on which research is desirable to contribute to the preparation 
of the accounting profession in advance of the legislative 
requirements which are on the horizon.
1.3. OBJECTIVES OF THIS STUDY
This study is concerned with examining the case of one of the 
groups of users of financial information, the employee group. 
The specific objectives of the study are as follows:
1.3.1. To examine the justification for viewing the employee 
as a legitimate user of financial information 
concerning his employing enterprise.
1.3.2. To identify the major local characteristics of the Irish 
paradigm of disclosure of financial information to 
employees insofar as it has developed to date.
1.3.3. To establish the current practice in major Irish 
enterprises regarding the disclosure of financial 
information to their employees.
1.3.4. To explain the pattern of disclosure and non-disclosure 
of financial information to employees by Irish 
enterprises, in terms of the local characteristics 
referred to in 1.3.2. above.
1.4. LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY
The objectives of this study are as stated in 1.3. There are 
inevitably a number of facets of disclosure of financial 
information to employees which will not be considered in 
isolating the objectives as stated. These facets have not been 
ignored because of their invalidity or because of their lack of 
importance, but simply to contain the study within manageable 
proportions of time and funding.
1.4.1. Important issues which are not being considered in this 
study are set out below:
1.4.1.1. No attempt is made to rank the disclosure by 
reference to the quality of the information disclosed or 
to the satisfaction of the employees' information needs. 
This study considers whether or not Irish enterprises 
disclose financial information to their employees and 
ranks disclosure by reference to the volume of 
disclosure. This writer feels that research which would 
rank by quality of disclosure and/or by satisfaction of 
employees' needs warrants a separate study.
1.4.1.2. The response of the employee to the information 
currently give to him by his employer has not been 
examined. Again, although this is a very important 
issue for the development of good practice in the field 
of disclosure to employees, it is regarded as outside 
the scope of this study.
1.4.1.3. Practice among smaller enterprises than those 
examined may be, and probably is, different from that 
determined for those enterprises examined. However, the 
study does not attempt to discover practice among all 
employing enterprises, but to discover the practice 
among those larger enterprises which often lead the 
field in innovative developments, and to whom the 
expected EC legislation is most likely to apply in the
first instance. At a later stage an examination of 
smaller enterprises would prove of interest, once best 
accounting practice has been established in the larger
enterprises, however at this juncture, the study is
limited to Republic of enterprises employing 500 or
more people (see 4.3.1. for discussion of the 500 cut­
off point).
1.4.1.4. This study examines the justification of 
disclosure to the individual employee, and the paradigm 
of disclosure to employees in the Republic of Ireland. 
The specific issue of the disclosure of financial 
information to the employee's representatives for 
industrial relations negotiations, identified by Amernic 
(1988) and Purdy (1991), is, therefore, outside the 
scope of this study, although it would be of interest 
for further research.
1.4.2. The attitude of the "financial accountant" has been 
hypothesized as significant (see 3.6.3.) in preference 
to the attitude of "management". The reasons for this 
are indicated in Chapter 3, but also include the 
following:
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1.4.2.1. The difficulty of determining a precise 
definition of "management". Some enterprises 
are managed by majority decision of the Board 
of Directors after lengthy consultations; 
others are managed by powerful Chief Executives 
with a largely non-executive Board of
Directors, with a range of variations between 
the two extremes. Assessing the attitude of
such an ephemeral person as "management",
would, therefore, be difficult and the results 
may very well be flawed.
1.4.2.2. The Financial Accountant must be regarded as 
the individual to whom "management" delegates 
the authority to deal with matters pertaining 
to the disclosure of financial information. He 
(with the auditor) is the professional expert 
whose loyalty to independently determined 
standards lends integrity to the enterprise's 
financial statements, and who would normally 
be regarded as "management's" advisor on 
developments in reporting practice.
1.4.2.3. It is of interest to draw conclusions for the 
education and training of the financial 
accountant, arising from the determination of
his attitude, rather than drawing conclusions 
for "management". This is so, from the 
perspective of the writer who is both an
15.
accountant and an educator, and from the 
perspective of the specific application of this 
research.
1.5. THE NEED FOR THIS RESEARCH AND THE CONTRIBUTION THIS STUDY 
WILL MAKE
As has already been discussed in 1.2., financial accounting has 
reached a major developmental stage in its evolution. There 
are renewed moves to establish a conceptual framework. The 
Accounting Standards Board is in the process of exposing its 
conceptual framework and the IASC has adopted its Conceptual 
Framework, which appears to form the basis for much of the 
ASB's conceptual framework. The Corporate Report opened the 
debate on the reporting of financial information to a wider 
range of users and the adoption of the 5th and Vredeling 
Directives and subsequently the Social Charter of the European 
Community herald the approach of statutory requirements to 
disclose financial information to employees.
The accounting literature suggests reasons why financial 
information should be disclosed to shareholders, (see Chapter 3 
for a discussion of this issue), and legislation supports such 
disclosure. Proposals for a conceptual framework of financial 
accounting suggest that the employee should also be regarded as 
a user of financial information, but without suggesting 
reasons. It is hoped that this study will contribute to the
development of disclosure of financial information to employees 
by examining the justification for this suggestion that 
financial information should be disclosed to employees.
If it can be established that there are valid reasons for 
disclosing financial information to employees, the process can 
be advanced one stage further by considering the extent to 
which an Irish paradigm of disclosure has already developed. As 
there is a possibility that EC legislation and/or UK standards 
may enforce a disclosure paradigm on Ireland which is 
appropriate for other European countries, but which may not be 
suitable for Ireland, it is hoped to contribute to the 
development of disclosure to employees in Ireland by 
identifying any substantive characteristics of the Irish 
paradigm which are unique to that paradigm, and which should be 
taken into account before importing a European paradigm.
Having identified characteristics of the Irish paradigm, it is 
hoped to contribute further to the advancement of disclosure by 
isolating those characteristics which explain the propensity of 
enterprises to disclose or not. Such an identification should 
facilitate an extension of disclosure by pointing to 
enhancement of those characteristics.
In summary at present, all that can be said with certainly in 
Ireland is that some enterprises disclose financial information 
to employees and others do not. It is suggested that it would 
be a useful contribution to the promotion and increase of 
disclosure in Ireland if an explanatory model could be derived,
to indicate the variables influencing some enterprises to 
disclose and to determine the significance of uniquely Irish 
variables.
The writer, in seeking an area worthy of research, is conscious 
of Tricker's (1978) warning:
" Proposed changes in the basis of accounting have become so 
profligate that the jocular tag "flavour of the month 
accounting" does not seem out of place."
and, cognisant of the importance of selecting an area which
will prove of enduring relevance, has chosen the field of
employee involvement through disclosure of financial
information because:
1.5.1. EC legal requirements and/or UK standard requirements 
for disclosure will probably be introduced within the 
next decade in Ireland. It is suggested that local 
characteristics of paradigms of disclosure in other 
countries are detectable. It is important for Ireland, 
that current Irish disclosure patterns should be 
examined to detect any Irish local characteristics. The 
identification of such characteristics, would prove 
useful in the enhancement of the Irish paradigm of
disclosure and by way of background knowledge for those 
who become responsible for disclosure to employees in
Ireland.
1.5.2. There is an external need arising from changes in 
management style in recent years and from increasing 
participation by employees, for accountancy to change 
patterns and procedures of financial disclosure. For 
example Handy (1985 pp 393 - 394) refers to the change 
in management practice from a practice of acquiring 
labour and ".. dumping it on an inefficient market place 
as soon as it is surplus to requirements", to the modern 
practice of regarding labour as a fixed asset which must 
have money and time invested in ".. building up the 
skills and commitment of the individuals even though the 
pay-off is long term." Also Kast and Rosenzweig (1984 
Chapter 3) cite the "New Look" leadership style 
advocated by McGregor and by Likert; which is a 
democratic and group oriented style providing general 
rather than close supervision and which is concerned 
with the management of human resources through 
participation. Additionally Daft (1986 pp 103 - 104) 
refers to the need for 'system effectiveness' 
measurement and the need to measure factors such as 
'survival', 'scarce resource utilization' and
confidence and trust between management and workforce.
1.5.3. It is suggested by writers such as Farnham and Pimlott 
(1985 pp. 50 -55) that Irish society is changing to a 
more single-class structure and delineations between the 
rights and life styles of different classes in 
particular in the workplace are less clear and, in many
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Having selected the reporting of financial information to 
employees in Ireland as a suitable topic for investigation, it 
was then necessary to determine the most suitable accounting 
theoretical framework for the research. An examination of the 
Dominant Approaches to Accounting Theory (Appendix A) indicates 
the possible alternative approaches.
An inductive approach to this work is attractive, since there 
is no existing evidence of current Irish practice or attitudes, 
and there are difficulties in evaluating practice, once 
determined, against an 'ideal' paradigm. While such a paradigm 
could, of course, be derived from current European or UK 
practice, previous research (Teoh and Thong, 1984) has 
clearly identified unique "local effects" in the general area 
of Corporate Social Responsibility Accounting (CSR). It would, 
therefore, seem inappropriate to use a foreign paradigm to test 
Irish patterns within an area generally considered within the 
CSR umbrella. Although the inductive approach fell into some 
disfavour subsequent to its application by the early pioneers 
(for example, Paton (1922), Hatfield (1927), and Paton and 
Littleton (1940)), and the normative-deductive approach came 
more to the fore; in the field of CSR, a number of researchers 
have found an inductive approach more appropriate; (for 
example, Medawar (1976), Ullman (1979), Heard and Bolce 
(1981) and Gray, Owen and Maunders (1987)).
A normative-deductive approach, which firstly states a 
paradigm against which the accounting practice can be measured, 
is more value-laden than the inductive approach, and would, of 
course, permit some evaluation of the practice as measured 
against the pre-determined paradigm. The inductive approach 
does not allow for this evaluation or for any statement of what 
is missing from current practice.
However, in the first instance, this writer feels that it is 
important to adopt a broadly inductive approach since there is 
no existing evidence of an appropriate Irish paradigm. Once 
actual practice has been established, it will be possible to 
engage in further research which can combine a normative 
approach. This issue will be explored in Chapter 3. It is 
within the decision usefulness approach that the issue of 
disclosure of financial information to employees will be 
examined. This matter is discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
In order to achieve the objectives of examining the Irish 
paradigm of disclosure and of identifying characteristics which 
are uniquely Irish and not universal, an examination of the 
literature was conducted to determine:
The historical development of the communication of
financial information to employees worldwide,
The proposal to harmonise practice in the European 
Community on the disclosure of financial
information to employees and
Legislation in the field of employee participation
and disclosure in Ireland.
The work involved in ascertaining current practice and 
attitudes among major Irish companies is conducted by means of 
a survey. The form of this survey is a mail questionnaire and 
the results are collated using Minitab and TSP (a software 
package produced by TSP International for regression analysis).
Using Minitab and TSP, the relationship between disclosure and 
a number of independent variables is examined. Multiple 
regression analysis and other techniques are used to construct 
a model of disclosure and non-disclosure of financial
information to employees in Irish enterprises.
1.7. DEFINITIONS OF "EMPLOYEES", "FINANCIAL INFORMATION", 
"DISCLOSURE" AND "LARGE UNDERTAKINGS" FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS 
STUDY.
1.7.1. Definition of
employees: All levels of permanent employees,
including part-time workers and those
on probationary contracts, but
excluding directors, tempfarary and 
contract workers.
Definition of
financial
information:
Definition of 
disclosure :
Definition of 
large
undertaking:
All forms of historical and predictive 
financial information, including
profit and loss accounts, balance 
sheets, funds and cash flow statements, 
added value information, budgets, 
variances, segmental information,
employment costs, absenteeism figures, 
health and safety expenditure, 
expansion plans, capital commitments 
and contraction plans.
Actively making known financial 
information by means of written, verbal 
or audio-visual media.
All enterprises in the Republic of 
Ireland with 500 or more employees 
(as defined in 1.7.1.)
1.8. AN OUTLINE OF THE REMAINING CHAPTERS OF THIS STUDY
1.8.1. Chapter 2 examines the justification for regarding 
the employee as a legitimate recipient of financial 
information concerning his employing enterprise. In the 
context of the Decision Usefulness approach, it is 
suggested that many of the reasons supporting the
shareholder as a justified recipient of information
apply equally to the employee.
1.8.2. By reference mainly to the literature and to statute, 
Chapter 3 examines the development of the Irish paradigm 
of disclosure of financial information to employees. The 
sense in which paradigm is used is explained. The
current proposals for EC legislation on disclosure of 
financial information to employees are also reviewed in 
the context of their impact on Ireland. The influences 
on the Irish paradigm are reviewed, and hypotheses are 
developed.
1.8.3. Chapter 4 gives a description of the process of 
collecting data for the empirical study; explains the 
methodologies used and gives the reasons for their 
choice.
1.8.4. Chapter 5 presents the data collected which describes 
the extent to which information is disclosed to 
employees and analyses the findings regarding the
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significance of characteristics of the Irish paradigm in 
relation to the propensity of enterprises to disclose or
not.
1.8.5. Chapter 6 describes the construction of a multi-variate 
model of the relationship between characteristics of the 
enterprise and disclosure. The model is used to test 
the hypotheses referred to in 1.8.2.
1.8.6. Chapter 7 suggests an interpretation of the results of 
the study which may be useful in progressing the 
field of disclosure of financial information to 
employees in Ireland.
1.9. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has given the background to the study. The 
objectives of the study and the limitations of the study have 
also been specified.
■ *
An overview of the need for this research and the contribution 
it is hoped that this study will make have been given, and the 
research methodologies to be employed in the study to achieve
the objectives have been outlined.
By way of introduction to the study, an overview of the 
following chapters has been tabulated. Critical definitions 
used in the study have been stipulated.
CHAPTER TWO
THE ASSUMPTION OF VALIDITY OF THE EMPLOYEE AS USER 
WITHIN THE DECISION USEFULNESS APPROACH
2.1. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, the assumption that the employee is a user of 
financial statements is examined. It is hoped to establish the 
justification for regarding the employee (qua employee) as a 
recipient of financial information, as a fundamental first 
step in conducting research into the issue of the disclosure of 
financial information to employees in Ireland. The case for 
disclosure is examined within a Decision Usefulness approach, 
by examining the elements of the decision making process 
entered into by the employee. During this examination, the 
parallels between the decision making process engaged in by the 
employee and the decision making process engaged in by the 
shareholder are highlighted. If it can be established that the 
decision making process of the employee has the same or 
comparable characteristics as that of the shareholder, then 
given the universal acceptance of the shareholder as a
justified recipient (the 'primary' user referred to by the 
ASB), it is felt that the case for disclosure to employees is 
greatly strengthened.
Of course, it could be argued that legislation should simply be 
introduced to require managers to regard particular users as 
justified recipients of financial information concerning the 
enterprise: that there is no need to justify a particular
group as a user group; simply instruct managers to disclose, 
and in an orderly law abiding society, managers will comply. It 
is unlikely, however, that such an approach would be helpful in 
encouraging confidence in the information disclosed. On the 
contrary, much energy and effort would probably be devoted to 
finding ways around disclosing full and fair information useful 
to users. Williams' (1984) study revealed that directors often 
adopt social responsibility reporting practices for reasons of 
altruism and an appeal to logic and the justice of the claim 
for information. He suggests that a more useful response to 
appeals for disclosure of information will result from appeals 
to altruism, justice and logic than from external statutory 
pressures.
2.2. THE DECISION USEFULNESS APPROACH
Dominant approaches to Accounting Theory have been
schematically represented (see Appendix A) as the Classical, 
Decision Usefulness and Information Economics approaches.
'Accountability' within the Information Economics approach is a 
possible framework for considering the justification of 
disclosing financial information to employees (see, for
example, Gray et al. (1987 pp 89-90)).
Additionally the 'Social Welfare' argument proposed by Laughlin 
and Puxty (1982 pp 62-68 and 1983) was considered. This 
argument is based on the dysfunctional results from the
application of the User criterion. Laughlin and Puxty suggest 
that decision usefulness is actually inimical to societal 
welfare. This suggestion is based on the failure of the 
proponents of decision usefulness to prove that basing 
disclosure on the needs of users improves social welfare, and 
not on their own proof of the converse. Laughlin and Puxty
suggest, although they do not offer any proof, that users 
should not be given information useful to their decision 
making, because they will only make decisions which will serve 
their own short term sectoral interests, and will not make 
decisions in the best interests of 'the organisation' and of 
'society' as a whole. This argument has been rejected in the
context of this study. While there may be some validity in the 
argument in the case of short term speculative investors, or 
indeed in the case of career path managers, there is no 
evidence to support the notion that employees, who are 
generally interested in long term job prospects (see Hussey & 
Marsh, 1983), will behave in a way that will damage the 
provider of their employment.
The Decision Usefulness approach was favoured for this study, 
since the assumption to be examined is that the nature of the 
decisions taken by the employee support his classification as 
a decision maker, and that the nature of those decisions may 
be parallelled with decisions made by the shareholder. 
Additionally, much of the literature favours the Decision 
Usefulness approach for shareholder disclosure (see, for 
example, Hofstedt (1972 pp 285-315), and Libby (1981 pp 
4-10)).
Belkaoui (1984 p 192) suggests that Decision Usefulness is the 
favoured approach for micro social accounting as all such 
accounting is concerned to some extent with decision making. 
Pope and Peel (1981) also support the Decision Usefulness 
approach to a consideration of disclosure of financial 
information to employees, as does Parker (1986 pp 67-93) whose 
view of accounting is as a communication medium (albeit flawed) 
responsive to the decision maker. Additionally, recent models
proposed for conceptual frameworks for the profession 
(including Solomons (1989) and the ASB (1991), which were 
adverted to in 1.2.3. and which are discussed further in 2.4.) 
have adopted the Decision Usefulness approach.
The Decision Usefulness approach has been depicted by the FASB 
(1980 p 2) as follows:
USER
B E N E F IT S  >  COSTS
RELEVANCE
R E L IA B IL IT Y
NEUTRALITY VERIFIABILITY REPRESENTATIONAL COMPARABILITY
FAITHFULNESS
TIMELINESS UNDERSTANDABILITY COMPLETENESS CONSISTENCY
F i g u r e  2.1.
Source: Financial Accounting Standards Board, SFAC2,
"Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Information" 
(Stamford, Conn: FASB, May 1980)
This chapter considers, within the Decision Usefulness 
approach to financial accounting indicated above:
a) whether there is validity in considering the employee as a 
decision maker. If the employee can be shown to be a decision 
maker, then there is justification in regarding the employee 
as a USER of accounting information, the first step in the 
model above, and
b) whether there is evidence in the literature that BENEFITS 
EXCEED COSTS in relation to the disclosure of financial 
information to employees, the second step in the model above.
The establishment of these two issues will provide a foundation 
from which the study can proceed, in Chapter 3, to examine the 
development of the disclosure of financial information to 
employees in Ireland.
It should be noted that the further issues referred to in the 
model, i.e. relevance, reliability etc., have been specifically 
excluded from the terms of this study in the stipulation of the 
objectives and limitations of the study (1.4.), and are of 
interest in the context of future research into the Irish 
paradigm.
2.3. THE NEED TO ESTABLISH THE EMPLOYEE AS A DECISION MAKER
One of the fundamental debates in the development of a 
framework within the Decision Usefulness approach is the issue 
of whether financial statements should be directed to specific 
users and their needs or to a wide variety of unspecified users 
with unspecified needs, referred to (see Appendix A) as 'The 
Decision Makers' approach and the 'Decision Models' approach 
respectively.
Varying views concerning the usefulness of information for 
decision making have been proposed. For example, writers such 
as Scott (1941) and Pattillo (1965 p 11) emphasised that 
decision usefulness derives from the application of equity, 
truth and fairness to all interested parties, without serving 
special interests. Sorter (1969) suggested that accounting 
data should be relevant for a wide range of decision models 
(The Decision Model approach), and that it is not, therefore 
necessary to consider who the user is or to cater for his 
specific needs (The Decision Maker approach); rather to provide 
a greatly expanded volume of accounting data in the financial 
reports and to allow each user to make his own predictions and 
decisions therefrom.
The Decision maker approach is the one on which this chapter is 
based, on the grounds that the Decision Model approach would 
result, in to-day's complex business environment, in the 
problem of information overload noted toy Revsine (1970), with 
the concomitant risk of decline, or even complete loss, of 
usefulness.
The Decision Maker approach identified by writers such as 
Hofstedt (1972) and Libby (1981) seeks to distinguish between 
the various individual decision makers and then to identify 
their needs. Hendricksen (1982 p 11) suggests that while such 
identification may lead to a single set of accounting 
principles, that it is not possible to so determine unless the 
individual decision maker and his needs are identified.
A somewhat similar example may be drawn from the medical 
profession, which has, as its fundamental conceptual framework, 
the principles of Hippocrates. Medical conduct is guided by 
the bedrock principles, described in Walton et al, (1986 p 56), 
as:
* responsibility to the individual patient
* the application of the best medical knowledge,
* independence from the patient,
* prohibition on inflicting any harm on a patient
* medicine as a prevention of illness as well as a cure and
* confidentiality of information elicited from a patient.
The spirit of these principles, although they date from 370 
B.C., transcends their archaisms and continues to inspire the 
ethics and medical standards of the modern profession. 
Questions of medical standards on issues identified by McGrew 
(1985 p+37) as including, for example, genetic engineering, 
the treatment of prisoners of war and abortion, must be tested 
for consistency with these fundamental concepts of medicine 
before they can be fine-tuned for points of detailed 
application. The first step in this medical conceptual 
framework was the identification of the individual "user" or 
decision maker. Hippocrates identified the individual patient, 
and he justified the choice of the individual patient rather 
than, for example, Society, the State or the general good, 
as the primary focus of the doctor's responsibility because of 
the need of the patient to take decisions about issues like 
changes in lifestyle, preventative medicine, agreement to 
surgery or other treatment etc. Therefore in developing the 
medical conceptual framework, the individual user (i.e. the 
patient) was identified and justified as a user because he was 
a decision maker. The patient was identified as the 'primary'
user which serves as an interesting (though by no means 
perfect) analogy in the examination of the employee and others 
as users of accounting information.
2.4. RECENT APPLICATION OF DECISION USEFULNESS IN CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK CONSTRUCTION
This approach of identifying the individual users of financial 
reports as decision makers, although not without its critics 
(see, for example, Puxty 1978), has been adopted by studies 
proposed in recent times for a conceptual framework of 
financial accounting, and by the Commission of Financial 
Reporting in Ireland (1992).
These studies on a financial accounting conceptual framework 
identify their writers' views on who the users of financial 
statements are (See Appendix B). Maeve (1981), however, goes 
further than simple identification. He suggests that the 
reason for the need to identify the users is as a first and 
fundamental step in the process of agreeing a conceptual 
framework. He proposes that the very first question to be 
asked in attempting to agree a conceptual framework is 'For 
whom are accounts to be prepared?'; and that issues such as 'By 
whom should accounts be prepared?', 'For what purposes are they
wanted', and 'What kind of accounting reports are suitable for 
these purposes' would follow from the answer to the first 
question.
Most's (1982 pp 1-31) suggestion is that a set of qualitative 
characteristics can be established by identifying users and by 
analysing their needs as decision makers. He suggests that 
from these qualitative characteristics various standards, such 
as methodological standards, evidence standards, measurement 
standards and disclosure standards can be developed, all 
leading to publication standards which satisfy the user needs 
identified originally.
Solomons (1989) takes the same route and identifies four
classes of users which he suggests are of prime importance when
considering what kind of information financial reports should 
provide. Solomon's proposal is of interest, as he does not 
simply list the users he proposes as decision makers, but he 
suggests that the users that he lists are 'primary' users. This 
notion of 'primary' and 'secondary' users is taken up again by 
the ASB proposal referred to below, and is, to some extent, 
reflected in the accountability approach by what is referred to 
as the 'primary level influences of organizational activity'
referred to by Gray et al. (1987 p 77).
The most recent proposal for a conceptual framework is 
currently in its draft stages. The ASB's (1991) draft 
'Statement of Principles on the Objective of Financial 
Statements and Qualitative Characteristics of Financial 
Information' also lists the users of financial statements and 
includes the employee as a user of financial statements.
However, the draft proposes that the shareholder should be 
awarded a primacy over the other users. The reason stated for
this award of primacy is attributed to the position of
investors as decision makers who have provided risk capital.
All the conceptual frameworks which have been proposed as
working frameworks by the professional accountancy bodies in 
the last twenty years, have listed the employee as a user of
financial statements (See Appendix B). However, none of the
proposals has examined rigorously the justification for the 
inclusion of the employee (or indeed, of the shareholder or of 
any other user) in the list of users of financial information.
The proposals for a conceptual framework have all adopted the 
approach of identifying individual users who are suggested as
justified users and recipients of published financial
statements. The most recent, and the one most likely to form 
the basis for the framework to be adopted by the Accounting 
profession in Ireland (i.e. that of the ASB) has suggested that
the shareholder be regarded as a primary user and the employee 
as a secondary user. As mentioned in Chapter 1, this award of 
primacy is not readily acceptable in Ireland.
2.5. THE NATURE OF THE DECISIONS MADE BY THE EMPLOYEE
An employee has to make decisions every day. He has to decide 
which overalls to wear, whether to park his car in the managing 
director's space, and whether to eat his sandwiches before 
or after answering a query. However, none of these decisions 
requires access to the company's financial statements for 
effective decision making. In order to justify the
classification of the employee as a user of financial 
information because he is a decision maker, he must make 
decisions which require him to use financial statements in 
order to increase decision effectiveness. This section 
considers the nature of critical decisions made by the employee 
which, it is contended, support his classification as a user 
within the context of the Decision Usefulness approach.
Additionally the section considers how each characteristic of 
the employee as decision maker compares with the same 
characteristic of the shareholder, who has been proposed as the 
decision maker by writers such as Montgomery (1979) who 
suggests that financial information should be provided to the
shareholder because of his need to make resource allocation 
decisions. Glautier and Underdown (1982 p 6) attribute the 
importance attached to financial disclosure to:
the need of a capitalist society to mobilize 
savings and direct them into profitable investments. 
Investors ... must be provided with reliable and 
sufficient information in order to be able to make 
efficient investment decisions."
Solomons (1989) and the ASB (1991) additionally award 'primacy' 
to the shareholder. In the sections which follow, the nature 
of the decisions taken by the employee are considered. There 
is no evidence in the literature of any previous consideration 
of this issue. However, previous research has suggested that 
employees are most interested in information about the future 
of the employing enterprise (Hussey and Marsh (1983 p 97)), and 
and that they are interested in the profitability and in the 
wages expense (Mitchell et al. 1981). Maunders (1984 pp 
10-11) suggested that the employee should be given information 
which would enable him to make predictions concerning future 
income from employment together with associated risks. Based 
on these issues, and on a consideration of comparable decisions 
taken by the shareholder, the following construct of the MAIN 
decisions taken by the employee as a decision maker within the 
Decision Usefulness approach was formulated:
* The employee as risk bearer (2.5.1)
* The employee as a recipient of income (2.5.2.)
* The employee as property owner (2.5.3.)
* The employee as stakeholder (2.5.4.)
Under each heading, the nature of the decision made by the 
employee is examined and the arguments for regarding the 
employee as a decision maker arising from decisions which he 
has to make are considered. The nature of those decisions is 
compared with the nature of comparable decisions made by the 
shareholder, and the issue of awarding primacy to the employee 
is also considered. The wider implications of the decision 
making role are examined in 2.5.4. which examines the employee 
as a stakeholder.
2.5.1. The employee as risk-bearer
This section examines the proposition that the employee, in 
entering employment with an enterprise, and in investing his 
"human capital" is a risk bearer. As a risk bearer the 
employee has decisions to make which warrant his classification 
as a user of financial information.
The shareholder invests his capital in a company and takes a 
risk in a two fold sense:
2.5.1.1 He must wait for his return on his investment until all 
the other contributors, i.e. employees, creditors, and 
lenders have received their return. His return is not 
guaranteed, therefore it is risky.
2.5.1.2 It may be that in the event of the other contributors 
not receiving the return due to them or of not 
receiving repayment of the 'capital' invested by them, 
recourse may be made to the capital invested by the 
shareholder. He may therefore lose the capital itself, 
extending the risk, adverted to in 2.5.1.1, to the 
capital.
The shareholder is a risk-taker who has no guaranteed cover for 
his risk-taking in a situation where other risk-takers have 
some form of guarantee for their investment. The debenture 
holder and lender are guaranteed their interest; and they may 
negotiate additional protection by securing the debt by a 
floating or fixed charge. The creditor is guaranteed payment 
before the shareholder and may also negotiate some form of 
protection such as the sale of goods subject to reservation of 
title, and may additionally charge interest for late payment of 
the liability. The employee is guaranteed his wages and has 
additional legal protection which classifies him as a 
preferential creditor in a winding up. Additionally he has the
protection of redundancy payment should his job terminate. 
Therefore, of all the risk takers, the shareholder, on the 
grounds that his risk is completely exposed while the other 
risk takers have some form of cover, has been regarded as the 
risk-bearer. This factor has entitled him, among other things, 
to financial information relating to the company for which he 
is bearing the risk. Traditionally, the employee has hardly 
been regarded as a risk-taker, and certainly not as a 
risk-bearer. The sole risk bearer has been deemed, by writers 
such as Stahl (1976 p.174)) to have been the shareholder.:
".... it is easy to assign to the owners of capital a 
special position. The risk they bear justifies their 
exercising the decisive influence over the running of 
the company by appointing the management..".
However, an examination of the situation of the employee 
indicates that he may very well be regarded as a risk taker. 
Just as the shareholder has financial capital tied up in the 
organisation, contingent upon its future performance, so the 
employee has human capital dependent for its realisation on the 
same source and subject to equivalent, if not greater risk. An 
employee has skills, training and labour in varying degrees 
that constitute his human capital and that permit him to earn 
income each year. This human capital provides a future cash 
flow to the employee just as any other form of tangible 
property which yields a monetary return has a present value to 
its owner. The employee has an investment decision to make
which is admittedly not a simple one. For example, an employee 
may have to decide between investing in his stock of human 
capital or in expending it, in the same way as a capitalist 
must decide whether to invest his financial capital or expend 
it. Then the human capital, in the same way as the financial 
capital may be invested in an enterprise to give the investor a 
future periodic flow of income. Human capital has many of the 
characteristics of financial capital. Holders of human capital 
are, more than ever before, entrepreneurs having to make 
investment decisions under uncertainty. The highest returns go 
to those investors who are best able to foresee changing 
circumstances and to adjust rapidly to them. In many cases, an 
employee has invested many years of his working life - a long 
term investment of his human capital - with one company and 
therefore has a substantial vested interest in the performance 
and future survival of the company. Risks taken by employees 
have been identified by Jonsson (1978) as:
1. The risk of damaging health whilst working
2. The risk of becoming unemployed due to a company's 
closure
3. The risk of being forced to move from a locality where 
there is a permanent shortage of job vacancies.
To this list may be added:
4. The risk of investing his life and talents in a skill 
that may become obsolete
5. The risk of having inadequate funds to finance his
future plans owing to a decline in the marketability
of his skill.
6. The risk of job dissatisfaction due to poor management 
policy
7. The risk of depreciation of his assets i.e. his skills
and talents due to abuse by his employer
The employees, in the current market position, therefore, 
can be regarded as risk takers. They are also similar to the 
shareholders in that there is no complete cover for the risks 
outlined above which they take. Even though redundancy or 
compensation payments may be paid in certain circumstances, 
it is difficult to imagine how money after the event can 
cover the risk taken by employees of possible damage to 
health, of family break-up, underutilised skills, loss of 
employment etc. Employees undoubtedly bear these risks and 
help to support risky enterprises with their investment of 
skills, enthusiasm and hard work. To the extent that they do 
not have any cover for the exposure of the "capital" they are 
investing, they are similar to shareholders and can be 
regarded as risk-bearers. It is possible to pursue the 
argument further and to say that not only are employees risk
bearers, like shareholders, but that they bear a greater risk 
than that borne by the shareholders. The shareholders, in 
exchange for the risk they bear, receive compensation in the 
form of residual profits and residual assets in the event of 
a liquidation. The risk taken by the employee can, like the 
risk taken by the shareholder, vary. The more specialised 
the operation of the company the employee works for, the 
greater the risk identified above. The shareholder would 
normally expect a premium attaching to a risk to which he 
exposes himself, in the form of a higher expectation of 
return. There is, however, no evidence of any such premium 
being available to employees. The apparent absence of such 
premium is explained by Jonsson (1975) by the facts that:
1. Companies are not legally responsible for certain risks 
(e.g. permanent unemployment owing to a company closing 
down or reducing its operations) and the consequences of 
the risk.
2. Employees often have little choice over the jobs they take 
and those with least choice may be obliged to take jobs 
with most risks.
3. Employees are not aware of risks especially health risks 
because they are not entitled to receive the necessary 
information.
4. Employees are irrational in their behaviour and do not take
long term health risks into account.
5. The employees are unable to exact the compensation either 
in advance or after the loss has been incurred.
Additionally employees are not in a position to spread this
risk in the same way as other risk takers can. It is possible 
for shareholders, lenders, and creditors to have a wide ranging 
portfolio mixing high and low risk investments. It is not 
normally possible for an employee to have more than one 
employment and so he is unable to spread his risk. This factor, 
quite clearly, exacerbates the degree of risk borne by the 
employee. In many instances, shareholders, taking a high risk 
investment, will understand that risk, and will not invest 
funds that they cannot afford to lose. Employees normally find 
themselves in the opposite position, that is, the employees 
taking the riskiest employments may be those who can least 
afford to lose their jobs.
The risk borne by shareholders and employees can be measured 
in financial terms as the loss of the capital investment and 
potential earnings for the shareholder and the loss of wages 
for the employee. However, the non-financial risk is more 
difficult to measure. Apart from some suicides in the early
part of this century arising from losses in shareholding there 
are few documented cases of mental trauma arising from losses 
by shareholders. The reports of the Black Monday crash of 
October 1987 do not refer to any evidence of damage to health 
arising from the crash. On the other hand, there is much 
evidence of damage to health, both physical and mental 
arising from employment or lack thereof, both to individuals 
and, indeed, to whole communities, as the Smith Report (1982) 
on Consett highlighted in the UK. Writers such as Routh (1986 
p 194) have likened the loss of one's job to a social evil on 
par with infant mortality, drug addiction, road accidents, 
illiteracy and crime. Haberson's (1986) study has produced 
evidence that unemployment is not only loss of monetary 
income, but loss of moral standing and deprivation of the 
psychological supports normally found in employment.
Therefore, for the reasons that firstly, the employee does 
not receive any compensating premium for at least some of the 
exposed risk he is taking and secondly, he cannot spread the 
risk he is taking, it would appear that not only is the 
employee a risk-bearer, but that he bears a greater risk 
than the shareholder.
It is suggested that the employee as risk-bearer has decisions 
to make around the risks he takes which warrant his 
classification as a user of financial statements.
Shareholders take risks in investing their financial capital. 
The ASB (1991) justified the shareholder as a primary user of 
financial statements arising from the risk inherent in his 
investment. It is, therefore, proposed that, arising from his 
role as risk-bearer, the employee is as entitled as the 
shareholder to be regarded as a primary user of financial 
statements.
2.5.2. Employee as a recipient of income
The second characteristic of the employee which should be
considered in examining the nature of the decisions he has to
make, is the employee as a recipient of income. The employee 
has to make decisions concerning the form, content and extent 
of his remuneration package.
Of course, the shareholder also has to make decisions 
concerning the income which he takes from the enterprise. As 
early as 1908 Smalenbach proposed that shareholders were 
entitled to information regarding the income which had been 
earned on their investment and related distributions, in 
addition to information regarding the state of their
investment. Edwards (1989 p 116) agreed that one of the
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primary purposes for giving financial reports to shareholders 
was to give them a basis on which to evaluate the total 
dividend.
Although it may appear that the distributions to the 
shareholder may be more discretionary than those to the 
employee, and more closely linked to profit, thereby 
supporting the idea that the shareholders are more entitled to 
receive financial information in order to make decisions 
concerning their income, this may not be the complete picture.
This writer would suggest that the employee, in his role as 
income-taker may be as entitled as the shareholder, in his role 
as income-taker, to receive financial information for three 
principal reasons:
2.5.2.1. The magnitude of the income taken by the employee 
will, in most instances, be a greater proportion of the 
enterprise's total income than that taken by the individual 
shareholder.
2.5.2.2. The employee's economic reliance on the income from 
the enterprise probably outweighs that of the shareholder, but 
at the very least, is almost certainly equal to it.
2.5.2.3. Research by writers such as Lintner (1953 pp 
218-249), and Fama (1970), and more recently, Aharony and 
Swary (1980) and Asquith (1983) indicates that the dividends 
paid to shareholders are not likely to be based on 'ability to 
pay' but on a desire for 'dividend smoothing' or 'dividend 
stability', whereas the income taken by employees is, in the 
current economic climate in Ireland, more likely to have been 
based on 'ability to pay' than ever before. This is supported 
by discussions which the writer has had with Trade Union 
research officers of SIPTU and ICTU. Therefore, it would seem 
that if the shareholder is entitled to financial information 
because he is in receipt of income, the level of which is 
dictated by the financial results, then the employee should 
also be justified in receiving financial information as he is 
in receipt of income which may be more closely related to the 
financial results.
For the above reasons, it would seem that employees, in their 
role as income-takers, are entitled to be regarded as users of 
financial information. Additionally it is suggested that they 
are, at least, as entitled as shareholders in their role as 
income-takers to receive financial information.
2.5.3. The employee as a property owner
The third characteristic of the employee which casts him in
the role of decision maker is that of property owner.
This section considers the employee as an investor of capital, 
i.e. his stock of human capital, in an enterprise. In the
same way as shareholders investing financial capital in the
enterprise are entitled to assess the manner in which their 
capital is being utilised and to make decisions concerning 
their capital, employees are entitled to make decisions 
concerning their capital. In an Irish context, there is the 
added dimension of the view of the capital invested as 
'property' which is capable of attracting the Constitutional 
protection of property rights. (Art. 40)
The term "property" has an extremely wide definition in law,
ranging from the ownership of land to things having a 
proprietary character, such as intellectual property, 
identified by Fitzgerald (1966), life, liberty and estate, 
identified by Locke (1920 p 251) to that now thankfully 
out-moded concept of a man's property right to "conjugal 
affection", identified by Hobbes (1651). Kocourek (1928 p 178) 
was even prepared to include "jural things of no direct 
economic value, like a man's reputation for social relations, 
corporal integrity, life, and family relations." Lord Shaw
(1916) thought that "a man's aptitudes, his skill, his 
dexterity, his manual or mental ability were all his own 
property." However for this purpose a definition more
susceptible to accounting measurement will provide a more
useful benchmark against which to compare the employee's 
property rights arising from his job with the property rights 
of a capitalist arising from his shares. The definition 
proposed for property is "an asset, tangible or intangible in 
which the owner has established ownership by contractual or 
other legal arrangement either with or without measurable 
consideration and from which the owner expects a future flow 
of revenue which may or may not be quantifiable in monetary 
terms". It is suggested that an employee has a 'property
right' to his job once he has established ownership.
Historically this view of the employee's property right to his
job has been considered, although sometimes with a slightly 
different perspective. For example, Lord Denning's widely 
quoted "right to work" refers rather to the social 
desirability (although perhaps practical impossibility) of the 
provision by society of a job of work to all members of 
society willing and able to undertake paid employment. Another 
example is the case of the rules of the Birmingham Friendly 
Society of Wire Weavers quoted in Webb & Webb (1919 p291), 
which stated "..that the trade by which we live is our 
property ... to be protected by all fair and legal means",
which was more a cry for unity amongst the workers against the 
actions of employers than a statement of property rights of 
individual workers to their particular job established by 
tenure and consideration.
In 1770 (p 123) Adam Smith wrote of "..the property which 
every man has in his own labour", stating that it was 
the original foundation of all other property," and thus, 
the most sacred and inviolable".
By the mid-nineteenth century, however, the fear of 
organised labour had become very clear, and a Royal Commission 
on Trade Unions was set up. In 1869 (p 17), in its final 
report, the notion of the protection of the employer was 
uppermost, and to the extent that there was any consideration 
of employee's rights, the report only considered the rights of 
individual employees who wished to stand alone against the 
Trade Union:
"It is more important that the law should protect the 
non-unionist workman in his right freely to dispose of 
his labour as he thinks fit, because, standing alone, 
he is the less able to protect himself." (pp 17-18)
Clearly what was behind this seeming concern for the rights of 
the employee was not that he should be protected from his 
employer, but that he be protected from the trade union. The 
Royal Commission report went on:
"It is important to ensure that no obstruction be placed
in the way of the employer resorting elsewhere in search
of a supply of labour."
In other words, it was quite clear that the EMPLOYER was the 
party in possession of the property (i.e. the job), and it was 
his property, not the employees, to do with as he pleased.
During the nineteenth century the legal relationship in which
an employee stood was that of party to a contract. However a
breach of a contract of service was a criminal offence. The
Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 1875 abolished nearly
all forms of criminal liability flowing from breach of
contract. What has been referred to by Webb & Webb (1919 p
291) as a "fundamental revolution in the law" meant that
thenceforward master and servant became, as employer and
employee, two equal parties in a civil contract. This was the
theory of the new law, although it has been suggested by
Heppple (1979 p 340) that "the legal duties imposed on the
employee are more onerous than those of the employer at common
law," and Sir Otto Kahn-Freund (1984 p 164) described the
individual relationship as:
" .. an act of submission, in its operation it is a 
condition of subordination however much the submission 
and the subordination may be concealed by that 
indispensable figment of the legal mind known as the 
"contract of employment" .. which is a command under the 
guise of an agreement".
However, the effect of the replacement of "real property
ownership" by "contract" as the primary source of legal rights 
began to be seen on cases effecting employment. Bramwell B. in 
R. v. Druitt (1867) in his address to the jury said;
"No right of property or capital .. was so sacred or so 
carefully guarded by the law of this land as that of 
personal liberty.. but that liberty was not liberty of 
the body only. It was a liberty of the mind and will; 
and the liberty of a man's mind and will, to say how he 
should bestow himself and his means, his talents, and 
his industry, was as much a subject of the law's 
protection as was that of his body."
A very early mention of the property right of employees to 
their jobs was seen in 1899 in the case of Allen v. Flood. The 
argument was put that the workers had "..an interest in their 
occupations like the property in land or personalty." This 
argument was accepted by Grantham J. when called upon to give 
an opinion in the House of Lords:
"This right to work as he likes is as much a personal 
right of the individual as is his right not to be 
molested in his person or his property".
There was not complete unanimity, however, on the issue, and
Mathew J. disagreed:
"I am not aware of any authority for the proposition 
that the law recognises a man's interest in his trade, 
profession or business as analogous to property in land 
or to a right created by contract."
More recent evidence of a slight shift towards the view of 
employee having a property right to the job, was seen in the 
1940 case of Noakes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd., 
heard by the House of Lords. It was decided that an employer's 
contractural right to the services of his workers did not form 
part of his property for the purposes of the Companies Act 
1929.
Lord Denning has repeatedly stated since the 1952 case of 
Abbott v. Sullivan that "the right of a man to work is just as 
important to him, if not more important, as his rights of 
property." He indicated in the 1969 case of Lloyd v. Brassey 
that ".. a worker of long standing is now recognised as having 
an accrued right in his job; and his right gains in value with 
the years."
In 1964 (p 3) Meyers sought to identify "the right to continue 
in employment at the will of the employee." More specifically 
Meyers thought that there existed a "consistent direction of 
social change" giving workmen " a control resembling that of a 
property owner over his property."
In Ireland the doctrine of 'voluntaryism' or non-intervention 
by the State in the field of employment law, which had 
characterized the scene since the Conciliation Act 1896, began
to suffer encroachment with the introduction of several pieces 
of legislation in the early 1970s which were designed to 
protect the position of an employee within his employment. The 
application of this legislation has led to what is effectively 
a "property right" to a job, once it has been established as a 
job. These pieces of legislation lay duties (usually designed 
to protect the employee) on the parties, which cannot validly 
be set aside by agreement. This was anticipated by Dicey (1926 
p 284), who concluded that the "rights of workmen would become 
a matter not of contract but of status." Since the provisions 
relating to unfair dismissal, all employees within their scope 
have obtained legal rights designed to protect their job 
security, and the new significance of "status" as a legal 
concept is that it confers an automatic right to reinstatement 
in the event of a dismissal not justified by law. Also it 
confers rights on employees to what is effectively a 
compensation payment similar to other capital compensation 
payments for depriving property owners of their rights to their 
capital assets.
Legislation, now on the statute books, which includes unfair 
dismissals legislation, redundancy legislation and equality 
legislation, endows employees with rights which are not 
enshrined in the employment contract. For example, the right 
not to be unfairly dismissed exists under statute, separate 
from contractural rights. There are therefore, on one hand,
rights enshrined in the employment contract enforced in civil 
actions in the ordinary courts and, on the other, a separate 
minimum "floor of rights" for individual workers enforced by 
civil claims in the industrial tribunals. This statutory "floor 
of rights" recognises many conceptual rights such as the right 
not to be unfairly dismissed, the right not to be sexually 
harassed, the right to retain one's job even though one is sick 
or having a baby, the right to strike, to equal pay etc.
These Acts include the Unfair Dismissals Act of 1977 which 
included provisions protecting the right of an employee to 
retain his job once it has been established as his job, usually 
by tenure of more than twelve months. In other words, where it 
had been previously assumed that an employer offering a job was 
the "owner" of that job and could withdraw the job from an 
existing holder at will and fill it with another person, the 
"ownership" of the job has shifted from the employer to the 
holder. It is now difficult to detach an employee from his 
job, once he has established it as his job by holding the 
position for the period stipulated by the Act. Of course, the 
ownership of property confers certain rights. For this purpose 
it may be said that ownership is not a single category of legal 
'right' but is a complex "bundle of rights". These property 
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pp 324-326) as "property for power" and "property for use." If 
an employee has this "property right" to his job, then it is
probable that what he has is a "property for power" right 
rather than a "property for use" right. It is inconceivable 
that an employee could dispose of and use his "property," i.e. 
his job, in any manner he thinks fit, but it is more 
appropriate to regard his property right as a "property for 
power" right, which entitles him to certain benefits and 
responsibilities deriving from the property and also (inter 
alia) to relevant information relating to the property.
When the Redundancy Act was introduced into Britain, in 1965, 
there was by then, a developed belief that an employee, 
deprived of his "property" (that is, his job) through no fault 
of his own, was entitled to a compensation payment for this 
deprival of property, in a similar manner to the compensation 
payment for the compulsory acquisition of property. The Times 
of London (1965) editorialized:
"A man has some rights in his job just as an employer 
holds rights in his property, and his rights gain value 
with the years".
This development was cemented by the introduction of the Unfair 
Dismissals Act 1977. Redmond (1980 p 89) has said of this 
legislation :
".. it is the greatest signpost to date on the road to 
recognition of proprietas on property rights in 
employment."
An explicit statement came from the President of the Industrial
Tribunals in Britain in the case of Wynes v. Southrepps Hall 
Broiler Farm (1968):
"Just as a property owner has a right to his property 
and when he is deprived he is entitled to compensation, 
so a long-term employee is considered to have a right 
analogous to a right of property in his job."
It follows that the enterprise, co-managing the "property" with 
the employee is responsible to the employee for actions which 
may impinge on his "property". Although not explicit in the 
statute, it is implicit in the Constitution that a citizen is 
entitled to information concerning his property. Article 40 
s.3. states that the State will "..protect as best it may .. 
the property rights of every citizen." It can be argued that 
since the State protects the property rights of a citizen 
owning shares in an enterprise by insisting that the enterprise 
gives information to the shareholder, then presumably there is 
also a Constitutional right for an employee holding a property 
right to his job in an enterprise to receive equivalent 
information since his property right is analogous to the 
property right of the shareholder. This constitutional 
position was most clearly stated by Costello J. in Caffola v. 
O'Malley (1985), when he said :
"Generally speaking, the right to earn a livlihood can 
properly be regarded as an unspecified personal right 
first protected by Art.40.3.1. But this right also 
exists as one of a bundle of rights arising from the
ownership of private property capable of being 
commercially used, and so receive the protection of 
Art.40.3.2."
This constitutional protection of the property right of the 
employee to his means of earning his livlihood was cited and 
accepted even in cases where statute specifically allowed the 
removal of a holder of an office "at any time" as in the case of 
Garvey v. Ireland (1981), and where the dismissal of an employee 
would have adversely affected his future employment prospects 
and his reputation as in the case of The State (Gleeson) v. 
Minister for Defence (1976).
The European Commission's Green Paper (1975) clearly summarized 
the situation:
" Employees are increasingly seen to have interests in 
the functioning of enterprises which can be as 
substantial as those of shareholders, and sometimes more 
so. "
The position of Ireland as a member of the EC will be 
considered in Chapter 3.
Hoxley (1930), referred to the right of the shareholder to 
financial information which would assist him in appraising the 
value of his investment. In the UK, the Gladstone Committee
(1844) proposed the disclosure of the balance sheet to 
shareholders to allow them to assess the 'real state of the 
concern'.
In Ireland, the Constitution (Bunreacht na hEireann) affords, 
in Art. 40 s.3. an assurance that the State will "... protect 
as best it may .. the property rights of every citizen." This 
right, which has no direct equivalent in the UK, has been 
applied to the right of a shareholder with shares in a limited 
company in a number of ways, including, for example, the right 
to dispose of his shares in any legal manner he thinks fit, and 
to require that his statutory entitlement to financial 
information arising from the holding of "property", i.e . his 
share capital, be made available to him. Arising from this 
Constitutional right, case law has prohibited the Revenue 
Commissioners from applying the doctrine of Ramsay v. Rawlings 
in Ireland, (in Re: Patrick McGrath v J.E. McDermot, 1988), 
and has forced a company to produce statutory accounts for a 
shareholder, where a company had simply not produced accounts 
and continued to pay the fine imposed under the Companies Act 
(Musgrave v. McGrath Ltd. 1979).
The shareholder is an investor of capital in which he has a 
property right. The employee is also an investor of capital in 
which it has been established that he has a property right.
Both groups are entitled to be regarded as users arising from 
the decisions which have to be made surrounding their 
respective properties.
In summary, it is suggested that the employee is entitled to 
receive financial information arising from the decisions which 
he must make concerning the investment of his property, i.e. 
his human capital in the enterprise. The decision making in 
which the employee engages in his role as property owner is 
similar to the decision making in which the shareholder engages 
in his role as property owner.
2.5.4. The employee as a stakeholder
As a risk-bearer, a recipient of income and a property holder, 
the employee undoubtedly has a 'stake' in the enterprise. The 
"stakeholder" concept is derived from a perspective of the 
corporation as an entity controlled by the managers who serve 
jointly the shareholders, creditors, employees, customers and 
others with whom they have contractural arrangements. (This 
concept is, of course, insufficiently broad for some critics 
who view the enterprise as responsible to all of society. 
However, such a broad view, although it may have validity, is 
outside the terms of this dissertation).
At the time when accounting, as we now recognise it, was 
developing, social structures in the capitalist society of the 
time ascribed primary decision making status to the shareholder 
and secondary status to the creditors. Financial accounts were 
designed to give a 'true and fair view' to the shareholder. 
Sullivan (1987) has suggested that the reason why the law 
required financial statements to be given to shareholders and 
to no other group was because of the social structures in place 
at the turn of the century in Ireland. He contends that the 
shareholders were the capitalists in what was then a mainly 
capitalist society, and that their role as capitalists gave 
them the power which permitted them to influence the flow of 
information towards them. Under the shareholder concept, the 
shareholder was the person with the power to make decisions, 
and therefore the person to whom financial information was 
disclosed. Employees were not regarded as decision makers.
Concurrent with the development of the modern financial 
statements there existed what Sismondi (1903 p211) described as 
two distinct social classes, the rich and the poor, the 
capitalists and the workers, whose interests were in constant 
conflict with one another. Parker, Ferris & Otley (pp 132- 
134) refer to the early 1900s view of 'scientific management' 
where employees were regarded as controllable in similar
fashion to machines. It is hardly surprising that the
disclosure of information, in such an environment, should be
to the powerful capitalist and not to the worker.
Accountants who do not disclose information sometimes quote the 
lack of legal requirement as their justification for not doing 
so. (See analysis of empirical findings in Chapter 5). 
Presumably they would regard a legal requirement as their main 
justification for disclosure. This view, however, displays a 
failure to perceive that the law alone does not, and should not 
lead Society's view on any matter. The law responds to 
societal concerns, but Society must express its concern in the 
first instance, viz. O'Higgins (1987) suggested:
"Law is one of the principal methods whereby society 
gives effect to social policy."
Roshier and Teff (1980 p 122) lend support to this view:
the formulation and operation of law is much more a 
result of social economic and political conditions than 
it is a cause of them".
There is in the socio-legal literature, considerable debate on
the precise influence of particular social structures on the 
manner in which social consensus is reflected in the law, but 
there is little disagreement with the fundamental view that law
emerges and changes in response to societal demand and not the 
other way around. (See, for example, Pound (1954) and Dworkin 
(1965)).
It is suggested here that social evolution is underway in the 
area of Society's perception of the employee in the workplace.
It has been suggested that the right of shareholders to receive 
information about the enterprise in which they have invested 
sprang from their position as providers of capital within a 
capitalist economy. At a time when many shareholders, because 
of the development of large enterprises, could not directly 
control the professional managers, there arose a concern among 
society's decision makers, i.e. the capitalists, about the
protection of shareholders and their right to information to 
enable them to make decisions. The law responded to the 
societal concern of the time by legislating for rights to 
information.
There are now many "capitalists" who sell their labour, and 
many "workers" who derive income from the holding of assets, be 
it the holding of a bank or building society account, the 
ownership of a house or the holding of equity, either directly 
or through a pension fund. Society is evolving. Management 
styles have changed and are still changing. The philosophy of 
the employee as a member of a collaborative team rather than as
a servant is emerging. In this regard the culture of Japanese 
organizations and the philosophy and practices of Japanese 
managers with a high degree of participative management have 
received considerable attention. (For example, Ouchi (1981 p 
143) suggests that US corporations need to adopt a new 
participative approach to management.) As Bullock (1977) 
pointed out in his report to the Department of Trade in the UK, 
the significance of educational developments is not just that 
more people have received a basic education, but that the 
nature of education has changed. There is now less 
concentration on formal authoritarian teaching methods and more 
encouragement to children to adopt independent and questioning 
approaches to develop individual initiative and ability. The 
effect of these post-war social changes has been an increasing 
desire among employees to control their working environment and 
to have a say in decisions which affect their working lives.
The concept of the right to a day's wage for a day's work and 
nothing more emanates from the "servant" view of the employee. 
If it is accepted that the societal view of the employee is 
moving away from the view of "servant" towards the view of the 
employee as a "member of the enterprise" or "stakeholder" or 
"contributor" (as described above) then the implicit legal 
rights of the employee move away from the right to only a fair 
day's wage for a fair day's work. The proposition here, it 
must be stressed, is not that Society has CHANGED, but that
Society is CHANGING: as Pound (1954) described it, "a stage
in social evolution". We are currently in a transitional 
period and our views of the rights of the employees are also 
changing.
It is within this context of evolution that this study tries to 
examine the future when the employee will come to be regarded 
much more widely as a "stakeholder" than as a "servant". One 
of the consequences of this shift is that the employee makes 
decisions not just as an income taker, but also as a 
stakeholder. Maunders (1984 pp 23 - 24) summarises the
literature on the decision making engaged in by the employee as 
a stakeholder as including decisions relating to health and 
safety risks associated with employment, the arrangements for 
participation in decision making and the motivational devices 
in which he is asked to participate.
2.5.5. Summary
Section 2.5. considered the validity of regarding the employee 
as a decision maker and therefore as a user of financial 
statements of his employing enterprise arising from the nature 
of the decisions which he has to make. It also tested the 
justifications for regarding the employee as a decision maker 
in this context against the justifications which are implied 
for regarding the shareholder as a decision maker in the
context of users of financial statements. This writer suggests 
that, because of the nature of the decisions made by the 
employee, there is validity in assuming that he is a decision 
maker and therefore a user of financial information. 
Additionally it is suggested that, given the parallels 
established between the decisions taken by the employee and 
those taken by the shareholder, the case for awarding 'primacy' 
to the shareholder over the employee is very weak.
2.6. A CONSIDERATION OF 'BENEFIT > COST' OF DISCLOSURE
2.6.1. Difficulties in determining 'cost' and 'benefit'
Within the Decision Usefulness approach referred to in 2.2. 
above, the next step, having considered the Users, is to 
examine the cost and the benefit of the proposed disclosure. 
Some research has been done on the cost benefit analysis of 
disclosure to employees. Puxty (1978) considered the 
constraints on Decision Usefulness, but in relation to 
employee decision makers, Pope and Peel (1981) suggest that 
the only constraint on information should be the processing 
costs. They contend that management often over-estimates the 
costs of greater information disclosure to employees and 
under-estimates the benefits.
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It is difficult to measure both the 'benefit' to be derived 
from the disclosure of financial information to employees and 
the 'cost' of such disclosure. Additional difficulties arise 
from the fact that there are a number of potential
beneficiaries and cost bearers associated with the disclosure
whose interests may either overlap or conflict. What may be 
beneficial for the employees may not prove beneficial for the 
shareholders, and what may be beneficial for one group of 
employees may not prove so for another group. The benefit or
cost may not be exclusive. What may be a benefit for the 
employees may have the same benefit for other stakeholders.
2.6.2. Benefits arising from the disclosure of information
Benefit streams arising from the disclosure of financial 
information to employees flowing to different beneficiaries may 
overlap. For example, if disclosure improves communication 
between employees and management, both employees and management 
probably benefit. However, it is useful to consider the 
classifications identified by Parker (1976). He identified
benefits under the headings 'benefits accruing to the 
organization', benefits accruing to management' and 'benefits 
accruing to the employees'.
2.6.2.1. Benefits accruing to the organization
The financial benefit arising from the disclosure of financial 
information has been proposed by writers such as Craig and 
Hussey (1982) who refer to the business planning benefit where 
improved organizational performance can be achieved by 
providing employees with feedback on their performance. They 
also refer to the achievement of a 'progressive image' in the 
eyes of the employees and others which may result from 
disclosure to employees. The Institute of Directors advocated 
disclosure, relying on the Bolton Dickenson Report (1985) as a 
justification for such disclosure. This survey, found that of 
companies which had introduced employee communication schemes, 
66% reported improved morale and loyalty, 62% increased 
productivity, 55% fewer industrial disputes, 49% better 
customer relations and 41.5% reduced employee turnover. These 
results were achieved in companies ranging in size from 4 
72,000 employees.
Leavitt and Meuller (1977) report an improvement in company 
performance as the quantity of feedback to employees increased. 
They also observed high hostility and low confidence when no 
feedback existed. Herzberg (1968) reported a positive 
motivational response when periodic reports were made directly 
available to workers.
Companies in the UK like John Lewis, and Levi Strauss in the 
US, state in their corporate manifestoes that their employees 
are their central, though by no means, their only concern. 
Other organisations cite the development of their human 
potential as a prime objective, although not one that 
supersedes a series of others. Such organisations are reported 
by Lessem (1977) as having been judged as "successful".
Research done by Turner et al. (1977) supports the belief that 
the provision of information to employees as part of an 
"employee communications" policy favours industrial peace.
The conclusion that one is to draw from these reports and 
others like them is that communication to employees is
beneficial, and therefore justified by that very benefit. There 
has been no attempt, however, to measure the benefit in 
financial terms. This, of course, would not be an easy 
exercise in the absence of agreement as to the meaning of 
benefit. In this context benefit is measured as the benefits 
to the organisation, i.e. the increased loyalty to the 
organisation, reduction in absenteeism and staff turnover rates 
and higher productivity. These factors benefit the organization 
of course, but they must also prove beneficial to all the 
stakeholders and to management, as increased profit and higher
productivity will also permeate as gains to all stakeholders in
the form of increased purchasing, increased market share,
greater stability for lending, greater job satisfaction, 
higher productivity bonuses, higher organisation-wide morale 
and better long run job security.
Parker (1976) identified other benefits to the organization 
from disclosure to employees as including the extension of the 
total organizational communication system (and its overall 
effectiveness), the reaching of organizational personnel 
directly (rather than only via press reports), the correction 
of rumours and inaccuracies circulating, and the establishment 
of a potential channel for two-way communication that 
stimulates further exchanges of views between management and 
employees.
2.6.2.2. Benefits to management
On closer inspection, however, this argument that everyone 
benefits gives rise to the question of whether some may benefit 
more than others. Whilst disclosure of financial information 
to employees may be beneficial, the fruits of the benefit may 
be seen as available to management, who alone are in a position 
to cream off any increased profits arising in the form of 
increased perquisites and benefits to themselves. The 
suggestion is that disclosure of financial information to 
employees, arises, not from any feelings of natural justice or 
progressive social corporate thinking but simply as a
management strategy to influence the employees and their 
representatives. Labour is viewed as a potentially malleable 
commodity in terms of how it may be used, but also a commodity 
ultimately controlled by an independent and often hostile will. 
Therefore, management (according to writers such as Rose 
(1975), Freidman (1977) and Storey (1983)) is continually 
engaged in devising and developing a variety of strategies for 
obtaining co-operation and securing compliance from workers for 
managerial objectives, of which, disclosure of selected 
information is one.
Strategies of consent such as scientific management, human 
relations, industrial welfare, job enrichment and work 
humanisation programmes, staff status and participation in 
decision making via worker directors; far from representing a 
radical reconstruction of the social relations of production, 
may all be viewed, as indicated by Fox (1974 p 77), as 
essentially "policies of expediency designed to render labour a 
more efficient, co-operative and committed production 
resource". From this perspective the disclosure of information 
by management to employees may be regarded as management 
strategy which benefits management.
A further benefit to management has been identified by Maunders
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(1984 p 179) as the improvement to the management information 
system which would result from the collating and reporting of 
previously unreported information to employees.
Parker (1976) suggests that the benefits to management of 
disclosure to employees include the projection of a positive 
self-image, reducing employee resistance to organizational 
change, responding to union pressure or anticipating and 
shaping the agenda for future regulatory changes in the area.
2.6.2.3. Benefits to employees
Perhaps the most relevant group in this examination of 
benefits, is the employees themselves.
If the suggestion adverted to in 2.6.2.2. is valid, and 
employee communications are regarded as a means of "softening 
up" a hostile workforce, then such disclosure can hardly be 
regarded as a benefit to employees.
Research in the UK (Lyall 1982) has shown that the motivations 
of management for disclosure are to improve productivity, to 
improve communications with employees and to "get the message 
across" to the workers. The results of research for this 
dissertation indicate that Irish managers disclose for 
different reasons. This will be referred to in Chapter Five.
However, perhaps some caution should be exercised with these 
results, as these motivations are those STATED by management as 
their reasons for disclosure, and no tests have been carried 
out to determine if these are the actual motivations of 
management for disclosure.
Perhaps, however the motivation of the managers who install a 
communications system is not relevant to an assessment of the 
"benefit" of the system. Although Ogden and Bougen (1985) may 
view disclosure as a sinister plot by management against the 
employees, a more moderate view must be that if the rate of 
absenteeism has gone down and the staff turnover rate has gone 
down and if the relations with management have become more 
friendly and if productivity has increased, and this has 
occurred coterminously with an improvement in communications 
between the employees and management, then while there may be 
other causal variables, it is probable that the benefits have 
resulted from the improvement in communications, and that the 
benefits are clearly perceived as such by the employees. It is 
almost immaterial that management's motivation was to make the 
work force sympathetic to management's viewpoint, provided the 
result is in the employees' interests,
Cushing (1977) has suggested a framework for evaluating the 
desirability of any change in disclosure practice. This
involves calculating the increment in expected utility (Di) as 
a result of the new disclosure for each employee (i) receiving 
the information.
In order for the disclosure to be regarded as beneficial, it is 
necessary (although not sufficient) that the expected utility 
differential for each employee be non-negative (i.e. Di>0 for 
all i).
The differential is decomposed by Cushing into three elements: 
[Gi + Ai - Ci]
Gi: the private gain i could expect to get as a result of the 
new information, in the absence of its public disclosure, 
excluding any information costs,
Ai: the additional gain or loss to i, over and above Gi,
assuming it is publically disclosed, excluding any 
information costs, and 
Ci: i's portion of the incremental costs of producing,
transmitting and using the information.
If information, previously not disclosed to employees, is now 
disclosed, then, theoretically, it may be said that Gi must be 
non-negative. This is supported by the application of 
Blackwell's fineness theorem, since the new information set is
"finer" than the old (see Demski 1973). However the magnitude 
of the incremental gain, from an information economics point 
of view, depends on the incremental effect of the new 
information on user decisions. This depends on both the 
content and timing of the 'new' information and the nature of 
the 'old' information, if any.
Ai may be either positive or negative, and indeed it may have 
some elements which are positive and some which are negative. 
Demski (1974) has suggested that it is theoretically possible 
for the negative elements to completely cancel any positive 
benefits. For example, if an employee report or an employment 
report were made generally available, and not just distributed 
to employees, it is possible that such disclosure could lead to 
reallocation of resources within the economy which would lead 
to gains and losses to the employees. However, although the 
theoretical possibility of the losses exceeding the gains has 
been pointed out by Cushing (1977), there is no empirical 
evidence that this is, in fact, the case. Such evidence as 
there is has been summarized by Maunders (1984 pp 177-180) as 
indicating that supplying employment information generally 
through the annual report is not a cost effective function of 
those reports, but that the supply of such information 
separately, even if it is also made available to shareholders, 
is cost efficient.
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In common with Gi, the magnitude and direction of Ai is 
relevant. Maunders (1984) indicates that no general 
assumptions can be drawn, due to the variable factors which 
include:
the tastes and beliefs of the individual employees,
the varying expertise of individual users (and even as 
between employees with equivalent expertise, the extent to 
which they have access to expert advice),
- the information overload thresholds of individual users and
- the manner in which the information is presented.
However, although the magnitude of the benefits of disclosure 
is not capable of measurement, it is possible to observe that 
there are benefits for the employees from such disclosure.
The manifestation of these benefits has been summarised by 
Parker (1976) as including the broadening of employee 
perspectives beyond their own immediate workplace, the 
demystification of financial information and results, an 
understanding of the role and importance of shareholders, cash 
flow and profits and the improvement of communication and
confidence between management and employees. Craig and Hussey 
(1982) refer to the improvement in human relations and in the 
sense of common purpose among employees.
2.6.3. Cost of disclosure to employees
As with the benefit factor, the measurement of cost of 
disclosure of financial information may be difficult. Costs may 
be financial and non-financial in nature. It is not always 
clear who bears the costs of disclosure.
2.6.3.1. Costs to the employee
The costs (Ci) referred to in 2.6.2.3. have been described by 
Maunders (1984) as direct costs which are those costs to the 
employee of processing and assimilating the information for 
predictive or evaluative purposes for his decision making.
Another cost which could apply equally to other stakeholders, 
and even to management, is the cost of information overload 
(Revsine 1973 pp 15-18), where the information disclosed to 
employees is added to the already extensive information 
available in the annual report.
2.6.3.2. Costs to the organization and to management
A factor which has been identified as a cost by Prakash and 
Rappaport (1977), but could, in some circumstances be regarded 
as a benefit, is the "information inductance" factor. This is 
the impact of reported information on the behaviour of the 
reporter. It can be occasioned by a change in organizational 
practices as a result of having to report on certain aspects of 
the operations. Maunders (1984 p 180) cites the 1982 
Employment Act as an example of this.
Pope and Peel (1981) adverted to the possible cost arising from 
the disclosure of confidential information by the employees to 
third parties. (See Chapter 5 for a consideration of this issue 
in an Irish context).
There is no evidence in the literature of any such breaches of
confidentiality in enterprises where information is disclosed
to employees. The Irish Transport and General Workers Union,
in a submission on the reform of Irish Company Law (1978)
argued against:
"... confidentiality escape clauses in proposed 
legislation on the grounds that .... there is no 
reason, on the basis of either logic or experience, 
to assume that a worker, in possession of commercially 
"hot" information, has an interest in using this to 
the detriment of the company, and hence, ultimately 
to the detriment of his or her own livlihood."
The critical evidence here is the "experience" referred to. 
While, logically, employees may not intentionally damage 
their own jobs, increased disclosure of commercially sensitive 
information must undoubtedly increase the risk of, at the very 
least, inadvertent disclosure of information. However, to 
date, experience both abroad and here in Ireland, have
indicated that the risk of leakage of confidential information 
by the main body of employees is slight. Leakage of such 
confidential "insider information" by management may not, on 
the other hand, be so slight!
Information concerning the most direct cost associated with the 
disclosure of financial information to employees is not yet 
publicly available in Ireland. That is, of course, the cost 
that enterprises incur in the design, production, printing
and distribution of information whether in the form of written 
reports or of video or other reports. Research conducted in 
England by Hussey (1991) indicates that while the cost can be 
high (up to £20 per copy for an employee report and up to £10 
per employee for a video presentation), 65% of those surveyed
spent less than £2 per copy for the employee reports. The
research suggests that UK organizations are spending more on 
their employee reports in 1991 than they did in 1979 (after
adjusting for price level changes), and that the desire, 
amongst disclosing enterprises, to communicate more effectively 
is regarded as a more important factor than cost.
2.6.4. Cost/benefit summary
It is not possible to measure and compare the benefits and the 
costs of disclosing financial information to individual 
employees. On balance, it may be said that the potential costs 
of systematic information disclosure to employees may, as 
suggested by Maunders (1984 p 181) easily be over-estimated. It 
may also be said that there are benefits arising from such 
disclosure, which appear to outweigh the costs in general. In 
specific instances, it would be necessary to consider the costs 
and the benefits in those instances in order to determine 
whether benefits exceed costs. This section has considered the 
general sources of those costs and benefits.
2 . 7 .  SUMMARY
In summary, because of the nature of the decision making in 
which the employee engages and because of the extent to which 
the profile of the employee as a decision maker matches the 
profile of the shareholder as decision maker, it is suggested 
that there is validity in the assumption that the employee is a 
user of financial statements arising from his position as 
decision maker. The issue of whether the benefit of disclosure 
to the employee decision maker would exceed the cost of such 
disclosure was also considered. There would appear to be good 
reason to believe that disclosure of financial information has 
a benefit which, in general may be described as being in excess 
of the cost; although in specific instances such a 
generalization may not be applicable.
The next stage in this study, having established that the 
Irish employee is, theoretically, a user of financial reports 
because of his role as a decision maker, and having 
established that benefit probably exceeds costs of such 
disclosure, is to examine the influencing factors, the focus 
and extent of such disclosure in Ireland. This is achieved by 
examining the Irish paradigm in Chapter 3, and by conducting an 
empirical examination of the Irish paradigm, which is described 
in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.
CHAPTER THREE
C H A R A C T E R IS T IC S  IN  THE DEVELOPMENT O F THE I R I S H  PARADIGM OF
D ISC L O SU R E
3.1. INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 2 the employee was established as a user of 
financial information within the Decision Usefulness approach.
Disclosure of financial information to employees is not a new 
phenomenon in an international context (see, for example, 
Parker, 1988). However it is a new aspect of financial 
reporting in Ireland. Thus, experience in the area is very 
limited and no academic research has been conducted on any 
aspect of such disclosure in Ireland.
Because of the very early 9tage of development of disclosure to 
employees in Ireland, it is proposed that this study should, 
inter alia, contribute to our understanding of disclosure in 
Ireland by identifying the main characteristics of the Irish 
paradigm.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the Irish paradigm of 
disclosure. The examination is conducted- in the context of 
Puxty, Wilmott, Cooper and Lowe's (1987) framework (modified as 
described in 3.3.2.). Within this framework, the historical 
development of the Irish paradigm is traced, the influence of 
foreign paradigms is briefly explored, and the Irish paradigm 
is contrasted with other paradigms. Following from this 
examination hypotheses regarding the local characteristics 
affecting the disclosure of financial information to employees 
are developed. (The subsequent testing of these hypotheses 
will be described in Chapters 5 and 6.)
3.2. SENSE IN WHICH 'PARADIGM' IS USED IN THIS STUDY
This chapter is concerned with an examination of what is 
referred to as the 'paradigm of disclosure'. There is a 
considerable literature which considers the term 'paradigm' and 
its usage in external financial disclosure. This section 
explains the sense in which 'paradigm' is used in this study.
Kuhn's (1962) original use of the word 'paradigm' referred to 
the shared elements which account for the relatively 
unproblematic character of professional communication and for 
the relative unanimity of professional judgement within a 
scientific community. He subsequently (1977 p 297) modified 
his stance by suggesting that this 'paradigm' or 'set of 
paradigms' would be more correctly described as a 'disciplinary 
matrix' having as constituents 'symbolic generalizations', 
'models' and 'exemplars'.
Wells (1976) has used the modified Kuhnian ideas and terms to
describe the present structure and knowledge stock of external
accounting and the environment in which this came about. The
Statement of Accounting Theory and Theory Acceptance
(SATTA)(1977) also quoted Kuhn in classifying a great number of
approaches, procedures etc. as paradigms:
" ..each of the accounting approaches currently 
advocated involves a unique way of looking at the 
accounting problem at hand whatever it may be .. in 
short each approach begins to take on the attributes 
of a distinctive paradigm." (p 42)
"Depending upon the level of generalisation at which 
one might choose to apply this view the
decision-usefulness approach and the economic 
approach to analysing accounting information issues 
might each be treated as an alternative paradigm."
(p 43)
However, the Kuhnian 'paradigm' is based on the natural
sciences, and Kuhn acknowledged (1977), that whatever
terminology is used, there exists within an individual science
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the 'preparadigm period', when the practitioners of a science 
are split into a number of competing schools, each claiming 
competence for the same subject matter but approaching it in 
different ways. He suggests that this developmental stage is 
followed by a relatively rapid transition usually in the 
aftermath of some notable scientific achievement, to a 
postparadigm period characterized by the disappearance of all 
or most schools, a change which permits far more powerful 
professional behaviour to the members of the remaining 
community.
Laughlin (1981) has questioned the validity of applying the 
Kuhnian ideas on paradigms to Accounting. He suggests that 
Kuhnian descriptions apply to the natural sciences where the 
knowledge of the science in question increases through 'normal' 
scientific activities explicating the core paradigm and through 
revolution in terms of changing the paradigm in question and 
pursuing 'normal' science under this new form. He concludes 
that this notion of paradigms can only apply to mature 
sciences. In his view the concepts of accounting do not 
possess the attributes required to be paradigmatic in nature. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1979) support this view, suggesting that 
accounting concepts (such as double entry, conservatism etc.) 
are more in the nature of methodological 'excuses' or 
rationalizations of extant practice.
Thi9 writer would agree that it is difficult to support the 
application of Kuhn's (1970b) view of the main hallmark of 
normal science, i.e., making 'good predictions' from the
'practice of the field', to the development of Accounting to
date. So, it is not the Kuhnian or Masterman (1970) natural 
science definition of 'paradigm' which is used in this study.
Rather, classifying Accounting as a social science instead of a 
natural science indicates the context in which 'paradigm' is 
used in this study. Such classification has been proposed by 
Klaassen and Schreuder (1979) and is well supported by
philosophers and social scientists such as Winch (1959), Ryan 
(1970) and Bernstein (1976). Within that classification, since 
accounting is a special form of language, (Jain 1973, Belkaoui 
1979), the 'paradigm' model designed by language theorists 
offers a more appropriate reference.
The paradigm equivalent proposed by Katz (1966 p 109) comprises 
broad generalizations which are given meaning in specific 
situations (actual or potential) by the addition of 'local' 
factors. In this sense the empirical activities are not,
strictly speaking, trying to amplify the generalizations but 
are rather an application of them in unique and often different 
situations. This is similar to the methodological form used by
mathematicians, as Mattessich (1978) observed. The assumption 
is that a specific system should contain basic assumptions and 
the amplified 'localised' auxiliary assumptions:
"A particular accounting system is tested by trying
to determine systematically whether it is the most
'satisfactory' system 'under the circumstances'."
(Mattessich 1972 p 486)
This is supported by research by Schreuder (1979) and by Teoh 
and Thong (1984) which indicates that attitudes to, 
experiments with and focusses on corporate social 
responsibility (including the disclosure of information to 
employees) vary noticeably from country to country. Gray et 
al. (1987) conclude that simply translating ideas from one 
country to another is not to be recommended. Gambling (1977) 
has argued that the local or "cultural effect" is the one broad 
major principle governing current international practice. 
Ullman (1979) suggests that much disclosure practice is 
political in nature, and argues that the increase in employee 
reporting in mainland Europe reflects a change in the political 
power of the employee group there.
In summary, it may be said that accounting, and more 
specifically, accounting to employees, is in a preparadigmatic 
state in the sense that there is no universally acceptable 
paradigm of accounting to employees. However, using the 
linguistic and mathematical models, it is valid to observe the 
existence of what are referred to in this study as 'paradigms
of disclosure with local characteristics'. For the purposes of 
this study, the term 'paradigm' is taken to mean the 
combination of patterns, background, policies and practices of 
disclosure of financial information to employees. The 
assumption is that a universally acceptable paradigm has not
developed and that the local empirical activities referred to
by Katz are present as local characteristics in paradigms of 
disclosure insofar as they have developed to date. The 
selection of 'paradigms of disclosure with local 
characteristics' which may be relevant and worthy of 
consideration in an Irish context are considered in the next 
section.
3.3. INTRODUCTION TO THE EXAMINATION OF THE IRISH PARADIGM OF 
DISCLOSURE
Ireland is a newly developed Republic, but as a separate nation 
of people, has been in existence for some millenia. Thus, 
although, in practice, much of our commercial practice, 
philosophy and legislation has come to us from an ex-colonial 
power, and in more recent times from the European Community,
it may not be valid to assume that the most relevant commercial
and accounting paradigms for the Irish people necessarily come 
from a former colonial power or from the EC.
3.3.1. The choice of other paradigms for consideration
The other paradigms chosen for contrast with the Irish paradigm 
are those of states which have influenced and are influencing 
the development of the Irish paradigm of general financial 
accounting.
There are many suggested overseas influences on the general 
pattern of Irish Financial Accounting practice and policy 
proposed in the literature. The AAA's (1977) morphological 
structuring classification model indicates that our political 
system and our economic system are pivotal to the type of 
accounting system which has emerged. This would suggest that UK 
and US influences might be to the fore, as we have a 
constitutional democracy (although not based on a federal 
political system), and a mixed economy similar in some respects 
both to the US and the UK.
The Sphere of Influence classification proposed by Seidler 
(1967), i.e. British, American and Continental European, would 
indicate our classification under the British system, but with 
the addition of the increasing influences which the countries 
in Continental Europe are having on our accounting systems (for 
example the Plan Comptable from France and the Two-tier board 
system from Germany), the distinction is less clear.
Nair and Frank's (1980) classification, based on measurement 
practices, classifies Ireland with the UK, Australia and other 
British Commonwealth Countries.
Nobes (1985) suggests a classification which groups Ireland 
with the UK, based on the influence of pragmatism of the 
individual accounting decision, legal system and user group.
What is clear from all these classifications, is that Ireland 
is not regarded as unique in any major respect or as a leader 
under any classification, but is rather considered as a country 
influenced and following the pattern established in the UK, or 
US or France or Germany or some combination of all. The 
examination of the Irish paradigm which follows will, 
therefore, advert to possible influences of the USA, and to the 
UK, France and Germany, as the main, or 'vital' (Mason, 1978) 
EC influences.
Ireland's current position is that we are beginning to develop 
our policies and practices of disclosure of information to 
employees. In such development we may be subject to external 
influences. This will be particularly true if we wait for 
direction from the EC before engaging in indigenous 
experimentation. On the other hand, research referred to 
above indicates that it would be preferable for us to develop
our own practice and policy using our own local "cultural" and 
"political" characteristics as the foundation for such
development.
3.3.2. The framework for the examination of the Irish paradigm
The development to date of the Irish paradigm will be
scrutinised in the context of the framework developed by Puxty 
et al. (1987), based on the work of Streeck and Schmitter
(1985). Although the framework of Puxty et al. was relevant
for general financial reporting, it will serve as a useful 
basis for the examination of development of the Irish paradigm 
of disclosure of financial information to employees. Puxty et 
al. identified the following influences:
The Market 
The State 
The Community
Within the framework formed by these three, fall the four 
influencing factors of:
Liberalism 
Legalism 
Associationism
Corporatism (see Fig. 3.1.)
At one extreme is liberalism, whereby disclosure would be 
governed exclusively by the discipline of the capital market 
principles, where information would only be provided if it were 
demanded commercially. At the other extreme is legalism, which 
relies upon the unreserved application of state principles. The 
third major influence is the community influence which emerges 
from the spontaneous solidarity of the local community (this 
would include the 'local characteristics' referred to in 3.2.) 
Within these three fence posts are ringed 'associationism' and 
'corporatism' which combine elements of the Market and the 
State with some evidence of Community influence. In 
associationism, regulation is accomplished through the 
development of organisations that are formed to represent and 
advance the interests and attitudes of their members. In this 
context, the influence of the attitude of the individual 
financial accountant and of his representative bodies is of 
interest, as is the influence of the individual employee and 
his representative bodies. Corporatism involves greater 
reliance upon the state principle of hierarchical control. 
Warranting consideration in this area is the extent to which 
state control married with professional and community influence 
can impinge upon the creation of a relevant paradigm.
In testing the Irish paradigm of disclosure of financial 
information to employees against this framework, it is also 
necessary to refer to the impact of 'external' influences, 
since Ireland has been influenced, as referred to above, in 
the development of her general financial disclosure paradigm, 
by foreign influences. The framework proposed by Puxty, 
fig.3.1., has therefore, been extended to incorporate the 
influence of foreign paradigms, see fig. 3.2.
Within this framework the historical development of the Irish 
paradigm will be traced, the influence of foreign paradigms 
will be explored and the Irish paradigm contrasted with other 
paradigms. From this examination hypotheses regarding the 
local characteristics affecting the disclosure of financial 
information to employees will be developed.
COMMUNITY
Figure 3.1. Framework for Financial Accounting 
Source: Puxty et al. (1987), p. 283
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COMMUNITY
Figure 3.2.
Modification of Puxty et al. framework
3.4. AN ANALYSIS OF THE IRISH PARADIGM
The analysis which follows will be based on an examination of 
the Irish paradigm of disclosure under the headings contained 
in the framework referred to in 3.3. and shown in Figure 3.2., 
The State (3.4.1.), The Local Community (3.4.2.), The Market 
(3.4.3.) and External Influences (3.4,4.)
3.4.1. The State
The objective of this section is to analyse the current Irish 
paradigm of disclosure of financial information to employees in 
the context of the influence of "The State" on the development 
of the paradigm.
In analysing the current Irish paradigm on disclosure, it is 
necessary to consider the historical background to the 
development of the paradigm in order to appreciate the impact 
of the Irish government on such development. This section, 
therefore, considers the background to the development of the 
influence of the state on the Irish paradigm.
3.4.1.1. Political background
Legislation requiring the disclosure of information to 
employees and the participation of employees in their employing 
enterprises is most usually associated with periods of 
government of a left of centre shading. For example, much of 
the pro-Trade Union legislation in the UK is associated with a 
Labour Government and conversely anti-Trade Union legislation 
with a Conservative government. The adoption of the Social 
Charter by the European Community is associated with a left 
wing Commissioner and a majority left-wing European Parliament. 
In Ireland, much of the legislation and pre-legislative
discussion on Employee Participation and on Employment Rights 
has occurred during periods of Labour party influence in 
Government. However, in the Irish context it is more difficult 
to be categorical about such linkage, as the left - right 
spectrum of Irish politics is not as clearly defined as in 
other countries.
Unlike many other European countries with broadly right wing 
and left wing political parties competing for votes against 
each other, Ireland has two major parties, both right wing 
(Fianna Fail and Fine Gael), one minor right wing party (The 
Progressive Democrats) and two minor left wing parties (The 
Labour Party and the New Agenda). The Labour Party has, from 
time to time, entered into coalition with one of the two major 
parties to form a government, but has rarely offered a 
numerically strong opposition and has never formed a left wing 
government. The influence of the New Agenda (formerly the 
Workers' Party) has been even less. Thus, a "pendulum pattern" 
of legislation has never developed in Ireland as it has in the 
UK, with legislation followed by repealing legislation as 
right wing and left wing Governments alternate. Figure 3.3. 
indicates a chronology of events impacting on disclosure of 
financial information in the UK, illustrating the influence of 
left- and right- wing governments.
SUMMARY OF EVENTS IN UK, IN D IC A T IN G  'PENDULUM' EFFECT
LABOUR CONSERVATIVE
1947 Cohen Committee
1957 BIM declaration that
1968 Donovan Report disclosure is a technique to
1969 "In place of strife" get employees' co-operation 
1971 S.57 Industrial Relations
Act 1971 Repealed IR Act. Trade Union
and Labour Relations Act 
1972 Commission IR - problems of 
1975 Employment Protection Act disclosure
1975 Corporate Report
1976 ACAS Code of Practice 
1976 CBI Guidelines
1976 Dept. Trade Discussion Document 
1976 Hundred Group Report
1982 Employment Act
1989 Refused to sign Social Charter 
1991 Refused to sign Social Chapter 
______ _______ ___ ____________________ Maastricht Treaty_____________
Figure 3.3.
In Ireland in 1922, when the Free State was established, the 
opposing political parties derived their ethos, not from the 
conservative/liberal/socialist spectrum, but from their stance 
on the issues of Republicanism and the Treaty partitioning the 
North and South of Ireland. The Treaty (as the Articles of 
Agreement for a Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland became 
known), gave a 26 county Ireland, to be known as the Free 
State, Dominion status within the British Commonwealth. It 
involved an oath of allegiance to the British Crown and the 
appointment of a Governor General. Opinion in Ireland was 
sharply divided about the terms of the Treaty. The split
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largely resulted from differing views on the issues of 
constitutional status, the oath of allegiance and the question 
of the partition of Ulster. Consequently, the political divide 
ranged not across the right/left spectrum, but across the 
pro/anti-Treaty spectrum.
Fianna Fail, the Republican party, was anti-Treaty. Fine Gael 
was a party formed in 1933 from an amalgamation of the 
Blueahirt facist party, the Centre party and Cumann na 
nGaedhael, which was a pro-Treaty party traditionally 
identified with the commercial and professional classes and 
large farmers.
The Labour Party was in existence before the declaration of the 
State but never succeeded in winning more than thirteen percent 
of the seats in the Dail and, therefore never formed a main 
opposition party and certainly never offered any prospect of 
forming a single party Government. The Labour Party's origins 
were rooted in the Trade Union Movement. In 1892 the Belfast 
Trades Council organised a local Labour Party. In 1894 the 
Irish Trades Council was formed and in the same year a branch 
of the Independent Labour Party was founded in Dublin by Kier 
Hardie. From 1911 onwards local Labour parties were formed in 
Dublin and in provincial towns to contest local elections.
Opinion was divided as to affiliation with the British Labour 
Party. However the Irish Labour Party was formed in 1912 as 
described by Kennedy and Good (1984 p 87) as a:
"..trade unionists' party with membership limited to
union members."
For some thirty years after the Civil War in 1922, much of 
Irish parliamentary time was spent in setting up the structures 
of the new State including legislation on reforms of the
electoral system, the release of political prisoners, 
abolition of the Oath of Allegiance, setting up of 
constituencies and the establishment of the Constitution. 
Economic structures had to be established and the state
airline, shipping line and other utilities were formed. There 
were delays to the business of establishing economic 
structures, including the Economic War with the UK and The 
Emergency (as the Second World War was known in Ireland). 
However, by the mid-sixties, Ireland had concluded a free 
trade agreement with the United Kingdom and the Lemass/O'Neill 
(between the Republic's Taoiseach and the Northern Ireland 
Prime Minister) talks on Northern Ireland had relaxed some of 
the tensions of the Northern Ireland situation. Attention 
began to be focussed on social issues, and in 1966 a new 
Government Department, the Department of Labour was 
established.
In 1965 Fine Gael, sensing a new interest in social and
economic questions at that time introduced a manifesto entitled 
"The Just Society" (1965 p 4), which included as party policy:
"Works committees elected by the workers will be
established in State-sponsored bodies to meet 
management periodically for discussions on matters of 
mutual interest.
... more information on the affairs of the enterprise 
in which he works should be made available to the
worker.
Fine Gael will make immediate provisions for the 
representation of workers on the boards of state
enterprises.
Fine Gael will introduce tax incentives to encourage 
profit sharing with workers."
However, Fine Gael lost the election, and their subsequent 
manifesto in 1969 reverted to more conservative policies.
By 1969 the Fianna Fail leadership had passed from Eamonn de 
Valera, who had been its leader since the civil war, to Sean 
Lemass, and the party was transformed from the populist 
nationalist party of the thirties to a party identified with 
the brasher face of big business. At the same time the Labour 
party adopted a radical new policy and declared itself a 
Socialist party for the first time. Labour, with a strong 
package of workers' participation policies launched, in 1969, 
its strongest ever attempt at power, and rallied many
well-known supporters, including Conor Cruise O'Brien to punch 
home the message of "The Seventies will be Socialist". However 
the traditional Irish fear of radical policies and the impact 
of the "Reds" campaign by the right wing parties referred to by 
Brown (1981 p 26) meant that the Labour party lost seats around 
the country.
The Labour party has been in coalition on four occasions: the
first being from 1943 - 1948 with Fine Gael. It served in 1954 
with Fine Gael for a further three years. However, they had 
little influence on Government policy, and indeed, in 1954 - 57 
the ultra-conservative Minister for Finance introduced severe 
cuts in social welfare benefits which the Labour party was 
powerless to prevent. However evidence of the Labour party 
influence on legislation is clear during the period 1973 - 1977 
when they were again in coalition with Fine Gael. This time 
they steered legislation on unfair dismissals, employment 
equality, anti-discrimination, redundancy payments and worker 
participation in State Enterprises through the Oireachteas.
In summary, it may be said, that there has been a 
'conservative' complexion on most Governments formed since the 
inception of The State, and it may be said that such complexion 
has not encouraged a significant body of legislation on 
employees' rights in general, and rights of participation and 
information in particular.
It may alao be observed that such legislation as there is in 
place is mainly associated with a period of influence of the 
Labour party. However, although such a link is clear, it is 
not true to say that Fianna Fail are actively against such 
legislation; rather that they do not regard it with as high a 
degree of priority as did the Labour party when in coalition. 
No Fianna Fail Government has subsequently repealed any of the 
employment legislation introduced by the Fine Gael/Labour 
Government. Indeed, a Fianna Fail Government was responsible 
for the introduction of the Employment Participation (State 
Enterprises) Act 1988, and a Fianna Fail Government has 
indicated (Plan for National Recovery 1987 p 56) that it 
favours the expansion of participation and disclosure when 
budgetary conditions allow.
Moreover, it was the right-wing Coalition of Fianna Fail and 
Progressive Democrats which set up the Industrial Relations 
Commission under the terms of the Industrial Relations Act 
1990. The Commission is charged with establishing Codes of 
Practice to provide a guide for parties as to standards of good 
behaviour in particular areas of industrial relations. While 
it is not (at the time of writing) clear which subjects will be 
covered by these Codes of Practice, it has been suggested by
the Minister for Labour that the issue of participation of 
employees in the workplace and disclosure of information to 
employees should be included.
In general, while it may be observed in other countries that 
legislation on disclosure and participation is associated with 
left of centre Governments, with right wing Governments 
opposing such legislation, the situation in Ireland is not so 
clearcut. Legislation introduced in Ireland under the 
influence of left of centre governments has not been repealed 
by more conservative successors, and indeed, conservative 
governments have added to such legislation. It may be 
foreseen that future participation and disclosure legislation 
may be progressed in a period without left of centre influence 
in Government. This condition may be observed as a 'local 
characteristic' in the Irish paradigm.
3.4.1.2. The chronology of development of the Irish paradigm 
of disclosure to the extent influenced by the State
As referred to above, although right wing governments in 
Ireland have not been antipathetic to legislation relating to 
the rights of employees, much of the pressure for such 
legislation may be traced to the trade union movement. In
Ireland the first steps were taken at the Irish Congress of 
Trade Unions' Conference in May 1967 when Congress adopted the
motion:
"Congress supports the principle and practice of 
industrial democracy providing for workers' 
participation in management."
The Conference instructed the Executive Council to examine how 
best the principle of industrial democracy might be brought 
into practice in Ireland having regard to experience of its 
operation in other countries, and the particular context of 
industrial, commercial and economic life generally in Ireland.
In February 1968, the Congress Industrial Democracy Conference 
posed the question "Why Industrial Democracy?", and responded 
with quotations from Pope John XXIII's encyclical (1962 p 38) 
and from James Connolly's work (1913 p 108). The former 
emphasised the legitimacy of the workers' active part to
play in the management of the concern in which they are 
employed, whether that concern be public or private". Connolly 
foresaw in the reconstitution of societies based on the 
Ralahine co-operative experiment "the framework and basis of a 
free Ireland." The Congress also referred to the Constitution 
of Congress which includes as an objective:
"To work for such fundamental changes in the social and 
economic system as would secure for the workers of 
Ireland adequate and effective participation in the 
control of the industries and services in which they 
are employed."
This, the Industrial Democracy Conference declared was, 
therefore, "..to be understood as a permanent social objective
of the Labour Movement."
Based on its study of the operation of industrial democracy 
abroad and on industrial, commercial and economic life in 
Ireland, the Conference rejected management arguments that 
Irish workers were incapable of participating in management. 
The evidence indicated, it said, "that given reasonable 
access to training, workers had the capacity to participate in 
decision-taking within the undertaking."
In May 1968, there was a lively debate on industrial democracy 
at the Annual Conference of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions. 
Mr. Michael O'Leary T.D., (Labour) stated that industrial 
democracy should begin in the State sector. Nine years later, 
as Minister for Labour, he was to introduce legislation putting 
worker directors onto the Boards of Management of seven State 
enterprises.
In January 1969 the Labour Party adopted outline policy on 
workers' democracy. By February of 1973 (Ireland having joined 
the EEC in the previous month) the Fine Gael/Labour coalition 
government was elected on a 14 point programme which included a 
commitment to provide for the election of worker
representatives to the Boards of State enterprises. A Worker 
Participation Unit was set up in the Department of Labour. By 
July 1975 a White Paper on the Election of Employees to Boards 
of State Enterprises was issued. The Worker Participation 
(State Enterprises) Act 1977 was signed by the President in 
April 1977.
In 1980, following consultations, a wide ranging discussion 
document was issued by the Department of Labour (1980). This 
document covered several facets of participation and disclosure
of information including:
3.4.1.2.1. Employee representation at Board level
The discussion document suggested that the law should be 
amended to afford companies, who so wish, an opportunity to 
adopt a two-tier board structure, providing for employee 
representation on the supervisory board.
3.4.1.2.2. Employee representation at plant level
It was proposed that joint co-operation at plant level could be 
formalised in three broad categories:
i) Information, citing the low incidence of the availability 
of information to Irish workers compared with that which is 
available elsewhere;
ii) Consultation, suggesting that both sides of industry should 
be prepared to establish consultation machinery at plant 
level, and that it should be invested with adequate 
personnel, authority and responsibility and
iii) Co-responsibility, stating that there is a strong case for 
establishing areas of co-responsibility (such as safety, 
rules, discipline, etc) where final decisions may not be 
made by management without the prior agreement of employee 
representatives, or, in the absence of that agreement, 
without clearly established procedures for further 
consultation.
The document suggested that in the light of the poor response 
to previous proposals that works councils with an information 
flow network should be set up on a voluntary basis by 
enterprises, there was no merit in relying entirely on 
voluntary initiatives.
3.4.1.2.3. Employee participation in shop floor organisation
The discussion paper proposed increased management training 
which should aim at developing a more participative style of 
management capable of encouraging workers' involvement and 
commitment to change. Such training should also assiBt 
management to cope with the erosion of their management 
prerogatives which would result from direct participation such 
as job rotation, job enlargement, job enrichment, 
semi-autonomous group working, work restructuring and flexible 
working hours, all of which are desirable to contribute to 
better industrial relations and to improving Irish industry.
3.4.1.2.4. Financial participation by employees
Financial participation whether through the introduction of 
profit-sharing or employee shareholding schemes was recognised 
as having great potential as a means of developing a 
company-wide identity and corporate image uniting the managers, 
employees, trade unions, and shareholders.
3.4.1.2.5. Disclosure of information to employees
Unions and management should agree the nature of information to 
be disclosed, the form in which it is to be presented, and the 
timing of its release. Arrangements should be reached for 
preserving and safeguarding the confidentiality of certain 
types of information.
The document also recognised the need for social accounting 
methods and regular reporting on safety, health and welfare 
conditions.
The Discussion Paper proposed that Government policy should be:
"Boards of Directors under existing law owe no specific
duties to their employees............ the time for
change has arrived and ... formal recognition should 
be accorded to the status of employees, having regard 
to the extension of the employees' rights through the 
contract of employment and through the development of a 
philosophy and pattern of employee participation in the 
affairs of the company."
In 1982 the Finance Act made provision, for the first time, for
employee share-holding schemes.
In 1985, with a Fine Gael/Labour coalition once again in power,
the Advisory Committee on Worker Participation Below Board 
Level was established by the Minister for Labour, with the 
following terms of reference:
"To advise the Minister for Labour on the scope for the 
development of employee participation at sub-board 
level in different types of work organisation; to 
promote interest in practical experimentation in 
workplace participation; to identify research needs 
and make recommendations."
In 1986 the Report of the Advisory Committee on Worker 
Participation was issued. This Report concluded that increased 
employee participation is desirable both for the personal 
development of employees and for the benefit of enterprises, 
and that as many organisations as possible should engage in 
such participation. It recommended guidelines towards Employee 
Participation which covered areas such as forms and structures, 
direct participation, job design and enrichment, financial 
involvement, Board representation, information sharing and 
communication, Trade union and Management attitudes and 
training and development policy.
Guidelines towards Employee Participation were commended to 
organisations interested in introducing participation.
It was recommended that renewed efforts should be made to reach 
agreement on suitable participative arrangements in all areas 
of the Public Service.
In many respects the document followed the recommendations of 
the 1980 document. However, the Advisory Committee only 
succeeded in achieving a majority opinion in favour of the 
introduction of enabling legislation in the private sector for 
all organisations employing more than one hundred people. Such 
legislation would give status and impetus to the development of 
participation, with a network of initiatives for organisations 
employing less than one hundred people. This failure to reach 
consensus on the issue of mandating legislation gives an 
indication of the significant opposition (largely from the 
employing community) to State influence.
The importance of relevant education and training was 
recognised and in particular the need to encourage management 
towards new styles of managing which would allow them to "look 
beyond certain erosions of traditional authority to the 
positive advantages of participation." It was also recognised 
that employees would be likely to require basic courses in 
business, accounting and marketing in order to understand the 
language of management. The Report recommended the development 
of links between industry and higher education both to conduct 
further research and to support training courses. It was also 
suggested that the transition year programme in Second Level 
education could fruitfully be used to spread the message of 
participation among the young population. There was unanimity
on this issue and, within the Irish paradigm, it flags the 
awareness of the need for pre-disclosure education. This issue 
will be taken up in the empirical investigation.
The Report also recommended the establishment of a Council on 
Employee Participation with a supporting Agency to promote 
participation.
By 1987 the (Fianna Fail) government came to an agreement with 
the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, the Federated Union of 
Employers, the Confederation of Irish Industries and Farmers' 
organisations on a Plan for National Recovery for the period 
1987 - 1990. This was to form the basis for Government policy 
which was supported by unions, employers and farmers; and was 
the model for the subsequent Programme for Economic and Social 
Progress for 1991 - 1994. Sec. 6.4. of the Plan referred to 
support for worker participation, and stated:
"The Government proposes to introduce enabling 
legislation to facilitate the introduction of worker 
participation at sub-board levels in State Enterprises.
The recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Worker 
Participation (1986) are being considered by the 
Minister for Labour with a view to identifying the 
options which might be achievable in the light of 
present budgetary constraints."
In 1988 the Worker Participation (State Enterprises) Act was 
signed and, together with the 1977 Act, constitutes the only 
labour legislation covering employee participation and
disclosure, although the setting up of the Industrial Relatione 
Act 1990 (referred to in 3.4.1.1.) is expected to progress the 
issues of participation and information disclosure to employees 
in a non-legally binding, although authoritative, manner. A 
Department of Industry and Commerce representative indicated to 
the writer that Government intends to wait until such time as 
the EC position on the 5th and Vredeling Directives becomes 
clearer, before making any moves towards legislation.
However the setting up of the Industrial Relations Act 1990 is 
expected to progress the issues of participation and
information disclosure to employees in a non-legally binding, 
although authoritative, manner. (See 3.4.I.I.).
3.4.1.3. Conclusions on the influence of the State
As referred to in 3.4.1., the view of government in Ireland in 
relation to the issue of influencing and regulating the
disclosure of financial information to employees reflects a 
general acceptance that it will be necessary, in the long
term, to introduce at least minimal legislation governing the 
areas of participation and disclosure of information to
employees. This indicates that the Irish paradigm may be 
expected to lean somewhat towards the legalism referred to in 
Puxty's framework. However, the reluctance of government to 
take any statutory steps, and the introduction of the guideline
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routing in the Industrial Relations Act 1990, together with the 
failure of the Advisory Committee to agree on the issue of 
legislation (referred to in 3.4.I.2.), suggest that neither the 
purist legalism approach, nor the corporationist approach are 
influences on the Irish paradigm, but rather a more 
associationist approach, that is, allowing preparers to 
develop, and their 'association' to regulate voluntary, 
non-statutory disclosure approach with de minimis legalism 
input. The extent to which this approach by the Irish 
government reflects the view of preparers of financial 
statements will be tested and referred to in Chapter 5.
This conclusion, that the state is reluctant to apply a rigid 
statutory framework to the Irish paradigm, is seen as a 
striking contrast to the paradigms developed in Germany and 
France. In the case of Germany, for example, Schreuder (1978) 
suggested that Germany is probably the country with the most 
extensive disclosure of financial information to employees. It 
is governed by the Works Constitution Act of 1972 (15.1.1972).
S. 43 (2) of this Act (The Betreibsverfassungagesatz) requires 
management to report to an employee meeting at least once a 
year on its personnel and social policies as well as on the 
economic situation of the firm and its future prospects. More 
detailed and more frequent information on the economic 
situation has to be given to the economic council of employees 
(the Wirschaftsausschuss Sec. 110). In addition the Workers'
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Council has to be informed of the company's investment and 
personnel plans and the training programmes under the detailed 
and specific provisions of sections 90, 92 and 97 of the law.
Another contrast may be drawn with the UK paradigm which, 
although similar to the Irish paradigm in its lack of legalism, 
is different in that there is no suggestion by the British 
government that disclosure of financial information to 
employees must be seen as an integral part of participation by 
employees. (This issue is dealt with in 3.4.2.). Quite the 
opposite is the case in the UK, where government spokesmen are 
vigorous in their condemnation of any move by the EC to 
introduce mandatory participation by employees through the 
Social Charter vehicle.
3.4.2. The Community
In reviewing the impact of the community influence on the 
disclosure of financial information to employees, it is more 
difficult to delineate the boundaries between 'community' 
influence and 'market' influence than it is in the area of 
general financial reporting. For example, in the light of 
recent business scandals and business failures, the pressure 
from the Irish community as a whole for improvements in general 
financial disclosure and audit has been palpable, and had led
to the formation of the Financial Reporting Commission (see 
Report p 4). The same is not the case for advances in 
disclosure of financial information to employees.
This section reviews the extent to which community influencee 
are detectable, and considers the influence of the 
'business community'. However, it is acknowledged that in 
considering the influence of the business community, there are 
overlaps between the 'community' influence and that of the 
'market'.
3.4.2.1. The community view of disclosure as part of 
participation
In reviewing the responses which the Department of Labour
sought in collating comments for the 1980 and 1986 documents
adverted to in 3.4.1., it becomes immediately obvious that 
there is, within the community that responded, agreement on one 
issue. In Ireland the development of disclosure of financial 
information to employees is seen as an integral element of
Worker Participation. This is spelt out clearly in the
Discussion Documents:
"There is a danger that disclosure arrangements could 
have a negative impact in the absence of agreed 
participation and in the absence of agreed training 
programmes." 1980 Document
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"Disclosure of information to employees about the 
operation of the enterprise is an essential part of 
participation." 1986 Document
This is in contrast to the position in the US where disclosure 
of financial information to employees is seen as an integral 
part of the collective bargaining process, and to the position 
in the UK where the development of disclosure of financial 
information to employees occurred as an technique used by 
companies to bring about the active co-operation of employees 
referred to in 2.6.2.2.
It appears, from the literature that disclosure of financial 
information to Irish employees is viewed by the community as an 
important constituent part of worker participation and not as 
an independent objective. It is of interest to test the extent 
to which preparers of accounts agree with this view of 
disclosure to employees as part of worker participation, and it 
is referred to again in Chapter 5. However in this writer's 
view, disclosure as an integral part of participation is a very 
healthy framework for the development of useful and 
collaborative disclosure to employees and aligns with the 
justification developed in Chapter 2 for disclosing information 
to employees because it is their right as decision makers, 
property owners and risk-bearers. However, comments to 
government may not always reflect practice and may be more in 
the nature of pious aspiration. The link between worker
participation and disclosure of financial information to 
employees is formulated as a hypothesis in 3.6. and is 
examined further in Chapters 5 and 6.
3.4.2.2. The secretive nature of the Irish Business Community
In the light of the apparently positive nature of the 
'community' response to disclosure and participation adverted to 
in 3.4.2.1., it would seem surprising that community influences 
have not been exerted to force extensive disclosure of 
information to employees in Ireland. The extent of disclosure 
was unknown prior to this study, but observation would have 
indicated that disclosure is not extensive. The empirical study 
is designed to determine the precise extent of disclosure. It 
is suggested that a major factor which militates against the 
stated positive attitude of the community towards participation 
and disclosure is the secretive nature of the Irish business 
community.
Irish businesses have been slow to disclose information other 
than the absolute minimum required by statute. This may be due 
to the inherently conservative nature of the people. It has 
also been exacerbated by government fiscal and economic policy, 
which has encouraged foreign companies to invest in Irish 
subsidiaries by offering attractive tax packages for
manufacturing companies and for exporting companies. Such 
packages include, for example, zero corporation tax with full 
tax relief on distributions. The effect of these policies has 
been to create a situation where, through the use of exaggerated 
international transfer prices, Irish profits have, apparently, 
been boosted (Murphy, 1984 - see also Foley, 1987).
Additionally, the Irish Revenue Authorities do not subject such 
transactions to the same type of scrutiny as, for example the UK 
Inland Revenue do under the terms of the UK 1975 Finance Act. 
Obviously, widespread disclosure of these augmented profits, 
especially to employees, is resisted by management, and 
legislation requiring additional disclosure, such as, for 
example, the 1986 Companies (Amendment) Act introducing the EC 
Fourth Directive has led to a situation, described to the writer 
by many practising accountants in Ireland, where companies have 
changed their accounting year ends, have split their operations 
into several 'small' or 'medium' sized companies, or have used 
the 'unlimited liability' vehicle to avoid the disclosure 
provisions of the Act. In many (although not all) of these 
reported cases, the holding company is foreign. This supports 
the suggestion made to the writer by officers of the Irish 
Development Authority (IDA) that one of the attractions of 
Ireland as an investment base is the comparative paucity of 
disclosure requirements. It was additionally suggested by the 
IDA that this reluctance to disclose is more noticeable in the
more newly established enterprises than in longer established 
enterprises. The link between length of establishment and 
disclosure/non-disclosure pattern will be tested in Chapters 5 
and 6 to determine whether the observation can be substantiated.
Much of the resistance to disclosure appears to emanate from 
foreign controlled managements and not from indigenous Irish 
management. This link between ownership structure and the 
disclosure of financial information to employees is formulated 
as a hypothesis in 3.6. and is examined in Chapters 5 and 6.
In summary, it may be seen that this issue of desire for 
secrecy by overseas investors is a local characteristic in the 
Irish paradigm which is unlikely to effect our fellow members of 
the EC, and should be appreciated as adding to the difference 
between the Irish and other paradigms of disclosure.
3.4.2.3. The Impact of Ireland's non-involvement in the Second 
World War
Experience in other countries indicates that the community may 
influence the disclosure of financial information to employees 
in times of national emergency which threatens the community.
For example, the establishment of Joint Consultative Committees 
in the UK resulted from an agreement in 1942 between the 
Engineering and Allied Employers' National Federation and the 
engineering unions. Such committees greatly stimulated the 
practice of providing information to employees and their 
representatives on the detailed performance of companies. 
Hussey (1981) observed that such disclosure was sought by the 
community in return for the expected increases in productivity, 
although much of the information disclosed was more concerned 
with the day to day production activities rather than an overall 
picture of the financial achievements.
For Germany also, the requirements of the war effort and the 
necessity for improved co-operation to ensure the most effective 
use of scarce resources led to the establishment of disclosure 
practices.
Such disclosure during the war years was not necessary in 
Ireland, both due to the fact that Ireland was not involved in 
the war or in the war industry and to the fact that Ireland's 
economy was agriculture-based and did not involve large scale 
industrial employment.
Because of her neutrality, there was clearly a limit to the 
extent to which Ireland could rely on the goodwill of 
belligerents controlling the seas and shipping to permit the
import of wheat and maize and the export of cattle. The 
Emergency was, therefore a period in which Ireland was forced 
into self-sufficiency. Tillage expanded from 1.5m acres to 2.5m 
acres during the Emergency. Agriculture was largely of the 
subsistence type with almost 400,000 small holdings. Meenan 
(1970 pp 213 - 215) notes that employment in productive industry 
declined due to shortages of raw materials. The overall result 
was an increase in subsistence farming by small holders who were 
supported by family members in tilling the land. There was, 
therefore, little large scale employment in the manufacturing 
sector, and farms tended to employ family members. This 
situation clearly did not lead to demands from workers for 
financial information and/or participation in management. There 
were not, therefore, significant numbers of the industrial or 
agricultural communities creating a demand or need for 
information concerning the employing organisation.
This lack of a tradition of disclosure in times of national 
emergency may be described as a 'local characteristic' in the 
Irish paradigm of disclosure which adds to the difference of the 
Irish paradigm from those which have developed in other States. 
However, it is of interest for the empirical study to assess the 
extent to which employees' demands for disclosure have 
influenced the disclosure that takes place, and conversely, the 
extent to which lack of demand for disclosure has influenced 
non-disclosure. This issue will be referred to in Chapter 5.
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3.4.3. The Market
There is no evidence of commercial demand for disclosure of 
financial information to employees in Ireland. Insofar as 
organizations such as the Federation of Irish Employers and the 
Confederation of Irish Industries have expressed any view, it 
has been the view that development of disclosure to employees 
should advance along a voluntary route and should not be 
statutorily mandated (see 3.4.4.4). The Irish Stock Exchange 
has not expressed any official view. Discussions which the 
writer has had with the General Manager of the Irish Stock 
Exchange indicate that the view would be one of passive support 
for such disclosure, provided that shareholders were entitled 
to receive any information disclosed to employees.
The associationism influence linked with the Market in Puxty's 
model is of interest in the light of the conclusion in 3.4.1.3. 
Apart from the associations referred to above, the associations 
which may be expected to impact on disclosure would be the 
associations of the preparers and of the workers. In relation to 
the association of the preparers it is of interest to note 
research which has been conducted in the UK, indicating two 
local characteristics in the UK paradigms the view of the UK 
association that the shareholder should be awarded primacy as a
user, and that the association which might be expected to 
influence and characterize disclosure, the association of
financial accountants, may not be the primary influencing
association.
In its comments on the development of the fundamental conceptual 
framework of Financial Accounting of the ASB, the ICAEW, as the 
association for English and Welsh financial accountants, 
declared its support for an increased emphasis on the primacy of 
the shareholder as a user of financial statements (TR860). The 
Irish association took the opposite view and supported the 
primacy of the employee alongside the shareholder as users of 
financial statements.
Members of the company management team other than the financial 
accountant have been reported as taking over responsibility for 
the collation and presentation of financial information to 
employees in the UK. Gibson (1978) reports on a survey 
conducted by the CBI which indicated that in only 23% of the
companies disclosing information which were surveyed was the
Finance/Accounting Department responsible for this area. Parker 
(1977) raised the question:
"What role can and will accountants play in an area which 
one would assume as traditionally theirs, but which is 
currently the prerogative of other departments within 
most British companies?"
This is a local characteristic of the British paradigm which is 
of interest in examining the Irish paradigm, and prompts the 
question in the empirical study (see Chapter 5) designed to
determine the extent to which Irish financial accountants 
perceive themselves as having a role to play.
Puxty et al. (1987) describe the UK as principally
associationist in the context of general financial accounting 
regulation, arising from the UK profession's independence from 
state control and from its influence on regulation and 
legislation. However, while this classification may be extended 
to the development of a UK paradigm of disclosure of financial 
information to employees, it may not be the financial
accountant whose representative bodies' interests are being 
advanced. This may be the case because the individual
accountants are presenting either a neutral or negative attitude 
to the issue. This matter warrants examination in the case of 
the development of the Irish paradigm, and the attitude of the 
Irish financial accountant will be tested, as referred to in
3.4.1. The possibility of a different attitude of the Irish 
financial accountant to his UK counterpart is worth examining in 
the light of the submissions of the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in Ireland to the Financial Reporting Commission and 
to the ASB, referred to above, which support the view of the 
employee as a primary user of financial information side by side
with the shareholder and the role of the financial accountant in 
serving the information needs of the employee. No such 
suggestion has emanated from the association of the UK 
financial accountant. The link between the attitude of the 
financial accountant and the disclosure of financial information 
to employees is formulated as a hypothesis in 3.6. and examined 
in Chapters 5 and 6.
The second association which is of interest in this context is 
that representing the interests of the employee. The extent of 
the influence of the Trade Union movement on legislation has 
already been referred to. The extent of the influence of the 
union on disclosure within individual enterprises is of 
interest, given the lack of legalism influence on the 
development of disclosure in Ireland. The link between the 
extent of unionization of an enterprise and the disclosure of 
financial information to employees is formulated as a hypothesis 
in 3.6. and examined in Chapters 5 and 6.
Pressure from the employees themselves within the Irish 
paradigm, given the prevailing influence of associationism, 
would be expected to have a significant relationship to 
disclosure/non-disclosure in their employing enterprise. The 
link between the extent to which employees demand information 
and the disclosure of financial information in their employing 
enterprises is formulated as a hypothesis in 3.6. and examined 
in Chapters 5 and 6.
3.4.4. External influences
In the development of an Irish paradigm, the influence of
paradigms identified in 3.3.1., i.e. those of the UK, the USA 
France and Germany should be reviewed.
3.4.4.1. British influence on the Irish paradigm
An important 'local characteristic' which has a bearing on 
Ireland's progress in developing practice and legislation
governing the participation of employees and the disclosure of 
information to employees, is the still very strong influence of 
Britain on Ireland. Winning political sovereignty did not 
automatically ensure economic and legislative independence. Many 
of the traditions and values that now govern Irish political 
life were inculcated under the English dominance in the 
formative period of the modern state in the late nineteenth 
century. Irish people acquired democratic values and learned 
democratic ways at the same time as did the British, and
largely in a British context. In these circumstances it was 
only to be expected that much of the political organization and 
many of the public services of the independent state that 
emerged in 1922, and subsequently in 1949 in the Irish Republic,
resembled those of the United Kingdom in their form and in the
way they worked. Much was simply taken over, as, for example,
the legislation, the central administrative and local 
government systems, or copied, as was the parliamentary system. 
Penniman (1978 p 59) notes:
"The metamorphosis from Irish Free State to Republic, 
though it had great symbolic importance, involving as 
it did the substitution of the governor general 
personifying the British Crown, by an elected 
President of Ireland, made very little difference to 
the working arrangements of government and 
administration."
On the handover of Government in 1922, Fanning (1986 p 218) 
observes that there was immediate confirmation from the 
Provisional Government that existing legislation was to remain 
in place and that " .. all existing Departments will continue 
to perform their normal functions
Neither did the civil war interfere with the smooth handover of 
British systems and British legislation to the new Government. 
The new Secretary of the Department of Finance is quoted in 
Fanning (1986 p 220) as having offered the opinion that the one 
beneficial effect of the civil war was the opportunity it gave 
senior civil servants to install the administrative machinery of 
an independent Ireland without the meddlesome interference of 
politicians.
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The Irish economy is still linked to the British; and the 
process of developing Dublin-oriented rather than 
London-oriented financial, banking, insurance and commercial 
services has been a slow one, particularly for a country that 
had very little industrialization. The UK was and remains, 
Ireland's major market and chief single supplier. However, 
since its membership of the EC in 1973, exports to and imports 
from other European member states are lessening Ireland's 
dependence on the British market.
Because of the strong body of British law and administration
adopted on the foundation of the State and because of the
continuing strong economic links, British legislation has 
continued to exert an influence in the drafting of Irish 
commercial and employment legislation. For example, the
Companies Act, 1963 is very comparable to the UK Companies Act
of 1948. There are strong similarities between the UK Companies 
Act 1980 and the Irish Companies (Amendment) Act 1983 and 
between the UK Companies Act 1981 and the Irish Companies
(Amendment) Act 1986. There are also evidences of Irish
emulation of British legislation in the taxation system,
although there are many distinctly Irish flavours to the 
Corporate and Capital Tax Systems. Cook (1986 pp 161 - 163)
observes that the Irish redundancy payments system has a close 
resemblance to the British scheme, and much of the Unfair 
Dismissals legislation has parallels in the British system.
In changing itself from an agriculturally based society to an 
industrially based society, Britain continued to be a dominant 
but not determining influence on Ireland's commercial 
legislation and practice. A shared language, media influence, 
a common labour market and often similar trade unions
facilitated such influence, and indeed, it has proved an 
efficient method of deriving good legislation when it is
possible to see the effects of a particular Act operating in a 
neighbouring island before enacting the comparable legislation 
here in Ireland. The UK has proved an effective testing ground 
for legislation, and problems which surface on the application 
of legislation in the UK can be observed and ironed out in the 
drafting of Irish legislation. Ireland, with its limited 
economic resources, can often avoid much of the expense of 
drafting and amending legislation when a comparable Act is 
available and has been tested, in the UK. The effect of this 
has been, of course, that Ireland has tended to be slow in
bringing forward innovative legislation in areas where it is
anticipated that the UK or the EC will give a lead, and this may 
include the area of Employee Participation and Disclosure of 
Financial Information to Employees.
This local characteristic has had the influence of diluting the 
Irish flavour of much of our commercial and labour legislation, 
but interestingly, it has not had such a diluting effect on the 
Employee Participation/Disclosure legislation which we currently 
have on our statute books. There is no parallel for either the
Worker Participation Acts of 1977 or of 1988 in the UK. There
is no equivalent commitment by Goverment in the UK to advance 
this type of legislation further as there is by Irish 
Government. There is no parallel commitment in the UK to regard 
disclosure of financial information to employees as an integral 
part of Worker Participation.
Thus, although the influence of UK legislation on Irish
commercial legislation is generally clear, Irish legislation 
does not follow UK legislation slavishly, and in the area of 
participation and disclosure of information to employees to date 
there is little evidence of direct UK influence on the Irish 
paradigm. It may be concluded, therefore, that local 
characteristics have existed in the development of the Irish
paradigm of disclosure of financial information to employees and 
should probably continue to be promoted.
Local characteristics of the UK paradigm which may be detected 
in the literature include the practice of pre-disclosure 
education (referred to as desirable in an Irish context, 3.4.1.)
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and the increasing tendency for non-accountants to accept 
responsibility for collating the financial information to be 
disclosed to employees (referred to in 3.4.3.).
The mid-seventies literature in the UK refers to the need for 
pre-disclosure education, preferably in advance of disclosure. 
Jones (1975) referred to the futility of disclosure of financial 
information to employees in the absence of pre-disclosure
education. Companies such as ICI and the National Westminster 
Bank are cited by Tinsley (1977) and Hopps (1976) respectively 
as examples of companies which have engaged in comprehensive
training schemes including the use of video presentations and
seminars to educate their employees in advance of the disclosure 
of financial information. Both of these issues are of interest 
within the Irish paradigm, and will be referred to in Chapters 5 
and 6.
Additional local characteristics in the UK paradigm which are 
suggested are the variations in disclosure which appear to be
associated with the size of the workforce (Hilton 1978), and
with the skill of the workforce (Norkett 1976). Again, the
link between both these issues and disclosure of financial
information is hypothesized in 3.6. and will be examined in
Chapters 5 and 6.
3.4.4.2. Influence of the USA on the Irish paradigm
The USA has not had such strong historic links with Ireland as 
has the UK; and there are significant differences between the
Irish accounting practices and those of the USA. However, much
of the theoretical reasoning for our financial accounting 
practice has been developed in the US, and this fact along with 
the relative importance of the US as an investor in the Irish 
economy make a review of the paradigm of disclosure developed in 
the US interesting in a study of this nature.
In the US the conceptual problem of how best to impart knowledge 
to employees was discussed as early as 1921 arising from a 
publication by the Department of Labour in Canada. The first 
reference to employee reports was by Botsford (1923 pp 84-86), 
and the earliest recorded example of such a report was for
employees of International Harvester Co. in 1936.
The influence of legalism on the US paradigm is clear. The 
right of trade unions to obtain financial information for 
collective bargaining has been inferred by the National Labor 
(sic.) Relations Board from the National Labor Relations Act 
(1935), the Labor-Management Relations Act (1947) and the 
Landrum-Griffith Act (1959). Gregory (1966 pp 223-231) writes
that this inference has been supported on the grounds that it is 
an unfair labour practice for an employer to refuse to bargain 
in good faith about wages, hours and other conditions of
employment.
Although this approach of legalism has clearly operated in the 
US for some considerable time, it has not influenced the Irish 
paradigm. The Irish government prefers (as referred to in
3.4.1.2.) not to introduce mandatory legislation, and would 
favour self-regulation by the professional bodies (an 
associationist approach), with minimal legislation following the 
establishment of best practice. Thus the development of the US 
paradigm displays different 'local characteristics' to that of 
Ireland, and it can, therefore, be concluded that in the area of
disclosure of financial information to employees, the US
influence on the Irish paradigm has been minimal.
3.4.4.3. The influence of the EC on the Irish paradigm
The influence of the EC on the Irish paradigm of disclosure is 
not yet apparent. Discussions which the writer has had with 
officials in the Participation Unit of the Department of Labour 
indicate that the official view of Government is that, while it 
is aware of developments in the EC, such discussion documents 
and policy statements as have emerged from the Department of 
labour, have emerged independently of the EC position.
However, Ireland has signed the Social Charter and The 
Maastricht Treaty and supports the notion of employee 
participation including disclosure of financial information to 
employees which is included in the Social Chapter.
The approach of the EC is a legalistic one, and is heavily
influenced by the German approach, which is to codify regulation 
in a detailed manner. Disclosure of information to employees is 
seen by the European Commission as part of the Social Charter.
The Social Charter has been subject to much discussion in the
media, in particular pertaining to the UK Government's 
opposition to some of its proposals.
The most recent action programme for the proposed Social
Charter was presented by Commissioner Vasso Papandreou in 
December 1989. 45 initiatives are planned, but only 17 will be
the subject of directives. The less binding "Recommendations" 
will be used for the proposals relating to social protection, 
child minding and minimum wage. The proposed inclusion of 
freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining 
and provisions relating to discrimination on grounds of race, 
colour or religion has been dropped. There will, however, be 
directives on the reorganisation of working hours and contracts
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of employment, and legislation to ensure that the principles of 
worker information, consultation and participation are 
recognised throughout the Community.
The disclosure of information is viewed as an integral part of
the participation of employees in the employing organisation. It
is expected that employee participation and disclosure of 
information will be the subjects of two separate directives, and 
that these directives will be based on the Fifth Directive on 
Participation and the Vredeling Directive on Disclosure of 
Information to Employees, or some modification thereof. It is 
expected that any directive will include a clause permitting 
member states to give precedence to a locally developed system
of disclosure where it is acceptable by all parties to the
social contract. Therefore, there is potential for the EC to 
impose "European" (perhaps German or French) 'local
characteristics on the Irish paradigm simply by virtue of the
requirement for member states to enact the provisions of the 
directive. It is possible that the Irish Government's antipathy
to the legalism approach of the EC may dilute its impact. Of
interest here is the extent to which Irish companies are aware 
of the potential provisions of legislation which may emanate 
from the Vredeling Directive. This issue is taken up again in 
Chapter 5.
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3.4.4.4. Ireland's response to the 5th and Vredeling Directives.
In common with other EC member states, Ireland has, as yet, 
made no effort to amend its Companies legislation to 
incorporate any the the provisions of the 5th or Vredeling 
Directives on Company Law. There is an expectation that these 
Directives will be amended within the structure of the Social 
Charter, and Member States are awaiting the final draft.
An ad hoc working group was set up in Ireland in 1984 under the 
chairmanship of Mary Redmond (a leading Industrial Relations 
lawyer) to examine Ireland's response to the Vredeling and 
Fifth Directives on Employee Participation and Disclosure of 
Information to Employees respectively. The working group 
recommended that these directives should be proceeded with, but 
with a slightly new approach. It was proposed that the 
Directive be adopted as an instrument of social policy giving 
workers the right to information and participation, rather than 
a company law instrument imposing obligations on companies. 
The suggestion is that these directives should be carried as 
amendments to Labour Law rather than to Company Law.
There have been opposing viewpoints to these Directives. The 
Irish Congress of Trade Unions, in a submission (1984) to Dr. 
Redmond's committee, requested that the Irish Government should
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press for the adoption of the original Vredeling and Fifth 
Directives. Congress supports the European Trades Union Body 
which argues that national legislative provisions are inadequate 
if a common market is to function properly and that regulations
laid down at European level on procedures for information
disclosure and consultation with workers would contribute 
towards the démocratisation of social and economic life in the 
Community. The actual impact of trade unions in influencing
disclosure to date in Ireland is of interest. The issue of
trade union influence will be examined in the empirical study, 
and will be referred to again in Chapter 5.
The Confederation of Irish Industry (CII) (1984) believed that 
the proposals contained in the Vredeling and Fifth Directives 
could jeopardise the attractiveness of Ireland as a base for 
foreign industrial investment which would be inclined to go 
elsewhere, to countries outside the EC where such perceived 
constraints would not apply. The CII also objected on the 
grounds that the proposals could undermine the authority of 
local management which would disrupt industrial relations; that 
the administrative cost would prove prohibitive and that the 
risks of confidential information being disclosed by employees 
would be unacceptable.
The Federation of Irish Employers (formerly the Federated Union 
of Employers) (1984) also objected to the 5th and Vredeling 
Directives on the grounds that they threaten to infringe on 
management's right to make important decisions promptly, that 
it is not practicable to superimpose EC legislation on the 
widely varying frameworks of Company and Industrial Law which 
exist in the Community and that it would act as a deterrent to 
US, Japanese and other non-EC investment in Ireland.
The Department of Labour in its submission to the Working Group 
(1984), stated that the Minister considered that the sharing of 
information between management and workers and the development 
of participative structures within the workplace can only have a 
positive impact, especially in regard to the development of a 
healthy industrial relations environment. The Minister 
expressed the view that the communication of all relevant 
information, not directly threatening the commercial security of 
the enterprise, is a prerequisite for the development of trust 
between workers and employers.
The Department of Industry and Commerce (1984) expressed concern 
at the impact which the implementation of the Directives would 
have on future investment and employment creation in Ireland. 
There was a view that employees should not be treated more 
favourably than shareholders.
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The authoritative Joint Oireachtas Committee on the Secondary 
Legislation of the European Communities declared, in September 
1985, that it favoured legislation as a necessary means of 
effecting participation in Ireland. In its report on the Fifth 
Directive, it commented that while it would be preferable to 
have a mutually acceptable system of employee participation in 
the management of companies evolve through the purely voluntary 
efforts of both sides of industry; it was sceptical of the 
prospects of much being achieved in the absence of legislation. 
Moreover, it saw the best prospects of securing general 
acceptance of the concept of employee participation to lie in 
the adoption of uniform measures in the Community.
Response in Ireland to these proposals may be summarised as 
"mixed". With the exception of the Trade Unions and the 
Department of Labour, there appears to be unease with the 
highly prescriptive and codified nature of the directives, 
although there were no comments which indicate disagreement with 
the principles of disclosure and participation. The most recent 
response arising from discussions that the writer has had with 
officials of the Department of Labour indicate a "wait and see" 
approach to the proposed modifications which are currently 
emerging to both these directives. Ireland could be said to be 
at a cross-road in relation to action to be taken on the 
implementation of regulation covering employee participation
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and the disclosure of financial information to employees. It is 
possible that we may be forced to adopt a legalistic approach. 
However, at the time of writing, the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in Ireland has been asked by the Department of 
Labour to contribute to discussions on ways in which Ireland may 
put in place policies and practices in the area of 
participation. This invitation is based on the indication 
(referred to above) by the European Commission that the 
Directives will include a clause which permits member states to 
give precedence to their own developed paradigms. So, although 
the EC approach would force Ireland into a legalistic paradigm, 
current indications are that the more favoured associationistic 
paradigm (referred to in 3.4.1.2.5.) may prevail.
3.5. SUMMARY
This chapter, following on from the establishment of the Irish 
employee as a justified recipient of financial information about 
his employing enterprise, examined the development to date of 
the paradigm of disclosure to employees in Ireland.
In this study the sense in which the term 'paradigm' is used is 
the combination of patterns, practices, background to the 
development of disclosure to employees, given that such 
development is at a preparadigmatic stage.
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The review of the Irish paradigm was conducted within the 
framework of influences applied by State, Community, Market and 
External Influences.
The nature of the Irish paradgim may be summarised, arising from 
the influences which are driving its development, as 
'associationistic' with some 'legalistic' influences. The 
development of the paradigm appears to reflect the influence of 
the association of workers, i.e. the Trade Union movement and 
its political ally, the Labour party, and the association of 
financial accountants. The Institute of Chartered Accountants 
in Ireland has taken a positive stance in recognising the right 
of the employee to financial information and the responsibility 
of its members to provide it. Of interest, in the context of 
this study, is the establishment of the extent to which, in a 
disclosure environment which is voluntary and not mandatory, the 
influence of the financial accountant and of the worker impact 
on actual disclosure practice. In other words, the extent to 
which the 'associations' represent the views of their 
constituents, and the extent to which those constituents 
actually influence disclosure within individual enterprises. Of 
particular interest, given the need to limit the study within 
manageable proportions and the thrust of this dissertation as an 
accounting one, will be the influence of the financial 
accountant. These issues will be referred to in Chapter 5.
Legalistic influences come from the positive attitude of 
Government to the disclosure of financial information, and from 
general support for the programme to mandate such participation 
and disclosure in the state sector. However, such influence is 
diluted in the private sector, with government apparently 
reluctant to introduce legislation mandating such disclosure. 
Additionally, government's view that disclosure should be seen 
as an integral part of participation of the workers is of 
interest within the Irish paradigm.
Other paradigms were considered in the context of the 
influence which other states' paradigms of general accounting 
have had on Irish paradigms, to determine whether such influence 
extends to the paradigm of disclosure of financial information 
to employees.
Although the UK has developed a largely associationistic 
paradigm, there are differences of emphasis between Ireland's 
associationism and that of the UK. The main association 
representing the disclosers of financial information in Ireland, 
The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland, has taken a 
more positive stance in recognising the right of the employee to 
financial information than has the sister-association in England 
and Wales. Local characteristics within the UK which are of 
interest to Ireland are the tendency for non-accountants 
to take the initiative in disclosing financial information to
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employees, the need for pre-disclosure education and the impact 
on disclosure of the size of the workforce and the skill of the 
workforce.
The paradigms of the USA, and of the EC (including those of 
Germany and France), are largely legalistic, and, therefore, 
different to that of Ireland which, it is suggested, is 
associationistic with legalistic influences.
3.6. CONCLUSIONS
Employee Participation and Disclosure of Financial Information 
to Employees are at a very early stage of development in 
Ireland. Local characteristics pertinent to Ireland can be 
identified. Government has committed itself to the introduction 
of legislation and to support agencies to promote disclosure of 
information as an integral part of a package of participation 
and disclosure. On the other hand, Government is anxious to 
protect the perceived attractiveness of Ireland as an investment 
location for US, Japanese and Swiss multi-nationals. Government 
is more likely to favour the introduction of practices, 
regulations and guidelines from an agency such as the Institute 
of Chartered Accountants, which is self-regulating. Budgetary 
constraints reduce the likelihood of strong Government support 
for legislation in the immediate future, or for Government 
investment in education and in the promotion of disclosure and
participation practice. It is suggested that such development 
must come from the associations representing the disclosers and 
the disclosees.
Arising from the examination of the Irish paradigm described in 
this Chapter, the following emerge:
There is a need to establish the current practice in Irish 
enterprises regarding the disclosure of financial information to 
employees. This was referred to in 3.4.2.2.
There are local characteristics which are of interest within the 
Irish paradigm, but which do not fall within the scope of the 
objectives set out in 1.3.3. (see 3.6.1.)
There are local characteristics which are of interest in 
completing the picture of the Irish paradigm, although not 
linked directly with disclosure/non-disclosure patterns, and 
which warrant further testing. (See 3.6.2.)
There are local characteristics which are of interest within the 
Irish paradigm, and which it is hypothesized are linked with 
the disclosure/non-disclosure pattern within the Irish paradigm. 
(See 3.6.3.)
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3.6.1. Local characteristics of interest
The following local characteristics which are present within the 
Irish paradigm were noted. Essentially these characteristics 
are matters of historical development which should be recorded 
and understood in any examination of the Irish paradigm of 
disclosure of financial information to employees. They ares
Because of the way in which the Irish party political process 
has developed, there has been a lack of a 'pendulum' effect 
(which could have resulted from a clear left - right political 
spectrum) on the development of disclosure of financial 
information to employees. Additionally, because of the mainly 
conservative nature of government since the inception of the 
State, there has been an emphasis on an evolutionary rather than 
revolutionary development of such disclosure. This was dealt 
with in 3.4.1.1.
Disclosure of financial information is generally not extensive. 
It would be expected, therefore, that disclosure of financial 
information to employees would follow the same pattern. This 
was referred to in 3.4.2.2. as the secretive nature of the 
Irish business community.
There has been in Ireland a lack of demand for disclosure of 
financial information to employees in times of national 
emergency. This issue was dealt with in 3.4.2.3.
Although Ireland has demonstrated a tendency to base legislation 
on a study of comparable legislation in the UK, this has not 
been a characteristic of the development of legislation relating 
to disclosure of financial information to employees, as 
described in 3.4.4.1.
The legalism approach adopted by the EC does not appear to align 
with the largely associationistic slant which is perceptible in 
the Irish paradigm of disclosure of financial information to 
employees. This issue was referred to in 3.4.4.4.
3.6.2. Local characteristics which require further examination
It was noted that the following characteristics of the 
Irish paradigm should be tested in the empirical study:
The need for pre-disclosure education (3.4.1.2.)
The responsibility for regulating and initiating disclosure of 
financial information to employees (3.4.1.3.)
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The view of preparers on the government stance that disclosure 
should be an integral part of participation (3.4.2.1.)
The existence of a fear of leakage of secret information 
(3.4.2.2.)
The view of preparers about their role in the preparation of 
information to be disclosed to employees (3.4.3.)
The extent of awareness of proposed EC proposals for disclosure
to employees. (3.4.4.3.)
3.6.3. Hypotheses on the linkage between characteristics and 
disclosure/non-disclosure patterns in Irish enterprises
Arising from the review of the Irish paradigm, the following 
local characteristics are identified as potentially influencing 
enterprises to disclose financial information to their 
employees. Hypotheses have been developed which will be tested 
to determine the linkage between these characteristics and the 
disclosure/non-disclosure patterns in Irish enterprises. Those 
hypotheses are:
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That there is a significant relationship between the attitude of 
an enterprise's financial accountant (referred to in 3.4.1. and
3.4.3.) and the disclosure/non-disclosure pattern of financial 
information to employees by the enterprise.
That there is a significant relationship between the extent of
unionization in an enterprise (referred to in 3.4.3.) and the 
disclosure/non-disclosure pattern of financial information to 
employees by that enterprise.
That there is a significant relationship between the ownership 
structure of an enterprise (referred to in 3.4.2.2.) and the
disclosure/non-disclosure pattern of financial information to 
employees in that enterprise.
That there is a significant relationship between the extent of
participation within an enterprise (referred to in 3.4.2.1.) and 
the disclosure/non disclosure pattern of financial information 
to employees by that enterprise.
That there is a significant relationship between the length of 
establishment of the enterprise (referred to in 3.4.2.2.) and
the disclosure/non-disclosure pattern of financial information 
to employees by that enterprise.
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That there is a significant relationship between the extent to 
which employees of an enterprise demand information (referred to 
in 3.4.2.3. and 3,4.3.) and the disclosure/non-disclosure 
pattern of financial information to employees by that 
enterprise.
That there is a significant relationship between the size of an 
enterprise's workforce (3.4.4.1.) and the disclosure/ 
non-disclosure pattern of financial information to employees by 
that enterprise.
That there is a significant relationship between the skill of 
the enterprise's workforce (3.4.4.1.) and the disclosure/non­
disclosure pattern of financial information to employees by that 
enterprise.
The issues referred to in 3.6.2. and 3.6.3. will be addressed in 
Chapters 5 and 6.
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CHAPTER FOUR
A DESCRIPTION OF THE PROCESS OF COLLECTING DATA IN THE FIELD TO 
ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
4.1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes the data collection process undertaken 
to achieve the objectives of the study. The data collection 
methodologies and instruments used are justified and details 
are given regarding the steps taken to ensure the validity and 
reliability of the data collected.
4.2. OBJECTIVES
The objectives of the data collection process are twofold.
The first objective is to collect data which will facilitate 
the completion of the picture of the Irish paradigm of 
disclosure of financial information to employees which was 
discussed in Chapter 3. In Chapter 3 it was suggested that in 
its development to date, the Irish paradigm of disclosure is 
largely associationistic with some legalistic influences, and 
it was hypothesized that there were a number of local Irish 
characteristics which influence disclosure. Because there are 
no data in the public domain on current disclosure, it is 
necessary for the completion of the picture, as indicated in
1.3.2. and 1.3.3. to determine the information described in
3.6.2..
The second objective, is to test the hypotheses referred to in
3.6.3. In order to conduct such tests it is necessary to 
collect information on the accountants' attitude, the 
ownership structure, the extent of unionization etc. This 
chapter describes the steps that were taken to collect this 
data. Chapter 5 describes the univariate analysis conducted on 
the data and Chapter 6 describes the multivariate analysis 
conducted in order to achieve the objectives stated in 1.3.3. 
and 1.3.4.
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4.3. OVERVIEW OF THE DATA COLLECTED
Data were collected from private and public enterprises in the 
Republic of Ireland employing more than 500 people (See 4.4.2.) 
to establish the following: (The references in parenthesis in 
this section refer to the question number on the mail 
questionnaire, Appendix F).
4.3.1. The existence of disclosure of financial information to 
Irish employees in the enterprises mentioned above. (3.3.)
4.3.2. Information on the characteristics which were 
identified in 3.6.2. which warranted further inspection to 
augment the picture of the Irish paradigm described in Chapter 
3, as follows:
Pre-disclosure education (3.5.)
Responsibility for regulation and initiation (4.4.)
Disclosure as part of participation (4.1.6.)
Secretive nature of Irish business community (3.3.)
Role of the accountant in disclosure of information (4.3.) 
Awareness of EC proposals (4.5., 4.6., 4.7.)
4.3.3. Information which will allow the hypotheses stated at
3.6.3. to be tested, as follows:
Link between worker participation and disclosure (3.1.)
Link between demand from employees and disclosure (3.3.,
3.6.)
Link between the attitude of the financial accountant and 
disclosure (4.1.)
Link between unionization and disclosure (2.2.)
Link between ownership structure and disclosure (2.3.)
Link between size of workforce and disclosure (2.4.)
Link between length of establishment and disclosure (2.2.) 
Link between the skill of workforce and disclosure (2.5.)
In relation to the influence of the financial accountant, 
several sub-factors are considered in the univariate analysis 
which are seen in association with the financial accountant's 
attitude. They are as follows:
Age, as accountants qualified more recently may have 
been exposed to a changing swing in education, 
particularly in the University sector, to incorporate 
'employee reporting' in curricula, as suggested by Clarke 
( 1 9 9 0 )  ;
Gender may be a significant factor: research by Barrett
and Granleese (1989) indicates that there may be 
differences in psychological profile between male and 
female chartered accountants;
Qualification, as indicated above, may be interesting, 
in that accountants with university degrees may have a 
different attitude to disclosure than those without;
Experience in accounting is also worth examining in order 
to determine whether experience measured in terms of 
years has any effect on the accountant's attitude to 
disclosure of financial information to employees;
Experience in industrial relations negotiation is also 
worthy of examination, particularly in these days of 
'ability to pay negotiations' referred to in Chapter 2;
Knowledge of impending legislation on disclosure is of 
general interest in the context of the government 
position referred to in Chapter 3. That is, it would be 
of interest to detect any difference in attitude where 
the financial accountant is familiar with the terms of 
impending legislation and with the provision that member 
states must take into account practices already developed 
in enterprises in those states at the date of 
introduction of mandatory legislation.
Univariate analysis of the data collected is detailed in 
Chapter 5 with pertinent correlations and relationships being 
highlighted. Chapter 6 deals with multivariate analysis of the 
significant variables as identified in Chapter 5.
4.4. A DESCRIPTION OF THE PROCESS OF COLLECTING DATA IN THE
FIELD TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY.
4.4.1. Overview of data collection process
In order to collect the pertinent data the following steps were
undertaken :
4.4.1.1. The population frame of enterprises to be examined was 
established (See 4.4.2.).
4.4.1.2. Having considered alternative survey mechanisms, it 
was decided to use a mail questionnaire (See 4.4.3.)
4.4.1.3. A mail questionnaire was designed (See 4.4.4.) with 
special attention paid to:
Optimization of response rate (See 4.4.4.1.) 
Question content (See 4.4.4.2.)
Structure of questions (See 4.4.4.3.)
Use of closed/open questions (See 4.4.4.4.)
Use of grid questions (See 4.4.4.5.)
The determination of attitude (4.4.4.7.)
4.4.1.4. The questionnaire was piloted (See 4.4.5.)
4.4.1.5. Second requests were despatched to non-respondents 
(See 4.4.6.)
4.4.1.6. Respondents who indicated disclosure, but who had not 
enclosed examples of material disclosed were 
contacted to establish disclosure (See 4.4.3.4.J.
4.4.2. Establishment of population frame
This study is concerned with the disclosure of financial 
information in large employing enterprises in the Republic of 
Ireland. Such enterprises are those employing 500 persons or 
more. The cut-off point of 500 was selected to coincide with 
the level originally adverted to in EC draft legislation (The 
Vredeling Directive) requiring the disclosure of financial 
information to employees. "Employee", for the purposes of 
this study, is taken to mean all levels of permanent 
employees, including part-time workers and those on 
probationary contracts, but excluding directors, temporary and 
contract workers. (For other important definitions, see 1.7.)
Use of index (See 4.4.4.6)
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In order to establish the population frame the following steps 
were taken:
4.4.2.1. The list published in Business and Finance in January 
1988 formed the basis for the population frame. All 
enterprises reported as employing 500 or more people on January 
1, 1988 were included in the frame.
4.4.2.2. Enterprises reported as employing 450 - 500 people 
were also considered. In relation to these enterprises, the 
personnel manager was contacted by telephone to verify the 
accuracy of the reported figures in Business and Finance. Only 
one such enterprise had in excess of 500 employees and was 
included in the frame.
4.4.2.3. In order to verify the exhaustiveness and accuracy of 
the Business and Finance list, several other potential sources 
of information were contacted. Details of these sources and 
their responses are given in Appendix C.
The Irish Productivity Centre and Eolas both supplied lists of 
enterprises employing 500 or more people. When an enterprise 
appeared on one list but not on another, the personnel manager 
was contacted by telephone to determine the level of staffing
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at January 1 1988. Where the number of employees was in excess 
of 500 the enterprise was included in the frame, otherwise it 
was excluded.
4.4.2.4. A question was included in the questionnaire to
determine the number of employees. (See 5.4.5.). Where the
response was that there were less than 500 employees, the
questionnaire was excluded from analysis and from the frame.
4.4.2.5. The total population, having exhausted all reasonable
checks, was then finalised at 116. It was then decided that a 
complete census as defined by Moser and Kalton (1983 p 54)
could be undertaken.
4.4.3. An examination of alternative collection methods
Having established the population frame and having determined 
that a census or complete enumeration would be appropriate, it 
was then necessary to examine the most appropriate method of 
collecting the data for this study. Alternative methods of 
obtaining the data which were considered for this research 
were:
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4.4.3.1. Documentary sources
While there is some documentary information from surveys 
relating to disclosure of financial information to employees 
conducted in the United Kingdom (e.g. Norkett 1976 and Lyall 
1982), no evidence has been found of a similar survey having 
been conducted in the Republic of Ireland, and no research has 
been conducted in the UK or US on the accountant's attitude to 
disclosure of financial information to employees.
There is presumably much documentary information about 
individual enterprises which could be used to supplement the 
information about those enterprises. However, there is a 
problem of gaining access to such information, as it was likely 
to have been collected for internal purposes; and not all 
enterprises would have uniform information.
4.4.3.2. Telephone interviewing
This method was considered and regarded as a possible recourse 
in the event of persistent non-response, but not a suitable 
first line method. It was not considered suitable due to the 
sensitive nature of the subject matter. A questionnaire allows 
the respondent time to consider carefully his response and to 
answer anonymously.
4.4.3.3. Observation
Observation is a classic method of scientific enquiry, being 
more traditionally associated with the natural sciences than 
with the social sciences. It would certainly be possible to 
observe the financial disclosure practices of accountants, and 
to observe their attitudes to such disclosure or non-disclosure 
as the case may be. As a systematic method of collecting data, 
however, it would involve many hours of attendance with 
individual accountants with all the attendant human behavioural 
problems associated with such observation. It was considered 
that these factors would make the study complex and make the 
data difficult to handle in a uniform way in the context of the 
scope of this study and of the resources available. It was, 
therefore, rejected as a first line method.
4.4.3.4. Personal interview
In view of the sensitive nature of the subject matter, and 
because of the number of respondents involved, it was 
considered that interviewing as a means of collecting initial 
data was inefficient. However, accountants who indicated 
disclosure were interviewed where the exact nature of the 
disclosure was not clear from the responses. The purpose of 
these interviews was to obtain a more detailed description of
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the disclosure to employees and of the pre-disclosure education 
structures within the enterprise, sufficient to allow 
classification of disclosure and pre-disclosure education 
within the continua described in Appendices H and I. In all 
instances sight was obtained of samples of the information 
disclosed to employees. This added richness to the information 
gathered concerning the quality of disclosure and aided the 
preparation of the disclosure continuum referred to in Chapter
4.4.3.5. Mail questionnaires
The advantages and disadvantages of mail questionnaires were 
considered and weighed as an appropriate vehicle for data 
collection for this study.
The major advantages considered were:
4.4.3.5.1. Cost. Mail questionnaires are less costly than 
interviews. In the words of Selltiz (1959 p 257): 
questionnaires can be sent through the post, interviewers 
cannot". A mail questionnaire ensures ease of coverage with a 
widely spread population throughout the Republic. The use of 
the mail system meant that the coverage did not have to be
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restricted to an accessible catchment area. Any other form of 
coverage of the same area would have involved considerable 
cost.
4.4.3.5.2. The survey was completed more speedily than by using 
interviews.
4.4.3.5.3. The use of a mailed questionnaire eliminated the 
possibility of interview errors and bias.
4.4.3.5.4. Respondents had time to consider their answers 
carefully.
4.4.3.5.5. There is a possibility, given the sensitive nature 
of the subject matter that respondents may have been more 
willing to answer the more personal questions anonymously.
4.4.3.5. 6. The problem of non-contact with the respondent was 
considered and reduced by checking names and addresses with 
Professional Registers and with current telephone directories. 
These were double checked with a data base held by the 
Industrial Liaison Unit of the Dublin City University.
The major disadvantages considered were:
4.4.3.5.7. Non-response. It is easier for a busy accountant to 
ignore a questionnaire than to refuse a face to face request to 
complete a questionnaire. This did not, however, present a big 
problem, and the response rate, at 74% (See 5.2), is 
regarded as satisfactory. The issue of non-response bias is 
dealt with in sec. 4.4.4.1.
4.4.3.5.8. The questions had to be simple and straightforward 
and capable of being understood with the help of brief printed 
instructions. This potential problem was carefully considered 
in designing the questions. It was, however borne in mind that 
the respondents were all professional people and had all been 
trained in the technical areas covered by the questionnaire.
4.4.3.5.9.. The answers in the questionnaire had to be accepted 
as final and honest. This problem was considered carefully in 
designing the questionnaire. There was, obviously, no 
opportunity to probe or to ask supplementary or corroboratory 
questions prompted by the responses. It was imperative, 
therefore to identify such supplementary questions at the 
questionnaire design and pilot study stages.
4.4.3.5.10. A mail questionnaire is inappropriate where 
spontaneous responses are required. However, this researcher
is of the view that the type of information being elicited in
this study is of a type which requires careful, thoughtful 
consideration rather than spontaneous response, and this 
problem does not apply.
4.4.3.5.11. The researcher cannot be sure that the person to 
whom the questionnaire is addressed actually answers the 
questions. The covering letter and instructions had to, in so 
far as possible, guard against this problem and point out to 
the accountant that it was his attitude which was being tested. 
Although respondents were not asked to sign the questionnaire 
or to identify themselves, the questionnaire included an 
invitation to apply for a summary of the results. This
necessitated a declaration of the respondent's name and 
address. It proved possible to check most of the 
questionnaires in this way. However, in two cases, the
questionnaire was completed by persons other than the financial 
accountant. In these cases, the questionnaires were eliminated 
from the anlaysis, although not from the frame, i.e. they were 
regarded as non-respondents.
4.4.3.5.12. There is no opportunity to supplement the
respondents' answers by observational data. It would be
useful, for example, in a survey on this subject to see the 
type of data which is being distributed to employees, to 
observe the degree of prejudice being exhibited by the 
accountant, and to observe the response of the employee to the
material. In many cases a copy of material given to employees 
was returned with the completed questionnaire and other 
respondents were interviewed to determine the level of 
disclosure; but observed attitude would have been difficult to 
measure and compare and would have extended the scope of this 
study beyond the boundaries set out in Chapter 1.
On balance, it was decided that a mail questionnaire was the 
most appropriate to the subject under review. A copy of the 
questionnaire is given at Appendix F.
4.4.4. Design of questionnaire
The factors considered in the design of the questionnaire 
included the optimization factor, the structuring, ordering and 
wording of the questions, the layout, printing and instructions 
to be included with the questionnaire along with the covering 
letters for original requests and reminders. Copies of the 
letters may be seen at Appendices G.l. and G.2.
4.4.4.1. Optimization of response
One of the most important factors in designing a questionnaire 
is to design it so that a high response rate will be 
facilitated. The primary factor in optimising the response rate 
is the brevity, understandability and relevance of the
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questionnaire (Moser & Kalton 1983 pp 262-265). The following 
sections describe the steps taken to ensure that, in designing 
the questionnaire, the response rate would be optimized.
4.4.4.1.2. Ordering
In relation to the questions soliciting factual responses, the 
questions which were most straightforward to answer were 
included first in order to create the impression for the 
respondent that, having commenced to answer the questionnaire, 
it was easy to make rapid progress through the questionnaire.
The questions requiring his opinion of future developments 
which would be perceived as interesting to the respondent were 
included last in order to revive any flagging of interest in 
the respondent.
4.4.4.1.3. Brevity
All possible questions were first included, and then questions 
which duplicated other questions, where they were not included 
to check validity, were eliminated. Additionally the 
questionnaire was considerably shortened to ensure that the 
average respondent could be told with reasonable accuracy that 
he should take no longer than 20 to 30 minutes to complete the 
questionnaire. For example, at the questionnaire design and
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pilot study stages, (see 4.3.5.) it emerged that questions on 
the 5th Directive were eliciting the same responses as 
questions on the Vredeling Directive. The inclusion of
questions on the 5th Directive, although of interest in the
general area of participation is not directly related to
disclosure, and its inclusion increased the complexity and 
length of the questionnaire. It was, therefore, decided to 
exclude the questions on the 5th Directive.
4.4.4.1.4. Understandability
At the questionnaire design stage, the immediate 
understandability of each question was examined. Testers (see
4.4.5.) were asked to think aloud as they answered the
questions, and to indicate their understanding of each question 
and to indicate their reasons for answering in a particular 
way. Where testers felt it necessary to seek an explanation of 
a question, the question was re-phrased or eliminated. Where 
the answers gave rise to further points, in some cases, 
additional questions were included, which were, in turn, 
subjected to pre-test.
At this stage, arising from the difficulty that testers had in 
answering some questions which had originally been included as 
closed questions, these questions were opened. For example 
questions 3.2., 3.4. and 3.5. were rephrased as open questions.
On final completion, the time taken was carefully checked and 
on the pilot study (see 4.4.5.) respondents were asked to 
indicate the time taken to complete the questionnaire.
4.4.4.1.5. Feedback
In order to further increase the response rate, respondents 
were asked if they would be interested in receiving a copy of 
the summarised results. Copies of such results were sent to 
respondents with an invitation to offer further comment.
4.4.4.1.6. Addressee
Rather than address the questionnaire to the "Chief Financial 
Accountant", efforts were made to identify the name of the 
Chief Financial Accountant, and to address the questionnaire 
and reminder to him personally. The Members' Handbooks of the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland and of the 
Chartered Association of Certified Accountants were consulted. 
Where this did not prove fruitful the company was telephoned to 
discover the name. In some instances this request was refused, 
and the questionnaire was addressed to the "Chief Financial 
Accountant" in 7.75% of the despatches. (Although the number
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of non-named respondents was small, there was a 20% higher 
non-response rate among this group than among the named 
respondents.)
In order to further increase the response rate, a stamped 
addressed envelope was included with the questionnaire. 
Research seems to favour this form rather than a franked return 
label (Scott, 1961 pp 143 - 205).
4.4.4.1.7. Non response
Non-response was dealt with:
(a) by re-issued questionnaires with stamped addressed
envelopes (The Multiple Mailing Method referred to by 
Wallace and Cooke (1990))
(b) by telephone call
A possible method which was considered was direct interview 
and/or telephone interview of the non-respondents. A 
sub-sampling for such follow up interviews was considered. The 
Hansen and Hurwitz (1946) basis for the optimum sub-sampling 
rate was considered. However, the problem of whether answers 
to questions collected in different ways can be regarded as 
comparable was taken into account. Hochstim's (1967) results
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are fairly reassuring on this point, but it did not prove 
necessary to apply this method, as the response rate was high 
and remaining respondents were unable or unwilling to 
participate.
The response schedule is set out in Appendix D. The response 
rate on the first request was 45.69%. After sending the second 
request a further 2 5.86% responded and on telephone request a 
further 2.59% responded (Total 74%).
Of the non -respondents, (26%), 6% proved impossible to contact 
in spite of persistent efforts; 10% said that it was a policy 
never to complete questionnaires; 7% said they were too busy to 
complete the questionnaire, and 3% said the issue was too 
sensitive.
Of the 10% who cited company policy not to complete 
questionnaires, it is likely that their profile of 
disclosure/non disclosure would probably be represented by the 
respondents to the questionnaire; similarly with the 
individuals it proved impossible to contact and similarly with 
the non-respondents who indicated that they were too busy. 
However, it seems likely that those who felt that the issue of 
disclosure is sensitive represent enterprises which do not 
disclose financial information to their employees, and this 
factor must be borne in mind in the analysis which follows.
However, in order to ensure the content validity of the survey 
and to eliminate the possibility of categorization and 
non-response bias, content validity tests referred to by Grove 
and Savich (1979) were conducted.
4.4.4.1.8. Content validity tests
Tests suggested by Oppenheim (1983 pp 265-269), Copeland et 
al. (1973), and Strawser et al. (1971) were conducted to 
consider the effect of any non-response bias.
Firstly, a visual comparison was made between respondents and 
non-respondents in terms of business sector, geographical 
location, reported numbers of employees and unionization. 
There was no obvious clustering of non-respondents in any 
geographic location, they were evenly distributed over the 
business sectors classified, and the incidence of unionization 
and the spread of workforce size was the same as that of 
respondents.
Secondly, statistical tests were performed to test the 
statistical significance of differences in responses between 
questionnaires received before the reminder and those received 
after the reminder. The rationale for this approach is that 
late respondents are a proxy for non-respondents.
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For responses which were numerical, such as the question on the 
number of employees, the T-test for difference in means was
used. (See Table 4.1.)
TABLE 4.1
T-test for non-response bias in mail questionnaire
Description Respondents Respondents Computed 2-tail
to first to second T-value prob.
request request
X N X N
1.1. Age 43.585 53 42.762 21 -0.84 .614
1.4. Years in present
job 10.762 53 9. 514 21 -1.41 .191
1.5. Experience in
accounting 17.868 53 15.912 21 1.876 .211
2.2. Years of est­
ablishment 32. 58 53 32. 16 21 .27 .724
2.4. No. of empees. 875 53 921 21 -.71 .602
2.5. Skill of empees. 41.98 53 41.33 21 1.29 .20
3.1. Participatory
environment 4.55 53 4.14 21 -.07 .849
4.1. Attitude score 28.28 53 27.58 21 .62 .618
For responses requiring a yes/no response, such as the question 
on disclosure or not, the Standardized Proportion Difference 
test was used. (See Table 4.2.)
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TABLE 4.2.
Standardized proportion test for non-response bias 
in mail questionnaire
Description Respondents 
to first 
request
Respondents 
to second 
request
Standardized
Proportion
Difference
2-tail
prob.
PI N PI N
(yes) (yes)
2.3. Foreign mangt.? .2763 53 .281 21
3.3. Disclose? .4785 53 .5383 21
1.47
-1.23
.295
.301
These results show that in none of the replies tested, was 
there a statistically significant difference at the 0.05 level 
between the replies received after the first mailing and those 
received after the reminder.
To the extent that these tests indicate, the results of the
mail questionnaire would appear not to be materially biased
because of non-response. The results can be generalized to the
whole population which is the subject of the study.
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4.4.4.2. Question content
As a further step in optimizing the response rate, the 
questions asked were only those capable of a reasonably 
accurate answer. The pilot study (see 4.4.5.) endeavoured to 
ensure that where opinions were sought the respondent could 
reasonably be assumed to understand what was involved and to be 
able to give meaningful answers.
In drafting the questionnaire the writer was cognisant of the 
problem of "willingness" identified by Moser and Kalton, (1983 
pp 310 - 327) by Payne (1951). It is possible that the area of 
disclosure of financial information to employees is perceived 
by the respondents as attracting opinions which are, in some 
way, more "respectable" than others. Care, therefore, was 
taken in designing the questionnaire to ensure that a degree of 
subtlety was applied. For example, questions which might have 
elicited a negative response were interspersed with less 
emotive questions and the scaling score was reversed at random. 
At pre-test stage, testers (see 4.4.5.) were asked to consider 
the "neutrality" of the questionnaire and instructions.
4.4.4.3. Structure of questions
It was decided to incorporate a mix of techniques in designing 
the questionnaire. There are two distinct areas that are being 
probed. Firstly the aim of the questionnaire is to determine 
the profile of the respondent, the organisation for which he 
works, and the nature of current disclosure. This type of 
information was elicited by closed questions with pre-coded 
lists of responses, and by some open questions. Secondly the 
study attempted to determine the attitude of the respondents to 
the whole idea of disclosure of financial information to 
employees. This attitude was tested by use of a Likert Scale 
and by some open questions. (This is referred to in 4.4.4.7.)
4.4.4.4. Closed Questions
The danger with closed questions is that the data obtained is 
not as rich as that to be obtained in an open or "free" 
question. This problem has been considered in relation to this 
study, but the writer is of the opinion that the following 
advantages outweigh the disadvantages:
4.4.4.4.1. Attractiveness to the respondent of having only to 
circle one number as against the requirement to 
consider each question from first principles and 
formulate an answer; and
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4.4.4.4.2. Ease of subsequent coding and analysis. (Indeed, 
Oppenheim (1966 p 56) suggests that some of the 
some of the richness of the open question can be 
lost in later classification.)
It was, however, recognised that even though much of the 
richness of an open answer can be lost on application of a 
coding frame, it is essential to allow the respondent some 
opportunity to shake off the strait-jacket of the closed 
question construct and express his underlying philosophy on the 
disclosure of information to employees. It was originally 
decided to include one open question to invite the respondent 
to expand on his views on such disclosure. It proved difficult 
and time consuming to compose a coding frame for this question, 
and so a few of the comments were included by way of appendix 
to give a flavour of the replies. (See Appendix E). All 
questions included an "other" response with space allocated to 
allow the respondent to elaborate. Subsequent to the pilot 
study, it was decided to expand the number of open questions 
(See 4.4.4.5. ) .
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4.4.4.5. Grid
This method was tried in a number of the questions. It is an 
elaboration of the "inventory" type of question. It was used 
in the questionnaire to collect information quickly without 
having to ask a great number of questions.
The objective of including such questions was to elicit the 
following statistical information:
Overall frequency tabulation showing which is the 
preferred method for disclosing to the range of employees 
by stratum of appointment.
Detailed comparison of information given to, for 
example, middle management with that given to all 
employees.
Grouping of respondents by experience to show whether 
higher qualified accountants are more inclined to 
to all employees.
However, as a result of the pilot study (See 4.4.5.), it was 
decided to eliminate these grid questions as the number of 
possible permutations and combinations was such that doubt 
would have been cast on the validity of the responses. It was
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decided to substitute open questions, and to consider an 
interview at a later stage where the response to the open 
question was insufficiently elaborative.
4.4.4.6. Index
An index of qualification of the accountant was considered 
which could have been drawn up from the profile questions 
asked, by scoring his qualification, his total accounting 
experience and his experience in his present job and his 
experience with disclosure.
On anaysis, this index proved difficult to construct and was 
rejected as its meaningfulness was doubtful. However, indices 
were constructed for the volume of disclosure of financial 
information to employees, and for a qualification scale of 
employees in the enterprises surveyed.
4.4.4.7. The measurement of the attitude of the financial
accountant
4.4.4.7.1. Introduction
The attitude of the financial accountant in an employing 
enterprise was hypothesized in Chapter 3 as being a significant 
factor in the disclosure of financial information to employees.
The Board of Directors delegates to the financial accountant 
the authority for the external disclosure of financial 
information as the professional who is trained and competent to 
execute that function, and he is directed by legislation and by 
the professional guidelines and standards of his professional 
association.
The preparation and communication of financial information to 
external users is for all practical purposes the responsibility 
of the financial accountant. As discussed in Chapter 3, the 
association of the financial accountant has projected a 
postitive attitude towards such disclosure on behalf of its 
members. This empirical study is designed to determine the 
extent to which that attitude reflects the attitude of the 
individual financial accountant delegated with the 
responsibility for external disclosure of financial 
information; and the extent to which such attitude, either 
positive or negative, influences the disclosure within the 
enterprise and thereby contributes to the development of the 
Irish paradigm of disclosure to employees.
The financial accountant in Ireland, unlike, for example, his 
counterpart in Mainland Europe, has the discretion to exercise 
considerable professional judgement in the interpretation and 
application of the concept of "true and fair view". Similarly
the association of accountants in Ireland exercises 
considerable power in the setting of standards of disclosure of 
financial information.
However, concern has been expressed in the UK about the ability 
of the financial accountant to cope with the demands of 
communicating financial data to employees. (See, for example, 
Gibson (1978) and Parker (1977)). Concern has similarly been 
expressed about the low profile of accountants in Ireland in 
contributing to pay negotiations which are 'ability to pay' 
driven. Discussions which the writer has had with officers of 
the Irish Congress of Trade Unions and with officers of SIPTU 
in Ireland and of the TGWU in the UK indicate that the 
accountant rarely becomes involved in employee negotiations, 
even when such negotiations involve an "ability to pay" debate. 
These negotiations and disclosures are, normally, conducted 
with Human Resource and Industrial Relations officers of the 
company, who, generally, have little or no training in 
Accountancy. Thus, although in the UK there is a suggestion 
that the accountant is being displaced by 'communications' 
experts in the disclosure of financial information to 
employees, there is no such suggestion evident in Irish 
literature. One of the questions in this questionnaire is 
directed at the issue of responsibility for disclosure in 
Ireland.
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This element of the study is designed to determine the attitude 
of the financial accountant towards disclosure to employees and 
to test the hypothesis that there is a link between the 
accountant's attitude to disclosure and whether the 
enterprise discloses or not.
This section explores the definition of attitude in order to 
examine the constituent parts of the concept and the manner in 
which attitudes are acquired. The internal architecture of 
attitude is then considered in order to determine the attitude 
typing to which "attitude to disclosure to employees" belongs. 
There is then an examination of the problem of measuring 
attitudes and a discussion of the scaling method chosen for the 
study. The question of strength of attitude is then examined 
and the intensity dimension is examined. Having looked at the 
definitions relating to attitude, the issue of the link between 
attitude and behaviour is then discussed and finally, the 
possibility, having established the nature and intensity of 
attitude, of changing attitude, or increasing or decreasing 
intensity is considered.
4.4.4.7.2. Definition of attitude
Attitude has been defined in many ways by social 
psychologists. Triandis (1971 p 15) suggests that an attitude 
is an idea ".. charged with emotion which predisposes a class 
of actions to a particular class of social situations". 
Rokeach (1976 p 112) proposes that attitude may be described as 
a relatively enduring organization of beliefs around an object 
or situation predisposing one to respond in some preferential 
manner. However, there appears to be general agreement that a 
positive attitude towards an object is a "..mental readiness to 
feel, think and be inclined to behave towards that object in a 
positive manner" (Reich and Adcock 1976 p 28).
It is widely agreed (as summarized by Reich and Adcock (1976 pp 
29 -30) that attitude has cognitive, affective, conative and 
behavioural components and several kinds of functions. An 
accountant's attitude towards disclosure of financial 
information to employees would consist of:
The accountant's feelings toward and evaluation of 
the issue of disclosure to employees,
His accumulation of knowledge of the issue,
His behavioural intentions towards disclosure, and
His actual observed behaviour towards disclosure.
Some psychologists (for example Osgood et al. 1957 p 48) stress 
the affective component: "Attitudes are predispositions to
respond, but are distinguished from other states of readiness 
in that they predispose towards an evaluative response"; 
whereas others (for example, Smith et al. 1956 p 37) lay
greater emphasis on the motivational-cognitive component: 
"..an attitude is a predisposition to experience, to be 
motivated by, and to act toward a class of objects in a 
predictable manner". Most authorities agree that an attitude is 
a learned pre-disposition to respond in a consistently 
favourable or unfavourable manner with respect to a given 
object. However, this may be an oversimplification as there 
are a number of complicating factors which have been identified 
by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975 pp 39 - 49). A major factor to be 
taken into account is the dissonance theory whereby a person 
will strive towards consistency within himself in terms of his 
stated attitudes and his behaviour, and it has been suggested 
that he is more likely to alter his attitude to fit his 
behaviour than vice versa. In order to minimise the dissonance 
effect, the questionnaire has been designed to seek a 
statement of the PERSONAL attitude of the respondent and of the
ENTERPRISE'S practice in relation to the object, without 
adverting to the input of the accountant in the application of 
policy, but rather to the hypothetical general issue of who 
should influence policy and practice.
4.4.4.7.3. The internal architecture of attitude
Having considered the constituent components of the attitude 
that this study attempts to measure, it is necessary to examine 
the class of attitude to which the attitude to disclosure of 
financial information belongs. Of course, not all beliefs or 
attitudes are on the same level to an individual. An attitude 
to the right to life of every human being would probably be 
held universally as a core attitude, whereas an attitude to the 
survival of the lesser yellow spotted dung beetle would 
probably not be ranked as an important belief by most people. 
Attitudes towards the disclosure of financial information to 
employees could not be ranked amongst the central attitudes of 
mankind, but it is an issue about which most people could 
express an attitude either favourable or unfavourable, albeit 
not always very strongly. If a particular belief or attitude 
is regarded by an individual as central to his being it will be 
difficult to alter the attitude. According to Rokeach (1976 
p 3) ".. the more central the belief, the more it will resist 
change  " and, if changed ".. the more central the
belief changed, the more widespread the repercussions in the 
rest of the belief system." Rokeach suggests that beliefs or 
attitudes can be classified as Types A, B, C, D and E. Type A 
beliefs are those primitive beliefs about which there is 100 
percent consensus. They are beliefs about the physical world, 
the social world and self, such as belief that a mountain is a 
mountain, that one's mother is one's mother and that one's name 
is X. It is hard to imagine any debate surrounding such 
issues, and equally it is hard to imagine how one could change 
someone's attitudes to these primitive beliefs. Clearly 
disclosure of financial information to employees could not be 
classified as a Class A attitude for the vast majority of 
people.
A Class B belief is one in which the individual again is 
unshakeable, but for which he does not require universal 
agreement. For example a child, thrown into the water at a 
young age, may hold a primitive belief that water is 
frightening and dangerous, even though all those around him 
have a very positive attitude to water. Again, for the 
MAJORITY of people, their attitude towards the disclosure of 
financial information to employees would not have the primitive 
character required for classification as a Class B belief.
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A Class C belief is one which is not primitive in character, 
but is one which is acquired concerning those people or groups 
of people in society who are qualified to serve as 
authoritative reference points. For example, an accountant may 
accept completely the authority of the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants, but may reject the authority of, for example, the 
Pope to mould his attitudes. Examples of authority figures in 
whom an individual may have a Class C belief would include, for 
example, a parent, a teacher or a legislator.
Linked with Class C belief is Class D belief, which indicates 
that, having accepted the authority of an individual or group 
of individuals in whom a person has a Class C belief, then the 
person will generally accept the beliefs proposed by that 
individual or group of individuals. For example, if the 
accountant accepts the authority of the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants, he will accept the attitudes promulgated by the 
Institute, through, for example, the accounting standards.
Type E beliefs have been categorised by Rokeach (1975 p 11) as 
"Inconsequential beliefs", which represent more or less 
arbitrary matters of taste. If an individual believes that 
chocolates are delicious, he may not be swayed by authority, 
but it is certainly not a central belief, and has little impact 
on his existence.
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This writer suggests that belief in or attitude to the 
disclosure of financial information to employees has all the 
characteristics of a Type D belief, as defined above, as it is 
not a central or primitive object, and it is an attitude that 
is usually learned from Authority figures in whom one has a 
Class C belief, such as employers, writers, and probably, most 
importantly for this study, University and professional 
accountancy lecturers. The survey data (See Chapter 5) 
indicate that the object is not one in which there is a high 
intensity attitude, and therefore, it is one which, according 
to Rokeach ".. the less likely it is to resist change". The 
question of intensity is discussed in the next section.
4.4.4.7.4. Intensity of attitude
The previous section considered the class of attitude to which 
attitudes to the disclosure of financial information to 
employees belongs. Within each class, however, there are 
varying degrees of intensity or strength of attitude. Even 
within a class E belief, intensity can vary. One can have an 
intense dislike or like for chocolate or one can feel 
completely neutral about chocolate. Similarly with attitudes 
towards disclosure, the intensity of attitude can vary. The 
class of attitude to which a particular attitude belongs can 
influence the likelihood of that attitude affecting an
individual's behaviour and the likelihood of that attitude
being strengthened or weakened or reversed. Similarly with 
intensity of attitude, the stronger the intensity, the more 
difficult it is to effect change. Katz (1944 p 51) wrote:
".. the problem of the depth of opinion, or the 
intensity of belief or attitude, is perhaps one of the
most basic questions in the measurement of public 
opinion."
Krech and Crutchfield (1948 p 251) shared Katz's view:
"The degree to which an attitude is important or
central to the individual is one of the most critical
attributes requiring measurement."
Rokeach (1976 p 13) agrees:
"..intensity becomes a more compelling criterion of 
importance as we move away from a consideration of the 
relative importance of beliefs between classes to a 
consideration of beliefs within each class."
The attitude to disclosure of financial information to
employees is not a central or primitive attitude. The data
collected (referred to in Chapter 5) indicate that the attitude
of acountants to disclosure to employees is positive, but not
intense. The indications are, that because of its class and
intensity, the attitude under review is capable of being
changed by those bodies/persons to whom accountants have a
Class C attitude.
Because of the nature of financial accounting and of its
teaching, it is highly possible for educators of accountants to
strengthen the positive attitude of accountants to disclosure
to employees, with a probable correlational increase in the 
extent of disclosure to employees in Ireland. (This issue is 
dealt with in Chapters 5 and 6)
It is contended, that because the attitude held by Financial 
Accountants in Ireland towards the disclosure of Financial
Information to employees is a Type D attitude and of a low, 
but positive intensity, it is capable of being strengthened 
because of both its type and intensity. The grouping in 
society that can strengthen the attitude of Accountants to the 
issue of disclosure to employees is that group to which the 
financial accountant has a Class C attitude in professional 
matters, i.e. the "law", the teachers, trainers and educators 
of professional and student Accountants.
Having considered the issue of intensity, the next section 
discusses the possibility of measuring attitude and of 
describing the intensity of that attitude.
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4.4.4.7.5. The measurement of attitude
A number of aspects need to be considered in relation to the 
measurement of attitude. These include the issues of 
reliability, validity, the actual choice of scale and its 
components. A closer examination of these aspects now follows:
4.4.4.7.5.1. Reliability and validity
Since attitude is not directly observable, it can only be
measured indirectly. Because of the need for fine
discriminating points along the attitude dimension, most
attitude tests rely on verbal reports. The measurement 
technique chosen must give a "reliable" and a "valid" measure 
of attitude. Reliability refers to the extent to which the 
information is free of variable measurement error, such as
temperature factors, respondent's mood, etc. In other words, 
if a measurement were taken of accountants' attitudes on a 
different occasion the results should be the same. Validity 
refers to the degree of relevance of the instrument; for
example, if care were not taken, a respondent's responses may 
not be a good indication of his attitude towards the disclosure 
of financial information to employees, but rather of what he 
thinks is a socially acceptable answer.
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Scaling has been chosen as the most appropriate method for 
measuring attitudes in this study, and the scale chosen is the 
Likert scale. There is considerable evidence that the Likert 
scale is highly reliable, yielding comparable results when 
administered on different occasions. Shaw and Wright (1967) 
and Robinson and Shaver (1969) have reported very high 
reliability coefficients.
4.4.4.7.5.2. Choice of Scale
The scales considered for the measurement of the attitude of 
accountants included Thurstone's Scale (1929), Guttman's Scale 
(Suchman & Guttman 1947) and Likert's Scale (1932). Due to the 
amount of time consumed by Thurstone Scale and the difficulty 
of obtaining a suitable group of judges, this method was 
rejected. Guttman's Scale was similarly considered and 
rejected for the purposes of this analysis on the grounds that 
the rather laborious procedures involved would not necessarily, 
in the end, produce a usable scale. Oppenheim (1966) 
criticises Guttman's somewhat arbitrary standards such as the 
lower limit of 0.9 for coefficients of reproducibility. 
Guttman himself acknowledges that the main usefulness in his 
scale is when the researcher wishes to examine small shifts or
changes in attitudes. That is not the major thrust of this
study, and therefore, the Likert scale was felt to be the most
appropriate.
Likert's primary concern was with unidimensionality (making 
sure that all the items would measure the same thing.) He also 
wanted to eliminate the need for judges required by the 
Thurstone scale by getting the respondents in a trial sample to 
place themselves on an attitude continuum running from 
"strongly agree" to "strongly disagree", with an odd (usually 
three) number of positions mentioned between. These positions 
are given numerical weights for scoring purposes. He 
established that more complex scoring methods possessed no 
advantage.
The attitude score adopted is to allocate a high score of 5 to 
the most positive attitude in favour of disclosure to employees 
with a low of 1 to the most negative attitude. The statements
have been phrased so as to eliminate any apparent bias on the
side of the researcher, with approximately equal numbers of 
statements apparently in favour of disclosure and against 
disclosure. Additionally the scoring direction does not 
automatically run from a high on the left to a low on the right 
or vice versa, but is mixed. This is to counteract the "halo 
effect" identified by Oppenheim (1966). Where the respondent 
feels positively to the area he may rate each question
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favourably without considering each item separately. This can 
be facilitated and is evidenced in what Oppenheim describes as 
the "response set" where the "good" end is identified as being 
to the left and the "bad" end is identified as being to the 
right (or vice versa), and the respondent, having decided that 
he is, say, favourably disposed to the object of the ratings, 
may run down the list of questions always ticking the items to 
the left or right without considering each separately.
4.4.4.7.5.2.1. Number of points on the scale
Likert suggests an uneven number of points to allow the 
respondent to categorise himself on the positive or negative 
side of the attitude spectrum. Oppenheim suggests that 
respondents are often afraid of using the extreme categories. 
Therefore, the use of three points was considered too limiting 
with an expectation that the majority of responses would fall 
in the middle points. This writer has used a five point scale 
in order to allow a strongly held view to be expressed. The 
possibility of using seven points was considered, but in the 
light of Likert's finding that more than five points would lead 
to no better findings, it was decided to use five points. The 
word "strongly" was applied to the description of the extreme 
points to emphasise firmness rather than extremism.
The statements have been exposed to pre-test and pilot study
(see 4.4.5.)and to the tests indicated below to ensure
validity.
4 . 4 . 4 .  7 . 5 . 2 . 3 . Use of bi-polar scale
The measurement of the attitude under review requires a
measurement procedure whereby the accountant assigns
"disclosure to employees" to a position on a bipolar evaluation 
dimension. A bipolar scale, rather than an uni-polar scale is 
deemed essential by Oppenheim (1966) for a scale testing 
attitude when a Likert scale is used in order to allow the 
respondent the opportunity to adjudge himself as having a 
favourable or adverse attitude to the object, and so in this 
study the scale chosen is a five point scale ranging from 
"strongly agree" through "uncertain" to "strongly disagree". 
The attitude is assessed by setting an index over responses to 
a set of belief items which take the form of a number of 
psychological objects or statements.
4.4.4.7.5.3. General principles applied to psychological
objects
The general principles applied in selecting the psychological
objects to form the basis of the test in this study were those
advocated by Robinson and Shaver (1969 p 347):
a. Statements referring to the past were avoided
b. No statements were included that are factual 
or capable of interpretation as factual.
c. Statements capable of interpretation in more 
than one way, as determined in pre-test, were 
excluded.
d. Irrelevant statements were avoided.
e. Statements which were endorsed by everyone (or 
no one) were excluded.
f. Statements were kept simple, clear and direct.
g. Statements were made as short as possible.
h. Each statement contains one complete 
thought. Statements deemed to encompass more than 
one were eliminated at the design stage.
i. Universal statements were avoided.
j. Complex and/or compound sentences were simplified
or eliminated.
k. Vocabulary was selected as appropriate for
qualified accountants.
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4.4.4.7.5.4. Creation of the scale
The steps taken in creating the scale were:
a. The draft list of items was compiled, being statements of 
belief and not of intention.
b. Each item was examined to determine whether it indicated a 
favourable or unfavourable attitude towards disclosure of 
financial statements to employees. Where an item was ambiguous 
or appeared to indicate a neutral attitude it was eliminated. 
(This step is similar to that taken using the Thurstone method, 
although the use of judges is eliminated).
c. The items were then randomly phased to avoid the "serial 
effect" as a source of variation, i.e. some questions were 
phrased to elicit the "strongly disagree" response from a 
respondent with a positive attitude. This is to avoid the 
possibility of the respondent choosing, for example, the left 
hand column for all answers, having established a pattern and 
ticking mechanically in this column.
d. The list was then piloted (see 4.4.5.) with a score of from 
1 to 5. Strong agreements with favourable items receiving 5 
points and strong disagreements with those items receiving 1
point. Scoring was reversed for unfavourable items. Each 
respondent's preliminary score was obtained by totalling his 
scores.
e. An item analysis was then performed and only those items 
which met Likert's criterion of internal consistency were 
retained. The item score was computed and where there was not 
significant correlation with the attitude score it was 
eliminated from the scale.
f. Items were also eliminated where they had a high 
correlation with other items i.e. where there was a double 
counting of a particular factor.
g. The eight most discriminating items then formed the basis 
of the attitude scale and were administered to all respondents. 
The Likert scale, therefore, ensured that the possibility of 
the double counting of items as well as the possibility of the 
inclusion of items based on factors other than the attitude 
under consideration were eliminated.
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4.4.4.7.6. The link between attitude and behaviour
The basic purpose of this part of the empirical investigation 
is to test the hypothesis that there is a relationship between 
the attitude of the enterprise's financial accountant and the 
disclosure/non-disclosure pattern of financial information to 
employees in that enterprise. Of the two primary research 
methods identified by Cronbach (1957 pp 671-684) this study 
uses the Correlational Method rather than the Experimental 
method. The most characteristic feature of the Correlational 
Method is its reliance on existing variation. To use the 
Experimental Method, it would be necessary to measure the 
accountants' attitudes and behaviour, then to manipulate the 
attitude of the accountants in some way, and then finally to 
measure again.the attitude and behaviour. In this study, such a 
longitudinal approach has not been used, and therefore an index 
of the relationship between the measured attitude of the 
accountant and behaviour towards disclosure to employees has 
been obtained. Clearly a causal effect of attitude on 
disclosure could not be inferred since an observed relationship 
between these variables could also be the result of behaviour 
causing the attitude, or it could also be the function of a 
third variable such as political views. The results of the 
measurement are referred to in Chapter 5.
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4.4.5. Pilot study
Before piloting the questionnaire, the writer consulted a 
number of accountants and experts (the "testers") on the 
disclosure of financial information to employees. Because 
there is little or no research already available in this area 
in Ireland, and because the major variables influencing 
disclosure have not been authoritatively identified, 
interviews were conducted with individuals having relevant 
experience in the area. These individuals were Roger Hussey, 
academic, from Bristol Polytechnic, Geoffrey Selwyn finance 
director of British Land PLC, Declan Bourke Technical Director 
of the Institute of Chartered Accountants, Dermot Boucher of 
the Irish Productivity Centre, Anthony Walsh, Professor of 
Accounting and John Hurley, Professor of Organizational 
Psychology of Dublin City University. These discussions, 
combined with a review of the pertinent literature, resulted 
in the establishment of the broad skeleton of the questionnaire 
to be piloted.
4.4.5.1. Pilot study methodology
Random number tables were used to select 30 names from the list 
of enterprises to be surveyed. The questionnaires were 
distributed with an introductory letter and a stamped addressed 
envelope. The format of the questionnaire included a loose
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leafed page printed on yellow, summarizing the structure of the 
questionnaire and pertinent definitions. The first part of the 
questionnaire itself was printed on white with the attitude 
questions printed on yellow. This was to:
4.4.5.1.1. facilitate the respondent who did not disclose any 
information to employees and who was told to move to 
Section 4 (yellow pages);
4.4.5.1.2. heighten the awareness of a change in the emphasis 
of the questions, from factual questions to attitude 
questions ;
4.4.5.1.3. break the length of the questionnaire;
4.4.5.1.4. re-focus the attention of the respondent whose 
attention might wander and
4.4.5.1.5. encourage a "sunny" attitude towards the 
questionnaire, as suggested BBC4 (1986).
204.
4.4.5.2. Response Rate to pilot study
The initial response rate was 14 (47%). A second questionnaire 
was dispatched with a second stamped addressed envelope and a 
covering letter. The total response rate following the reminder 
was 22 (73%). No further attempt was made to pursue the
non-respondents.
4.4.5.3. Results of pilot study
Respondents had little difficulty in answering the pilot 
questionnaire. Some minor amendments were made to the layout, 
for example the "Management Accountant" was added to the list 
of possible leaders in the area of disclosure to employees.
In order to determine the degree of skill of the workforce in 
the participating organizations, respondents had been asked to 
give precise analyses of the percentage of the workforce under 
the headings, Professional/graduate; Skilled; Semi-skilled and 
Unskilled. The non-response rate to this question was high 
(45%), and so it was amended in the main survey to a grid 
question analysing the percentage of the workforce in the 
ranges 0 - 25%, 26 - 50%, 51 - 75% and 76 - 100%. As a result 
of this modification, there were no respondents who skipped 
this question in the main survey.
Arising from the pilot study, it proved possible to close open 
questions on the participation schemes in operation in the 
enterprise, the reasons for disclosure, and the reasons for 
non-disclosure.
There were ten questions which were included in the attitude 
scoring, other questions included in the table were designed to 
test the inherent conservatism of the respondents and to seek 
their attitudes to refinements of questions included in the 
score grid. A correlation tabulation was performed on the 
responses to the questions. It was found that the responses to 
question 22 have a high correlation (.762) to the responses to 
questions 24 and 25, whereas all other questions appeared 
reasonably independent. Question 22 was therefore, withdrawn 
from the attitude scoring in the main survey.
4.4.6. Second requests
Following despatch of the main questionnaire, where the 
questionnaire failed to elicit a response, a second request 
with stamped addressed envelope and covering letter (see 
Appendix G.2.) were sent. Subsequent failure to respond was 
followed up by a telephone call. The results of the requests 
may be seen on the response schedule at Appendix D.
4.5. SUMMARY
This chapter stated the objectives of the empirical study as 
the collection of data in order to allow the ascertainment of 
the patterns of current disclosure of financial information to 
employees by major enterprises in the Republic of Ireland, and 
an exploration of the hypotheses stated in Chapter 3 ( 3.7.)
The process of collecting the data, including the attitudinal 
data, has been described. Tests conducted to ensure the 
reliability and validity of the data have also been described.
This chapter defined attitude and the class and intensity to 
which the attitude to the disclosure of information to 
employees could be ascribed. It is suggested that this attitude 
is not a primitive attitude and the empirical work described in 
Chapter Five indicates that it is of low intensity, although 
positive. Therefore, it is suggested that it is an attitude 
which is not resistant to change and since it is a class D 
attitude, it is capable of being changed by those authoritative 
persons who formulate and mould the accountant's attitudes 
pertaining to accounting matters.
2 0 7 .
The following chapter examines the data collected, describes 
the extent of disclosure of financial information to employees 
in Ireland and explores the significance of surrounding 
factors, described in 3.6.
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CHAPTER FIVE
RESULTS OF DATA ANALYSIS
5.1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes the univariate analysis that was 
conducted on the data from the returned mail questionnaires 
(see Chapter 4). The analysis conducted included:
Cross-tabulation,
Chi-square tests, which test for significant differences in 
frequencies across categories, and
Analysis of variance which tests for significant differences in 
mean across categories.
The purpose of this analysis was firstly, as stated in 1.3.3. 
and in 3.6. to establish the current practice in major Irish 
enterprises regarding the disclosure of financial information 
to employees; and secondly, as stated in 1.3.4. and 3.6., to
isolate the variables which are significant in explaining the 
disclosure/ non-disclosure patterns in Irish enterprises. The 
variables so isolated will be included in model-building in 
Chapter 6.
In designing the questionnaire a question was asked to assess 
whether or not financial information is disclosed to employees 
(Q. 3.3. - Appendix F)). Additionally a question was included
(Q.3.4.) in an attempt to assess the extent of disclosure of 
information to employees. However, on analysis, it became 
clear that due to the early stage and voluntary nature of 
disclosure of financial information to employees in Ireland, 
it would not be possible to rank disclosure by quality due to 
the widely disparate disclosure mechanisms and formats that are 
being used. Additionally, it was not possible to grade 
disclosure by reference to satisfaction of employees' needs, 
since research has yet to be conducted to establish the precise 
nature of Irish employees' user needs.
This chapter describes the steps taken to examine the link 
between local characteristics and the disclosure/non-disclosure 
pattern. No attempt was made to link the characteristics 
listed to the 'quality' or 'satisfaction achievement' of the 
financial information disclosed to Irish employees. However, in 
order to give some feel for the information disclosure within 
the Irish paradigm, a continuum was constructed to give, by
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way of peripheral information, a classification of the 
quantity of information disclosed and of the extent to which 
pre-disclosure education exists. In the analysis described in 
this chapter, the main focus of interest is the acceptance or 
rejection of the hypotheses relating to
disclosure/non-disclosure, and all tests of significance are 
performed on disclosure/non-disclosure, but reference will be 
made to what is called 'disclosure score', which was computed 
as follows:
The respondents were asked to explain what information they 
disclosed, and a continuum of disclosure was devised to grade 
the information disclosed to employees.
The continuum was devised from the responses elicited, from the 
copies of material returned with the questionnaires and from 
discussions with respondents who had indicated disclosure, but 
who had not appended examples of such disclosure with returned 
questionnaires (See 4.4.3.4.).
This continuum ranged from no disclosure to disclosure of 
detailed weekly and cumulative divisional and group financial 
information. A score was attributed to the points on the 
continuum (Appendix H) and it was aggregated with a similar 
score attribution to a continuum of pre-disclosure education 
(Appendix I) which is regarded as an integral part of
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disclosure policy (see Chapter 3). The scoring which resulted 
gives ordinal amplification of the extent of disclosure 
operated by respondents and gives a measure, albeit crude, of 
the quantity of information disclosed by enterprises to 
employees.
It is accepted that this does not give an interval scale of 
value. However, even though it is uncertain how much better a
disclosure score of 5 is than a score of 4, or if the
difference between 5 and 4 is the same as the difference 
between 10 and 9, it is probable that a score of 5 is better
than a score of 4 and any score less than 4; and that it is not
as good as a score of 6 or upwards.
Thus, in relation to the hypotheses stated in Chapter 3, the
variables are linked with disclosure/non-disclosure and the 
'disclosure score' is referred to by way of secondary
information which will help to complete the picture of the 
Irish paradigm, and which may indicate issues for further
research.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows:
Section 5.2. details the response rate to the questionnaire, 
Section 5.3. gives the results of the analysis of the profile 
of the respondents:
5.3.1. Age and gender
5.3.2. Qualification and experience
5.3.3. Experience with negotiations
Section 5.
Section 5.
Section 5.
4. gives details of the analysis of the information 
about the enterprises represented in the study:
5.4.1. Business sector
5.4.2. Unionization
5.4.3. Length of establishment
5.4.4. Extent of foreign influence
5.4.5. Size of workforce
5.4.6. Skill of workforce
5. analyses the current disclosure practice:
5.5.1. Employee participation schemes
5.5.2. Disclosure to employees
5.5.3. Reasons for disclosure/non-disclosure
6. analyses the accountants' attitude:
5.6.1. An overview
5.6.2. The effect on disclosure/non-disclosure
5.6.3. Attitude to responsibility
5.6.4. Attitude to regulation of disclosure
5.6.5. Familiarity with EC proposals
5.6.6. Effect of age on attitude
5.6.7. Effect of qualification and experience on
attitude
Section 5.7. gives a summary of the main findings, and links 
the findings to the objectives stated in 1.3.3. 
and amplified in 3.6.2. and 3.6.3.
5.2. RESPONSES TO QUESTIONNAIRE
The questionnaire which was described in Chapter 4 (and is 
shown in Appendix F) was sent to the Chief Financial 
Accountants of the companies in Ireland employing 500 or more 
full time permanent employees.
116 questionnaires were despatched and 86 responses were 
received. 13 of the companies surveyed were immediately 
eliminated from the analysis and from the frame as the number 
of employees was below 500. A further 3 questionnaires were 
eliminated from the analysis (although not from the frame), as 
the financial accountants had been unable to complete the 
questionnaires due to extended sick leave or absence on a 
business trip and they had been completed by other members of 
the staff. Therefore from a maximum possible population frame 
of 103, 74 valid questionnaires (72%) formed the basis for the 
following analysis.
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An analysis of the distribution and response timetable is 
included in Appendix D. All respondents answered all 
questions, i.e. there were no missing values from the data. 
DESCRIBE and STEM AND LEAF tests were conducted on the data to 
detect any values out of range and/or any unusual patterns, and 
none was present.
5.3. PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS
5.3.1. Age and gender
Information concerning the age and gender of respondents was 
sought (see 4.3.3.) The questionnaires were directed at the 
chief financial accountants in the major employing firms in the 
country. 5.5% of the respondents fell within in the 20 - 30 
age range, 38% in the 31 - 40 range, 42.5% in the 41 - 50 range 
and 14% in the 61 - 65 range. No respondents were aged over 
65. (See Table 5.1.)
Only 3% of the respondents were women, which made meaningful 
comparisons of women's and men's responses (as suggested in
4.3.3.) impossible. However, it is worth noting, in passing, 
that the two women included in the survey had very positive
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attitudes to the issue of disclosure of information to 
employees, and had considerable experience with pay 
negotiations.
5-3.2. Qualification and experience
Information concerning qualification and experience was sought 
(see 4.3.3.). The vast majority (See Table 5.1.) of the 
respondents were professionally qualified, some with degrees 
as well. 7% were partly qualified, 1% had a degree (relevant) 
only, 3% had undergraduate and masters degrees only, 89% were 
professionally qualified of whom 25% had degrees.
Respondents had considerable experience with accounting, 
although relatively few respondents have been in their present 
job for periods in excess of ten years, as can be seen from 
Figure 5.1.
This indicates either progression upwards within the same 
company, or movement to another enterprise.
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Figure 5.1.
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5.3.3. Experience with negotiations
To determine the extent to which respondents have had an input, 
over their careers, to formal negotiations with employees (see
4.3.3.), they were asked to indicate such experience. In
general, it appears that the financial accountant, in the 
large employing companies, has little or no input to these 
negotiations. This indicates a slowness by accountants to 
engage in an area of potential contribution by them in the 
efficient running of their companies; particularly in these 
days of so called "ability to pay" negotiations. It would seem
that the accountant would have a major contribution in
establishing "ability to pay". However, 5% said that they had 
had extensive experience with negotiations, 14% had 
considerable experience, 24% had moderate experience, 32% had 
minimal experience and 25% had no experience with negotiations. 
(See Table 5.1.)
This result was corroborated by Trade Union negotiators in the 
Transport and General Workers Union in the UK and SIPTU in the 
Republic of Ireland, who indicated the difficulty experienced 
in obtaining an explanation of figures presented to negotiators 
as part of the wage negotiation process. Very often 
negotiations are conducted with Industrial Relations and/or 
Human Resource managers and the accountant is rarely, if ever, 
a party to negotiations, even those based on financial results
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or information. Trade Union negotiators felt that their own 
knowledge of the bases and interpretation of figures was 
superior to that of the managers with whom they were
negotiating; and yet the accountant was, typically not called 
upon to contribute to discussions.
TABLE 5.1.
QUALIFICATION AND EXPERIENCE OF RESPONDENTS
Experience with accounting Number of years in present
No. % No. %
0 - 5  years 0 0% 0 - 5  years 30 41%
6 - 1 0  years 9 12% 6 - 1 0  years 23 31%
11- 15 years 13 18% 11 - 15 years 10 14%
16- 20 years 23 31% 16 - 20 years 7 9%
21- 30 years 21 28% 21 - 30 years 4 5%
> 30 years _8 11% > 30 years _0 0%
74 100% 74 100%
over
220.
Qualification
TABLE 5.1. (cont.)
/">
Experience 
with negotiations
No. % Yrs No. % Extent No. %
Prof. (no deg) 47 64 <20 0 0 Extensive 3 5
Prof. (deg.) 19 25 21-30 4 5 Considerable 10 14
Prof. (postgrad) 0 0 31-40 28 38 Moderate 18 24
Deg only 1 1 41-50 32 43 Minimal 24 32
Postgrad 2 3 61-65 10 14 None 19 25
Part qual. 5 7 — — — —
74 100 74 100 74 100
5.4. PROFILE OF THE ENTERPRISES REPRESENTED
5.4.1. Business sector
Respondents were asked to indicate the business sector to which 
their organisation belongs. The list was taken from the 
Central Statistics Office classification, and the responses are 
shown in Table 5.2.
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TABLE 5.2.
CLASSIFICATION OF RESPONDENT ENTERPRISES
Agriculture and forestry 11%
Mining and quarrying 1%
Food drink and tobacco 19%
Retail 7%
Petroleum and coal 1%
Chemicals 5%
Metal manufacturing 1%
Mechanical engineering 1%
Instrument engineering 5%
Vehicles 1%
Textiles 4%
Cement 1%
Paper, printing and publishing 4%
Other manufacturing 8%
Utilities 3%
Transport and communication 8%
Banking, insurance and financial services 12%
Professional and Scientific Services 4%
Distributive trades 1%
Miscellaneous services 3%
Table 5.2. indicates the percentage of the total responses 
represented by each sector. It has not been weighted for the 
number of employees covered by each questionnaire. It can be 
seen that the sectors which are represented range from those 
with a high proportion of unskilled workers, such as Retail and 
Food production industries to those with a high proportion of
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skilled workers such as Banking, Insurance and financial 
services. The survey, therefore, covers a wide spread of Irish 
industry and commerce.
5.4.2. Unionization
Respondents were asked to indicate whether their enterprises 
were unionized, non-unionized or partly unionized (see
4.3.3.). This question was asked in order to determine any 
difference between practice in companies which were unionized 
and those which were not in order to detect the significance of 
the associationist influence of the association of employees 
referred to in sec. 3.5. However, only 4% of the respondents 
reported that their enterprises were non-unionized, 85% 
being unionized and 11% being partly unionized (see Table
5.3.), which made further analysis or cross tabulation 
meaningless.
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EXTENT OF UNIONIZATION
TABLE 5.3.
No. %
Non-unionized 3 4
Partly unionized 8 11
Unionized 63 85
74 100
5.4.3. Length of establishment
5.4.3.1. In order to determine if newly established companies 
had a more positive approach to the issue of disclosure of 
information to employees (see 4.3.3.), respondents were asked 
to indicate the length of establishment of their enterprises. 
It appears that the majority of enterprises employing more 
than five hundred persons in Ireland have existed for more than 
thirty years. (See Table 5.4. and Figure 5.2.)
LENGTH OF ESTABLISHMENT
10 15 20  3 0  40
Years established
Figure 5.2.
TABLE 5.4.
LENGTH OF ESTABLISHMENT
No. %
< 10 years established 5 6%
10 - 15 years established 8 11%
16 - 20 years established 3 4%
21 - 30 years established 11 15%
> 30 years established 47 64%
74 100%
5.4.3.2. Analysis of relationship between disclosure and length 
of establishment of the enterprise.
The possible correlation between the length of establishment of 
the enterprise and the disclosure/non-disclosure of the 
enterprise was examined. However, it can be seen from Figure
5.3. that although the newly established firms disclose more 
frequently than average (overall, 50% of the enterprises and 
50% do not disclose, see 5.5.), there is very little 
difference between them and the oldest established firms. The 
firms that have been in existence for 10 - 15 years are notable 
for their non-disclosure.
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The significance of differences in the patterns of disclosure/ 
non-disclosure by length of establishment was tested (see Table
5.5.). The test does not indicate a significant difference in 
disclosure/non-disclosure between long established and newly 
established enterprises at the 90% confidence level. (Because 
of the low cell counts, enterprises were defined as long 
established if they have been established for more than 20 
years). The confidence level was set at 90% because the 
univariate analysis is used as a screening process to determine 
the significant variables for inclusion in the model building 
in Chapter 6. However, length of establishment will not be 
included in the model building.
As referred to in 5.1. the 'disclosure scores' were also 
examined, and are included, for interest, in Table 5.5. When 
correlated with length of establishment, with the exception of 
the 10 - 15 year old group, the disclosure scores indicate an 
even spread of high and low scorers across the ranges of length 
of establishment.
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RELATIONSHIP
TABLE 5.5.
BETWEEN DISCLOSE/NON- 
OF ESTABLISHMENT
DISCLOSE AND LENGTH
Length of Disclosure Disclose?
establishment score
years no. of No Yes
resp.
<10 5 4.8 40% 60%
1 0 - 1 5  6 0 100% 0%
1 6 - 2 0  3 4.0 67% 33%
21 - 30 11 3.9 55% 45%
> 30 47 4.43 43% 57%
A one way analysis of variance test on the difference in the
pattern of disclosure between newly established and established
enterprises, using the coding in the questionnaire, i.e.
disclosure = 2 and non-disclosure = 1, shows s
MEAN ST.DEV.
Newly established 1. 600 .548
Established 1.493 .504
T = 0.43, p = 0.69
5.4.4. Extent of foreign influence
5.4.4.1. It was hypothesized in Chapter 3 (3.6.3.) that
ownership structure bears a significant relationship to 
disclosure/non - disclosure of financial information to 
employees. Analysis showed that the enterprises considered in 
this study are mainly controlled by Irish holding companies.
47% have an Irish holding company; 28% have a foreign holding 
company, and 25% were enterprises without holding companies.
(See Table 5.6.)
TABLE 5.6. 
CONTROL STRUCTURE WITHIN IRISH ENTERPRISES
No. %
Irish holding company 35 47
Foreign holding company 21 28
No holding company 18 25
74 100
4.4.2. Analysis of relationship between disclosure
ownership structure
The possibility that companies with foreign ownership have a 
different record for disclosure of financial information to 
employees than their domestic counterparts was examined. Again, 
bearing in mind that overall, 50% of companies employing more 
than 500 employees disclose information (see 5.5.), it is 
interesting to note that there is a difference between foreign 
ownership influence and domestic influence. The companies with 
foreign ownership are less likely to disclose than companies 
with Irish ownership, as can be seen from Figure 5.3.1.
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This may be attributed to the use of Ireland by foreign 
companies to maximise tax advantages by using transfer pricing 
and short stay operations here. A possible reason could be the 
an outward flow of information which they would be reluctant to 
disclose to local employees either due to the lack of 
committment to the workforce or due to the distorted nature of 
the accounting figures based on international transfer pricing. 
Discussions which the writer has had with accountants in the 
Republic of Ireland have confirmed reports of unseemly haste by 
foreign parents in taking steps to avoid the disclosure 
requirements of the Companies (Amendment) Act 1986. Far from 
contributing to improving standards in disclosure, it is clear 
from these discussions that companies with foreign parents are 
actively attempting to retard disclosure standards.
The significance of differences in the patterns of disclosure/ 
non-disclosure between Irish and foreign controlled enterprises 
was tested using one way analysis of variance (see Table 5.7.). 
The test indicates a significant difference between Irish 
controlled and foreign controlled enterprises at the 90% 
confidence level. Ownership structure will be included in the 
model building in Chapter 6.
In examining the 'disclosure score', it may be seen from Table
5.7. that Irish controlled companies have an even spread in 
disclosure score indicating inclusion of high scorers and low
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scorers. However, the foreign owned enterprises have a very 
low average disclosure score; indicating that even when they do 
disclose, they tend to disclose little information.
TABLE 5.7.
FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AND DISCLOSE/NON-DISCLOSE
Holding Average Disclose?
company disclosure No Yes
score
Irish 4.37 46% 54%
Foreign 2.50 65% 35%
No holding company 4.56 44% 56%
In order to test for the significance of the foreign/Irish 
control factor, "Irish" and "No holding company" were combined; 
A one way analysis of variance test on the difference in the 
pattern of disclosure between 'foreign' and 'Irish' 
enterprises, using the coding in the questionnaire, i.e. 
disclosure = 2 and non-disclosure = 1, shows;
MEAN ST. DEV.
Foreign ownership 1.250 .489
Irish ownership 1.647 .503
T = 2.001, p = 0.05
5.4.5. Size of workforce
5.4.5.1. Respondents were asked to indicate the number of 
employees in their enterprises. (This was referred to in
4.4.2.4.J. Questionnaires were withdrawn from analysis where 
the number of employees was below 500. The majority of 
enterprises included in the analysis employed between 500 and 
1000, see Figure 5.4. and Table 5.8.
TABLE 5.8. 
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES IN ENTERPRISES
No. No. %
employees enterp •
500 - 1,000 45 61%
1,001 - 1,500 8 11%
1,501 - 2,000 6 8%
2,001 - 2,500 4 5%
> 2,500 11 15%
74 100%
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5.4.5.2. Analysis of relationship between disclosure and size 
of workforce
In addition to seeking confirmation of the number of employees, 
this question was asked in order to consider any significant 
relationship between the size of the workforce and the 
disclosure/non-disclosure patterns see 3.6.3.). The
relationship between disclosure and size of the workforce was 
examined. Although the linear correlation is weak (0.345), it 
is interesting to note (Figure 5.5.) the very high proportion 
of the companies employing more than 2,500 employees that 
disclose information to their employees.
The significance of differences in the pattern of disclosure/ 
non-disclosure by size of workforce was tested (see Table
5.9.). The test does not indicate a significant difference in 
disclosure/non-disclosure pattern between enterprises with 
different sizes of workforce at the 90% confidence level. Size 
of workforce will not be included in the model building in 
Chapter 6.
Of interest is the 'disclosure score', and when the average 
disclosure score is examined, it appears that the companies 
with 1,500 - 2,000 employees have the highest score, with
companies employing 2,001 - 2,500 having the lowest score.
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TABLE 5.9.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISCLOSURE AND SIZE OF WORKFORCE
Number of Disclosure Disclose?
employees score No Yes
500 - 1,000 2.84 60% 40%
1,001 - 1,500 2.25 71% 29%
1,500 - 2,000 8.83 - 100%
2,001 - 2,500 0. 50 75% 25%
> 2,500 7.82 9% 91%
A one way analysis of variance test shows that there is a 
significant difference in disclosure/non-disclosure pattern 
between enterprises employing in excess of 2,500 persons and 
those employing between 1,500 and 2,000 and the other 
enterprises. However since the cell count in both categories 
is very low, the significance is not reliable. Grouping these 
categories indicates that the difference in
disclosure/non-disclosure pattern between grouped categories is 
not significant at the 90% confidence level.
5.4.6. Skill of workforce
5.4.6.1. In order to determine the degree of skill of the 
workforce in the participating enterprises (see 4.3.3.), a 
grid question was posed analysing the percentage of the 
workforce in the ranges 0, 1 - 25%, 26% - 50%, 51% - 75% and 
76% - 100%; by Professional/Graduate; Skilled; Semi-skilled
and Unskilled (see Q. 2.5. Appendix F). In the pilot study, 
respondents were asked to give precise analyses of the 
workforce under this heading, but the non-response rate to
this question was high, so the question was changed to the grid
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format detailed above and, arising from this modification, 
there were no respondents who avoided this question in the main 
survey. So, although the degree of accuracy was not as high 
as would have been obtained from precise employee grade 
statistics, it was possible to devise an ordinal scale which 
was useful for analysis of the relationship between disclosure/ 
non-disclosure patterns and the skill of the workforce. The 
score shown in Figure 5.6. was attributed to the grid 
responses.
SKILL PERCENTAGE OF WORKFORCE
0 1 - 25% 26 - 50% 51 - 75% 76 - 100%
Professional/
graduates 16 17 18 19 20
Skilled 11 12 13 14 15
Semi-skilled 10 9 8 7 6
Unskilled 5 4 3 2 1
Figure 5.6.
This resulted in a maximum score of 47 and a minimum score of 
37. A score of 42 would result, for example, from a respondent 
with 25% of the workforce in each of the categories. While 
this is not a precise reflection of the skills of the employees 
and does not result in an interval scale, it does produce an 
ordinal scale which shows an approximate rating of the skill of
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the workforces of the enterprises which have been the subject 
of the study. The scores achieved on the scale resulting from 
the above scoring showed 50% of the respondent enterprises 
below the mid-point with 21% at the mid-point and 29% above the 
mid-point. This is reasonable given the high preponderance of 
companies in the manufacturing industries represented in the 
study. A stem and leaf display of the results is shown in 
Figure 5.7. It can be seen that the most common scores are 41 
and 42. There are no missing values and no outliers, which 
indicates that there is no need to consider separately the 
responses from any of the respondents or to eliminate any 
responses.
STEM AND LEAF DISPLAY OF THE SKILL-SCORE OF EMPLOYEES IN
3 99999999999
4 0000000000111111111111111
4 222222222222222333333
4 4444444444555
4 6677
Figure 5.7.
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5.4.6.2. Analysis of relationship between disclosure and skill 
of workforce
It can be seen from Figure 5.8. that at the lower end of the 
scale, where qualification is low, there is approximately the 
mean spread of disclosers and non-disclosers. In the middle of 
the range there is a high proportion of non-disclosers, but as 
the work force becomes more skilled, the rate of disclosure 
increases. A one way analysis of variance test shows that the 
difference in disclosure/non- disclosure pattern between 
enterprises with skilled workforces and enterprises with 
unskilled workforces is significant at the 90% confidence level 
(see Table 5.10). Skill of the workforce will be included in 
the model building in Chapter 6.
Again, by way of interest, the 'disclosure score' has been 
included in Table 5.10. It may be observed that enterprises 
employing the workforce with the highest skill show the highest 
disclosure score.
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TABLE 5.10
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISCLOSURE AND SKILL OF THE WORKFORCE
Qualification Average Disclose?
Scale disclosure
score
No Yes
39 5.27 46% 54%
40 2.90 50% 50%
41 2.93 53% 47%
42 2.27 67% 33%
43 1.83 83% 17%
44 6.10 30% 70%
45 5.33 33% 67%
46 6.00 0 100%
47 11.00 0 100%
In order to test the significance of the skill of the workforce 
as a significant explanatory element for inclusion in the 
model, the skill scale was divided into "skilled" (score of 43 
and above) and "unskilled" (score of 42 and below) and a one 
way analysis of variance test was conducted.
MEAN ST. DEV.
Skilled 1.765 .498
Unskilled 1.421 .437
T = -2.75, p = 0.010: therefore, the issue of skill of the
workforce is significant, and should be included in the model.
5.5. CURRENT DISCLOSURE PRACTICE
In order to determine the existence of disclosure of financial 
information to employees (see 4.3.1.), respondents were asked 
to indicate whether or not they disclosed financial information 
to their employees. They were also asked if they had any 
pre-disclosure education of employees. 50% disclosed 
information and 50% did not. In relation to pre-disclosure
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education, 76% of respondents said they had none, 13% said 
there were courses available to all employees, 6% had courses 
for senior management only and 5% said they designed the 
information disclosed in such a careful way that it obviated 
the need for pre-disclosure education. (See Appendix N for 
a summary of disclosure.)
5.5.1. Employee participation schemes
Respondents were asked to indicate the practice of the 
organisation for which they worked in relation to general areas 
of employee participation in order to test the hypothesis on 
participation (see 3.6.3. and 4.3.3.), that there is a 
significant link between worker participation in an enterprise 
and the disclosure/non-disclosure pattern in that enterprise.
5.5.1.1. In order to determine the general philosophy of 
participation existing in the organisation, the respondent was 
asked to indicate which of a range of employee participation 
schemes are operational in the organisation. He was then asked 
to indicate the group/groups of employees to which the scheme/s 
is/are available. 54% responded that there are no 
participation schemes available, with only 23% offering the 
government promoted employee share participation scheme. Figure
5.9. shows the analysis of the type of participation schemes 
reported. The percentage of each which is available to all
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employees or management only is shown in Table 5.11. (The total 
is more than 100% as some companies offered more than one type 
of scheme).
TABLE 5.11 ■
EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION SCHEMES
TYPE OF SCHEME RESPONDENTS 
OPERATING SCHEME
AVAILABLE TO:
Approved share 
participation
No.
17
%
23
All
Employees
100%
Senior 
Mgt.
Non-approved share 
participation 5 7 - 100%
Share option 14 19 43% 57%
Employee partic­
ipation on Board 7 10 100% -
Sub-Board consul 
tative Board 6 8 100% -
None 40
*
54
* A number of 
above schemes.
companies 
The total
operate two or more 
is, therefore, in excess
of the 
of 100%.
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Type of s c h e m e
Type of scheme - key
1 = Approved share participation scheme
2 = Non- approved share participation scheme
3 = Share option scheme
4 = Employee participation on the Board
5 = Sub-Board consultation
6 = No participation scheme
Figure  5 .9 .
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5.5.1.2. Disclosure linked with participation schemes
In order to determine the participation context in which 
disclosure of information is taking place, a cross-tabulation 
between participation schemes and disclosure of information was 
conducted. As might be expected, those companies with no 
participation schemes disclosed financial information to 
employees less frequently than those with participation 
schemes. However, there is some discrepancy among companies 
with schemes. Those with tax approved schemes, participation 
on the Board or involvement in decision making disclose more 
often than those with share option schemes and those with 
non-approved participation schemes. (Figure 5.10).
A one way analysis of variance test shows that the difference 
in disclosure/non-disclosure patterns between enterprises with 
participatory environments and enterprises with
non-participatory environments is significant at the 90% 
confidence level (see Table 5.12.). 'Worker participation' 
will be included in the model building in Chapter 6.
Of secondary interest is the issue of the 'disclosure score' 
which is included in Table 5.12. It may be observed that there
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RELATIONSHIP DISCLOSURE/PARTICIPATION
  Partic ipotion sc h e m e»
W /\ No disclosure IV  XI D isclosure
Type of scheme - key
1 = Approved share participation scheme
2 = Non-approved share participation scheme
3 = Share option scheme
4 = Employee participation on the Board
5 = Sub-Board consultation
6 = No participation scheme
is a consistency between disclosure quantity and the operation 
of plant-wide participation schemes. The enterprises with the 
highest disclosure scores are those operating tax approved 
share participation schemes and those with the lowest 
disclosure scores are those offering no schemes for employees 
to participate in decision making or in profit.
TABLE 5.12
DISCLOSURE/NON-DISCLOSURE AND PARTICIPATION
Participation Average Disclose?
schemes disclosure No Yes
score
Tax approved 15.00 20% 80%
Non-approved 5.00 100% 0
Share option 3.67 67% 33%
Board participation 8.22 11% 89%
Involvement in 0 100%
decision making 11.50
None 1.95 70% 30%
To test for significance, "Tax approved", "Board
Participation" "Share option - all employees" and "Involvement 
in decision making" were grouped as 'participatory' and 
"Non-approved", "Share option - senior management" and "None" 
were grouped as 'non-participatory', and a one way analysis of 
variance test showed:
MEAN ST. DEV.
1.846 .368
1.319 .471
T= 5.29; p = 0.001
Participatory
Non-participatory
249.
5.5.2. Disclosure to employees
5.5.2.1. Reasons for disclosure/non-disclosure
When asked why they did not disclose information to employees, 
the lack of legal requirement and the possibility of leakage of 
confidential information were most commonly cited as the 
reasons, (see Figure 5.11 and Table 5.13). Of the respondents 
who cited 'possible leakage of confidential information', all 
represented enterprises with foreign control. This appears to 
validate the characteristic referred to in 4.3.2. of a fear of 
leakage of confidential or 'secret' information.
By way of interest, Table 5.13. also shows the average 
attitude score (see 5.6.1.) of those respondents citing each 
reason for non-disclosure. Of the reasons cited, there was a 
tendency for "Effect on pay negotiations” and "Possible 
misinterpretation" to be cited most often by accountants with a 
negative or neutral attitude to the whole issue of disclosure 
and "No legal requirement" and "Insufficient Demand" to be 
cited by those with a positive attitude. This is as would be 
expected, and validates the internal consistency of the 
responses. (Full analysis of the accountant's attitude is in
5.6. )
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Figure 5.11.
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REASONS
Reasons key:
1 = To improve a sense of team spirit
2 = Employees have a right
3 = To improve industrial relations
4 * To develop an understanding of the company's position
5 * To improve productivity
6 * To re-enforce management's view
7 = Required to do so by overseas parent
8 * To pre-empt a legally imposed system
9 = To dispel rumours
10 = Pressure from employees
Figure  5 .12 .
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TABLE 5.13.
REASON CITED FOR NON-DISCLOSURE AV. ATT.
Respondents SCORE
not disclosing
No. %
No legal requirement 16 43% 25.76
Possible leak of confidential
information 15 40% 27.60
Insufficient demand from
employees 3 8% 25.00
Effect on pay negotiations 1 3% 24.00
Possible misinterpretation 1 3% 24.00
Never considered it 1 3% 18.00
Cost would outweigh benefit 0%
It has been tried and failed 0%
Other — 0%
37 100%
Those who disclose financial information to employees say they 
do so mainly to improve a sense of team spirit, (Figure 5.12 
and Table 5.14) with one quarter stating that the employees 
have a right to receive the information; additionally, 8.5% 
stated that they disclosed information to develop an 
understanding of the company's financial position among the 
workforce, although they did not say why they felt it desirable 
to develop this understanding, or what the expected outcome of 
such development would be.
Again, by way of interest, the average attitude score of 
accountants citing the various reasons is also given in Table 
5.14. While it can be seen that these attitude scores are all 
positive, those who disclose to further the interests of the 
company rather than the interests of the employee have a lower 
score. This validates the internal consistency of the 
responses.
Of interest here is the hypotheses stated at 3.6.3. that there 
is a significant relationship between the extent to which 
employees of an enterprise demand information and the 
disclosure/non-disclosure pattern of financial information to 
employees by that enterprise. The role of the employee in both 
the case of disclosing companies and the case of the 
non-disclosing companies is seen as passive. Only 8% of the 
non-disclosing enterprises fail to disclose because of lack of 
pressure from the employees, and none of the disclosing 
managements do so because of demand from the employees. The 
hypothesis that pressure from employees is linked to 
disclose/non-disclose patterns must be rejected.
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TABLE 5.14.
REASONS CITED FOR DISCLOSURE
Respondents Av. At
disclosing Score
No. %
To improve a sense of team
spirit 16 43% 30.25
Employees have a right 9 25% 33.40
To improve industrial relations 6 16% 29.80
To develop an understanding of
the company's position 3 8% 32.30
To improve productivity 2 5% 29. 50
To help re-enforce management's view 1 3% 29.00
Required to do so by an overseas parent 0 0%
To pre-empt a legally imposed system 0 0%
To dispel rumours 0 0%
Pressure from employees _0 0%
37 100%
5.6. THE ATTITUDE OF THE ACCOUNTANT
5.6.1. An overview
It was hypothesized (3.6.3.) that there is a significant 
relationship between the attitude of an enterprise's financial 
accountant and the disclosure/non-disclosure pattern of 
financial information to employees by the enterprise. In 
measuring the attitude of the financial accountant, the 
attitude score is accumulated by aggregating the score for each 
of the attitude questions (see Table 5.15). The more positive 
the attitude, the higher the score. Each question has a 
maximum of 5 points and a minimum of 1 point. As there were 
eight valid questions, the possible maximum score was 40 with a 
minimum of 8; the "neutral" score being 24.
TABLE 5.15.
SUMMARY OF ATTITUDE QUESTIONS
QUESTION STRONGLY AGREE
AGREE
1. The accountant 
should limit himself 
to reporting to
shareholders. (1) 10% 23%
2. Employees have 
a social right to
financial information 22% 54%
( 2 )
3. Employees are
not interested (4) 3% 35%
4. Employees need
financial information 11% 54%
(5)
5. Employees do not 
understand financial
information (7) 8% 51%
6. Companies cannot
afford the cost (13) 0% 7%
7. Business would 
be healthier if 
employees were
informed (14) 15% 50%
8. With unemployment,
no need to disclose 0% 3%
(15)
UNCERTAIN DISAGREE STRONGLY TOT.
DISAGREE
7% 40% 20% 100
11% 13% 0% 100
20% 38% 4% 100
19% 16% 0% 100
10% 31% 0% 100
18% 58% 17% 100
23% 10% 1% 100
12% 69% 16% 100
(For full question see questionnaire (Appendix F) - Figures in 
parenthesis refer to question 4.1.)
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The result of the attitude score is indicated in Figure 5.13. 
It can be seen that the range of the data is from 18 to 37; 
there are no gaps, only one stem without observations and there 
are no outliers. The most common observation is 29, which 
could be described as reasonably positive on a continuum of 
attitude. The mean score was 28.06 (median 28.07). The mean 
score of those who were favourable i.e. above the neutral 
score was 30.2, which indicates that the accountants who are 
favourable could be classified on a uni-polar scale as 
moderately so.
STEM AND LEAF DISPLAY OF ATTITUDE SCORE OF
ACCOUNTANTS
1 8
2 00111
2 22223333
2 44444555
2 666677777
2 888899999999999
3 0000000001111
3 222333
3 45
3 6666667
Figure 5.13.
While the results show that accountants could not be described 
as holding intensely positive attitudes to disclosure to 
employees, fewer than one in five of the respondents (18.9%) 
were below the neutral score of 24 (i.e. having an
unfavourable attitude), 6.7% were at the neutral score (i.e.
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having no strong feelings one way or the other to the issue), 
and an overwhelming 74.4% were favourable to the issue of 
disclosure to employees.
5.6.2. Effect of attitude on disclosure practice
It was hypothesized in 3.6.3. that there is a significant 
relationship between the attitude of the financial accountant 
and disclosure/non-disclosure pattern. A one way analysis of 
variance test shows that the difference in disclosure/non­
disclosure patterns between enterprises with accountants with a 
positive attitude and enterprises with accountants not having a 
positive attitude is significant at the 90% confidence level 
(see Table 5.16). The attitude of the accountant will be 
included in the model building in Chapter 6.
By way of interest, again, the 'disclosure score' was 
considered in conjunction with the attitude. It was found that 
there was a high correlation (.70) between the attitude of the 
accountant and the degree of disclosure i.e. the more positive 
the accountant, the higher the score. It would seem, therefore, 
that an increase in the attitude of the accountant would 
probably be associated with an increased practice of 
disclosure (see Figure 5.14.)
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RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISCLOSURE AND ATTITUDE
TABLE 5.16.
ATTITUDE
DISCLOSE
Positive Neutral Negative
Yes
No
35
20
1
4
1
13
MEAN 
ST.DEV
1.636
.489
1 . 200 
. 501
1.070
.486
T = 5.89, p = .0001.
5.6.3. Attitude to responsibility for introduction
5.6.3.1. Expectation of introduction of general disclosure
Respondents were asked when they felt disclosure to employees 
would become general practice. A very large majority felt that 
it will become practice within the next ten years, (Figure 5.15 
and Table 5.17).
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EXPECTED INTRODUCTION OF DISCLOSURE
N ext 1
Never (4 .0% )
Figu re  5 .15 .
TABLE 5.17.
RESPONSE TO QUESTION ON THE EXPECTED TIME FRAME FOR 
INTRODUCTION OF DISCLOSURE AS GENERAL PRACTICE________
GENERAL PRACTICE: No. %
Next five years 30 40
Next ten years 33 45
Next twenty years 6 8
Never 3 4
Don't know _2 _3
74 100
5.6.3.2. Responsibility within the enterprise
The respondent was asked a question concerning his own role 
(see 4.3.3.). When asked which officer of the organisation 
ought to be responsible for communicating data to employees, 
the majority of respondents felt that disclosure to employees 
should be the responsibility of a committee of managers which 
would include the financial accountant. A relatively small 
percentage (see Figure 5.16. and Table 5.18) of the respondents 
saw themselves as solely responsible for this reporting 
function.
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RESPONSIBILITY FOR DISCLOSURE
7 ( 1 . 0 * )
Key
1 = A committee of managers
2 = The financial accountant
3 a The personnel manager
4 = The communications manager
5 = Divisional managers
6 * The management accountant
7 = No information should be given
Figure  5 .16 .
TABLE 5.18
RESPONSE TO QUESTION ON WHO SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE
FOR DISCLOSURE?
ihould be responsible? No. %
A committee of managers 51 70
The financial accountant 12 16
The personnel manager 5 7
The communications manager 3 4
Divisional managers 1 1
The management accountant 1 
No information should be given
1
by anyone _1
7 4
__1
100
5.5.4. External regulation of disclosure
The question of which body ought to be responsible for 
initiating the practice by all enterprises of disclosure of 
financial information to employees (referred to in 4.3.2.) was 
one on which there was not agreement. Again, the majority of 
the accountants recognised that it is unrealistic to expect the 
employees to initiate a practice of disclosure of financial 
information in the current environment of misunderstanding and 
complexity that surrounds financial accounts. A large number 
of the respondents (see Figure 5.17. and Table 5.19) felt that 
individual managements should initiate the disclosure to 
employees. Very few felt that it should be his job; 
re-enforcing again the accountants' lack of perception of the
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RESPONSIBILITY FOR INITIATION
Responsible body
Body key :
1 *  I n d i v i d u a l  B o a r d s  o f  D i r e c t o r s
2 = The Irish Government
3 = The Professional bodies
4 = The European Community
5 = Employees/their representatives
6 = Individual company accountants
7 = Individual management accountants
8 = D o n ' t  know
9 = No i n f o r m a t i o n  s h o u l d  e v e r  be g i v e n
Figure 5. 17.
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need for him to take responsibility for the design of 
communications media and formats. Local legislation was seen 
by only 25% of respondents as the way forward, while some felt 
that legislation should come from the EC. Again, this 
emphasises the feeling of accountants that the responsibility 
for progress in this area, in which the accountant would be 
presumed to be the leading expert, should not be laid at his 
door. He appears willing to take direction, but reluctant to 
direct. Additionally it confirms the suggestion that the Irish 
paradigm is not seen by the majority as progressing under a 
legalism influence.
TABLE 5.19
RESPONSE TO QUESTION ON WHO SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR
INITIATINGDISCLOSURE
Initiation of disclosure? No. %
Individual Boards of Directors 32 43
The Irish Government 18 25
The Professional bodies 10 14
The European Community 6 8
Employees/their representatives 3 4
Individual company accountants 2 3
Individual management accountants 1 1
Don't know 1 1
No information should ever be
given _1 _1
74 100
2 S 6 .
Additionally respondents were asked a question concerning the 
future role of the Professional Accountancy Bodies in seeking 
regulation for financial information to be disclosed to 
employees. (See 4.3.3.) The most striking aspect of the 
response to this question was the percentage of accountants who 
declared themselves "Uncertain" about this issue (22%). This 
probably indicates a general lack of interface between the 
bodies and members, and a general lack of understanding of the 
function of the professional bodies (other than to "collect 
large subscriptions annually from members"). 4% expressed 
themselves strongly in favour of positive action by the 
Professional bodies, with 25% in favour; while 34% disagreed 
with such action and 15% strongly disagreed.
This response is of interest in the context of the stand which 
the main body (the ICAI) of accountants is taking in an 
associationistic role in supporting the disclosure of financial 
information to employees. The results of the survey show that 
the association is reflecting the positive attitude of its 
members. This lack of enthusiasm by members to the association 
taking positive action does not invalidate the description of 
the Irish paradigm in Chapter 3 as largely associationistic.
5.6.5. Familiarity with EC proposals
Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they 
were familiar with the Vredeling Directive on Company Law (see
4.3.2.). Less than one third of the respondents were familiar 
with this directive (see Figure 5.18.), and when asked why 
they were not familiar with it, the majority indicated that 
this was due to lack of publicity. This Directive did receive 
considerable publicity when it was first issued, although it 
has not featured in recent technical publications. Over one 
third indicated that they make it a practice to familiarise 
themselves with Directives when they are introduced onto the 
National statute books. This gives some evidence of the 
accountant's tendency to blinker himself from change until such 
change is actually forced onto his horizon by regulation. Of 
those who were familiar with the Directive, over one half felt 
it would have a moderate impact on their organisations when it 
is enacted.
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VREDELING DIRECTIVE 
RESPONSE TO QUESTION ON FAMILIARITY WITH VREDELING
%
Unaware of its existence 35
Aware, but unsure of content 34
Familiar with general terms 30
Fully conversant with terms 1
OF THOSE WHO WERE NOT FAMILIAR WITH DIRECTIVE 
Not familiar because:
It has not been publicised 52%
Only familiarise with directives
when they become law 34%
It will never be enacted 4%
Not relevant to work 10%
No interest 0%
OF THOSE WHO WERE FAMILIAR WITH DIRECTIVE 
What impact will it have on your organisation?
Major 8%
Considerable 8%
Moderate 67%
Minor 13%
None 4%
Don't know 0%
Figure 5.18.
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5 . 7 .  MAIN CONCLUSIONS
The main conclusions are summarized under the headings 
described in 4.3., as follows:
5.7.1. The existence of the disclosure of financial information 
to employees in Ireland:
5.7.1.1. One half of enterprises disclose financial information 
to their employees. (5.5.) It is of interest to note that the 
volume of disclosure is patchy and mixed and may best be 
described as 'not extensive'.
5.7.1.2. Less than one quarter of enterprises offer approved 
share participation schemes. Less than one fifth have a share 
option scheme, and of those that do, less than one half offer 
the option scheme to all employees. (5.5.1.)
5.7.2. Completion of the picture of the Irish paradigm
5.7.2.1. There is little evidence of pre-disclosure education 
in the enterprises surveyed. (5.5.)
5.7.2.2. The majority of respondents feel that disclosure 
should not be mandated by Government or by the EC, but should 
be initiated by individual enterprises. Respondents were 
uncertain about the role of the association of preparers, 
(i.e. the ICAI), (5.6.4.).
5.7.2.3. There is some evidence of the secretive nature of the 
Irish community referred to in Chapter 3. This is evidenced by 
the citation of 'fear of leakage of confidential information' 
as a reason for non-disclosure by 40% of the non-disclosers. 
This fear is associated with foreign control.
( 5 . 5 . 2 . I . )
5.7.2.4. The role of the accountant in disclosing financial 
information to employees within the Irish paradigm was 
considered. It appears that the accountant would prefer to act 
as a member of a team in this task than to accept sole 
responsibility. (5.6.3.2.)
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5.7.2.5. Less than one third of respondents declared themselves 
familiar with the proposals of the Vredeling Directive on 
disclosure. Respondents indicated that they were waiting until 
the legislation had actually been enacted before familiarizing 
themselves with its terms. (5.6.5.)
5.7.3.- Examination of the hypotheses set out in 4.3.3.
Four of the characteristics identified in 3.6.3. proved 
significant in explaining patterns of disclosure/non-disclosure 
of financial information to employees within the Irish 
paradigm. These variables were:
5.7.3.1. Ownership structure (5.4.4.)
5.7.3.2. Worker participation (5.5.1.2.)
5.7.3. 3. Attitude of the financial accountant (5.6.2.) 
5.7.3.4. The skill of the workforce (5.4. 6.2.)
The four remaining characteristics identified in 3.6.3. did not 
prove significant in explaining disclosure/non-disclosure of 
financial information to employees within the Irish paradigm. 
These variables were:
5.7.3.6. Demand for information from employees (5.5.2.1. and
5 .6 .4 .)
5.7.3.7. Unionization (5.4.2.)
5.7.3.8. The size of the workforce (5.4.5.)
5.7.3.9. The length of establishment of the enterprise
(5.4.3.)
The four significant characteristics will be included in model 
building in Chapter 6.
Some further tests and analyses to confirm the internal 
consistency of the responses, to explore the responses to 
attitude questions and to examine views on future developments 
were conducted. They are described in the Appendix to this 
chapter (Appendix 5.1.).
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APPENDIX 5 . 1 .
This appendix gives:
* some further detail concerning the responses to the
attitude questions (A5.1.),
* the responses to some questions asked to check the
internal validity of the responses (A5.2.) and
* the findings regarding views about future developments
(A5.3.).
A5.1. RESPONSES TO ATTITUDE QUESTIONS
Table 5.15. shows an analysis of the responses given to the 
questions making up the attitude score. It can be seen ( Q. l )  
that less than one third of the respondents felt that the 
financial accountant should limit himself to the traditional 
role of the accountant - that of reporting to the shareholders. 
Sixty percent felt that the financial accountant's role should
not be limited. Given the attitude class to which this 
attitude belongs, this is of interest to the educators of 
to-morrow's accountant.
There was a very strong body of opinion that the employees have 
a social right to receive financial information concerning the 
enterprise in which they are employed. (Q.2). More than three 
quarters of the respondents agreed with this proposition. This 
lends support to the proposal in Chapter 2 that the employee is 
a decision maker with a justified right to the financial 
information of his employing enterprise.
There was an even spread of attitude towards the issue of 
employees' interest in financial information (Q.3). It is 
interesting to note that one in five were unsure whether 
employees were interested or not, indicating a lack of thought 
on the part of financial accountants on this communications 
aspect of their work.
The answers to Q. 4 indicate that two out of every three 
financial accountants feel that employees need financial 
information concerning the employing organisation if they are 
to make valid employment decisions. Only 16% felt that 
employees did not need such information. It can be seen that 
although financial accountants feel that employees have a right 
to such information and actually need such information, they
are also unconvinced about the employees' interest in the 
information. This writer would suggest that this phenomenon is 
an acknowledgement of a defect in the manner in which 
information is presented by the financial accountant rather 
than an inherent defect in the employees themselves. This is 
borne out by the responses to questions concerning the future 
use of varying information and expansions in communications 
media (referred to in A5 . 3 . ) .
It is also further confirmed in the acknowledgement in Q.5. 
that employees would not understand financial information. 
Almost sixty percent of respondents felt this to be the case. 
Although this is generally taken to be a reason for NOT 
disclosing information to employees, the other side of the 
"employee understanding" coin is that if employees do not 
understand the information prepared and presented by the 
financial accountant; far from being conclusive proof that 
financial information should not be disclosed to employees, it 
is a reasonable ground to suggest that the financial accountant 
is failing in one of the most important aspects of his role - 
that of communicating understandable and relevant information 
to users of his financial statements, and that the financial 
accountant should consider the design of information and the 
media used in the communication of information to the users. It 
is interesting to note that there is linear correlation 
(correlation co-efficient 0.798) between attitude to the
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employees ability to understand and the disclosure score. The 
higher the disclosure score the more likely the accountant is 
to feel that the employees will understand financial 
information.
Always cost conscious, it would be expected that the financial 
accountant would consider the cost benefit analysis to the 
enterprise of disclosure of financial information to employees. 
However, having considered the cost of such disclosure, 75% of 
the respondents felt that in this instance, companies could 
afford the cost of such disclosure. 7% felt that companies 
could not afford such cost and 18% were uncertain. Of these 
last two categories, 98% work with companies which do not
disclose information to employees. On analysis, those 
accountants who work with companies which already disclose 
information to the employees were more strongly in agreement 
that cost is not an issue, and were less uncertain on the
issue.
In relation to the effect on organisations of disclosure to 
employees, respondents were asked if they thought businesses 
would be healthier if there were a practice of disclosure. Only 
11% thought businesses would not be healthier, with 23% 
uncertain. Two out of every three were of the opinion that
disclosure would have a good impact on the health of the
business. However, on further analysis, there was found to be
i
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a positive correlation (correlation co-efficient .607), between 
a positive attitude to this premise and an existing practice of 
disclosure. All respondents who disagreed or disagreed 
strongly with the linkage between disclosure and health are 
working with organisations which do not disclose. 86% of those 
accountants in disclosing companies either agreed or agreed 
strongly, with 14% being uncertain.
It has been suggested that in the current environment of 
unemployment and scarcity of jobs, that employers need not
invest as much thought and effort into the area of good 
employee communications. However the respondents to this study 
were very emphatic that even though many of the employment 
cards are in the hands of management, the unemployment
environment should not be an issue in the development of 
disclosure practices. (Q.8)
The mean score of those holding a degree as well as a
professional qualification was 29.1 compared with a mean score 
of 27.96 for those without a degree. However the difference is 
not significant, as may be seen from Table A5.1.
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Table A5.1.
ONE WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE: ACCOUNTANTS' EDUCATION
AND ATTITUDE
MEAN ATT. ST. DEV.
SCORE
Accountants with University education 29.13 4.76
Accountants without University education 27.96 4.37
Analysis of variance, 1 degree freedom, p = .861. Therefore, 
the difference in attitude between those accountants with 
university education and those without is not significant.
A 5 . 2 .  ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS TO CHECK INTERNAL VALIDITY
A5.2.1. Effect of thoughtful consideration on attitude
A further examination of the accountants' attitudes was 
conducted to determine if a negative attitude arises from a 
"first response" mechanism or from a detailed consideration of 
the issues and implications; similarly to determine the context 
of a positive response. Respondents were asked to agree 
strongly, agree, disagree strongly, disagree or state 
uncertainty with the statement "The disclosure of information 
to employees is a subject to which I have not given much 
thought". The responses to this question were cross tabulated 
with the attitude scale scores. There is a correlation 
co-efficient of .560, indicating a positive correlation between 
the degree of thought given to the issue and the positive 
nature of their attitudes. A chi square test was conducted to 
test the difference in attitude between those accountants who 
had given thought to the issue of disclosure and those who had 
not. Those respondents who strongly agree that they have not 
given much thought to the issue had negative attitudes and 
those who strongly disagree had positive attitudes. Table 
A5.2. summarises the attitude score to "negative", "neutral" 
and "positive". Due to the low count in some cells, the 
categories "Little" and "None" were combined; likewise the 
categories "Considerable" and "Extensive". It may be seen that
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attitude differs significantly from the expected count, 
indicating that those who have given little thought to the 
subject are more negative than expected, and those who have 
given a lot of consideration to the subject are more positive 
than expected.
TABLE A5.2.
CHI SQUARE: EXTENT OF CONSIDERATION AND ATTITUDE
EXTENT OF CAREFUL CONSIDERATION
None and Little Moderate Considerable and
Extensive
ATTITUDE
Negative 9 1
(3.9) (.41) 
Neutral 2 1
(1.3) (.14) 
Positive 8 0
(13.79) (.45)
5
(10.68)
2
(3.56)
45
(37.75)
(Figures in parenthesis represent the expected 
value)
count for each
Chi-square value =22.29, 4 degrees freedom, p = < .001
There is, therefore, statistical evidence that the attitude of 
the accountant will increase with the degree of thought given 
to the topic of disclosure of financial information to 
employees, and that the increase is significant.
__________________________________________________________________
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A5.2.2. Effect of innate conservatism on attitude
In order to determine the general context in which respondents 
felt positive or negative to the issue of disclosure to 
employees, they were asked to respond to a question to 
determine their attitude towards change and development in 
financial accounting in general. The question concerned the 
major development in the regulatory framework of financial 
accounting, viz. the issue of Statements of Standard Accounting 
Practice (SSAPs), now Financial Reporting Statements (FRSs). 
If disclosure to employees is viewed negatively by accountants 
who have a positive attitude to other major change and 
development in financial accounting, then further investigation 
would prove necessary, and the future development of disclosure 
might be at risk. If, on the other hand, a negative attitude 
to disclosure to employees exists in some accountants in tandem 
with a negative attitude to all change, such conservatism 
should not prove an insurmountable barrier to the gradual 
introduction of disclosure. As it becomes acceptable practice, 
accountants who currently declare themselves to have a negative 
attitude may find their attitudes changing with the 
increasing acceptability and application of the practice of 
disclosure. Accountants who have a more positive reason for 
disliking disclosure would be less likely to experience such a 
change of attitude.
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However, an examination of the average attitude score showed a 
linear relationship between attitude to disclosure to employees 
and attitude to other developments in accounting practice. 
(Table A5.3.). A chi square test was conducted on the detailed 
scores, but although it did show a significant relationship the 
result was not reliable as there were in excess of 20% of the 
cells with very low expected frequencies. However, an 
examination of the average scores indicates a clear 
relationship.
A cross check with disclosure score indicated an increasing 
disclosure score in conjunction with positive feelings about 
changes promulgated by the SSAPs. The accountants who agreed 
most strongly with the need to keep up to date with SSAPs 
disclosed most information. (Table A5.3)
While this question on SSAPs is thought to be a reasonable test 
of the conservatism of respondents, it is accepted that it is 
not a flawless question to serve this purpose. It may be, for 
example, that respondents cannot keep up to date with the SSAPs 
because they have difficulty in agreeing with their conceptual 
bases.
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TABLE A5.3.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ATTITUDE TO DISCLOSURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
Response to questions 
"It is impossible 
keep up to date Strongly Agree Uncertain 
with SSAPs" agree
Dis­
agree
Strongly
disagree
Average att. score 26 27 30 30 31
Average disclosure 2.85 2.72 4.67 
score
4.55 6.13
Another question was, therefore, added to the questionnaire to 
parallel this check. Accountants were asked whether they could 
visualise the use of video presentation of information which is 
currently only promulgated in the written form (see A5.3.). 
Again, there was a correlation between those who thought that 
video presentations would be introduced and those who had a 
favourable attitude to disclosure to employees.
A5.2.3. Subsidiary effects on attitude
A number of factors were considered in conjunction with 
attitude, as detailed in 4.3.3., i.e. the age of the 
accountant, the qualification and experience of the accountant.
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The gender of the accountant was eliminated from the 
consideration due to the small number of women respondents. 
These did not prove significant in their relationships to the 
accountant's attitude.
The accountants' ages were cross tabulated with attitude. (See 
Table AS.4.) There is a distinct tendancy for attitude to 
improve with age, levelling out at the age of 50. The average 
scores for respondants analysed by age is seen in Figure A5.1 
and Table A5.4. One-way analysis of variance test was 
conducted on these mean scores to determine the significance of 
the difference between the scores of the various age groups. It 
may be seen from Table A5.5. that the difference in the 
attitude score is statistically significant, at a 90% 
confidence level.
TABLE A5.4.
ACCOUNTANTS' AGE AND ATTITUDE
Age Att. Score
20 - 30 years 25.5
31 - 40 years 26.7
41 - 50 years 29.5
51 - 60 years 28.9
TABLE A5.5.
ONE WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE: ACCOUNTANTS' AGE AND
SOURCE DEGREES OF 
FREEDOM
SUM OF 
SQUARES
MEAN F-
SQUARES
Factor
Error
3
70
144.6 
1358.1
48.2
19.4
LEVEL MEAN ST.DEV.
20
31
41
51
30 yrs 
40 yrs 
50 yrs 
60 yrs
25.50
26.76
29.55
28.30
5.066 
4.155 
4.471 
4.692
ATTITUDE
■RATIO
2.48
P= 0.1: therefore the difference in attitude score between the 
age range groupings is statistically significant.
EFFECT OF AGE ON ATTITUDE
5.6.7. Effect of experience and qualification
A similar analysis was conducted to consider the possibility of 
a relationship between qualification, experience with 
negotiations and/or experience with accounting on attitude. 
However, no correlation between any of these factors and 
attitude was detected.
A5.3. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
In order to assist in making recommendations for future 
development and to help highlight possible areas for further 
research, respondents were asked some questions to elicit their 
view on the future development of disclosure of financial 
information to employees;
A5.3.1. Developments in communication media
In order to determine accountants' attitudes to future 
developments in the media of communication of financial 
information, a question was posed concerning the future use of 
video presentations to supplement the written financial report. 
A high proportion of respondents was uncertain about this 
issue. Clearly the use of such a medium is a possibility they
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have never considered, and to which they had not been exposed 
during their period of training and education. However, 5% 
strongly agreed that video presentations would commonly be 
used, 50% agreed, with 26% uncertain and 15% disagreeing - 4% 
disagreed strongly. So, although there is some uncertainty, 
55% of financial accountants were willing to acknowledge that 
such a major development is on the horizon. Again, this is of 
interest to educators and trainers of to-morrow's accountants. 
The accountants appear to have a positive attitude and, in the 
main, are willing to acknowledge the probability of huge 
changes in financial reporting practice, and yet there is 
little movement in the programmes of education and training to 
prepare them for the communications theory and practice they 
will need. This issue will be considered in Chapter 7.
A5.3.2. Tiering of disclosure by skill
When asked if all employees should be given the same level of 
information, there was an even distribution of response, with 
slightly larger proportion agreeing with the proposition. 
There were few who felt strongly about this issue, and on 
analysis, those accountants who have experience of disclosure 
felt slightly less strongly than those without. There is, 
therefore, considerable disagreement on this - issue of 
differentiated information. On further analysis it was found 
that accountants in companies with a high level of unskilled
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labour feel that the same information should be given to all 
employees, while accountants in companies with higher levels of 
employee skill were more strongly in favour of giving different 
information to various levels of employee.
A5.3.3. Tiering of media by skill
Respondents were also asked their view on whether the media 
used should vary with the different levels of employee skill; 
for example, if full blown accounts would be suitable for one 
group and a video presentation or tabloid format magazine 
suitable for another. There was strong support for this 
proposition with 73% expressing themselves in favour. However, 
on analysis, it can be seen in Table A5.6. that the feeling was 
not so strong among those who already disclose information to 
employees and that the difference between the disclosers and 
non-disclosers is significant. Because of the low count in some 
cells, the categories "Strongly agree" and "Agree" have been 
combined; likewise the categories "Strongly disagree" and 
"Disagree".
This indicates that experience with disclosure leads 
accountants to moderate their attitude towards the ability of 
employees at all levels to deal with information presented in 
the same format.
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TABLE A 5 . 6 .
THE MEDIA SHOULD VARY: Agree Uncertain Disagree
DISCLOSE?
No 32 0 5
(27.0) (2.5) (7.5)
Yes 22 5 10
(27.0) (2.5) (7.5)
ANALYSIS QF ATTITUDE TOWARDS VARIATION OF MEDIA
(The figures in parenthesis are the expected counts for each 
value)
Chi-square value = 8.519 with 2 degrees freedom, p = .025
Therefore there is a significant difference.
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CHAPTER SIX
FURTHER ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION
6.1. INTRODUCTION
Chapter 3 of this study identified a number of variables which 
it was hypothesized bore a significant relationship to the 
disclosure/non-disclosure pattern of financial information to 
employees within the Irish paradigm. Chapter 5 described the 
univariate analysis which was conducted to test those 
hypotheses. The variables which emerged as significant were 
identified in 5.7.3. and this Chapter will describe the 
multi-variate analysis conducted to construct a model from 
those significant variables to explain the disclosure/non­
disclosure pattern in Irish enterprises of financial 
information to employees. Variables which proved not to be 
significant, identified in 5.7.3., will not be included in 
this analysis.
Having examined the relationship between the dependent variable 
(disclosure or non-disclosure) and the separate independent 
variables, the combined predictors will be examined to teat 
for significance in explaining the disclosure pattern in Irish 
enterprises. The dependent variable is a limited dependent 
variable, i.e., either 'yes' or 'no', with no range of values 
in between.
The purpose of the further analysis detailed in this Chapter is 
to examine, using multiple regression analysis, whether and to 
what extent, any of the exogenous variables (worker 
participation in the enterprise, the attitude of the financial 
accountant, the skill of the workforce and the ownership 
structure) identified in 5.7.3. has a significant effect in its 
own right on the endogenous variable (disclosure or 
non-disclosure) and to draw conclusions concerning 
recommendations which could be made to influence the 
significant independent variables, thereby contributing to the 
development of disclosure by Irish enterprises of financial 
information to employees.
If it proves possible to identify the variables which are 
significant in influencing the disclosure practice of Irish 
enterprises at a time when disclosure is voluntary and not 
mandated by legislation, it would be possible to suggest steps 
which may be taken to stimulate voluntary disclosure in Ireland
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to encourage the disclosure which was justified in Chapter 2 in 
a manner which is formulated by voluntary practice and moulded 
to suit the Irish enterprise before such practice is mandated 
by legislation designed in mainland Europe.
6.2. METHODOLOGY EMPLOYED
6.2.1. Multiple Regression
In order to construct the model which will assist in an 
understanding of the variables which influence some enterprises 
in Ireland to disclose while others do not, regression analysis 
was used. Regression analysis is concerned with the 
investigation of the relationship between variables in the 
presence of random error. Multiple regression analysis seeks 
to explain variation in one variable (the dependent variable) 
in terms of a linear function of a set of other variables (the 
independent variables). Normally only a proportion of the 
variation can be explained by the model. The unexplained 
variation is usually referred to as the error term. The 
analysis aims to maximise the variation explained and so to 
reduce the error term. The general form of the model is 
expressed as follows:
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y = a + al xl + a2 x2 + .....  ak xk + e
where: y = the dependent variable,
x = the independent variables, 
a = the regression co-efficients, 
k = the number of independent variables, and 
e = the random error term
(For a more detailed general explanation of multiple 
regression, see Neter, Wasserman and Kutner (1985) and Draper 
and Smith (1981)).
A multiple linear regression was run, using Ordinary Least 
Squares model on the dependant variable (does the enterprise 
disclose or not) with the following independent variables which 
were identified in 5.7.3. as significant in the univariate 
analysis.
The attitude of the accountant (Atscore)
The control of the enterprise, whether foreign or Irish 
(Control)
The skill of the workforce (Skill)
The participatory environment of the enterprise (Partenv)
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6.2.2. Stepwise Selection
In order to determine the optimal combination of independent 
variables for the model, "stepwise selection" was used. Under 
this method, the first independent variable considered for 
entry into the equation is the one with the largest positive or 
negative correlation with the dependent variable. An 
independent variable is entered only if the hypothesis that the 
variation in the dependent variable being explained by the 
independent variable is caused by chance can be rejected at
0.05 significance level. As each variable is added, the 
existing variables are re-assessed to ensure their continuing 
validity.
Because the dependent variable is a limited dependent variable,
1.e. a qualitative, non-series variable with responses limited 
to "yes" and "no", dummy variables of 0 representing 'no 
disclosure' and 1 representing 'disclosure' were used. An OLS 
estimator was then applied to the data.
In order to maximise the reliability of the results of the 
regression analysis, Logit and Probit models were also used to 
analyse the data.
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Regression analysis was used to identify the model which best 
explains the dependent variable (disclosure/non-disclosure) in 
terms of the independent variables listed in 6.2.1. Regression 
multiplies each of the independent variables by a co-efficient 
and adds the results together; each co-efficient measures the 
contribution of its variable to the overall forecast.
6.2.2. Criteria for choosing models used
The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model was first applied to the 
data. Least squares has been described by experimenters such 
as Mosteller et al. (1981 pp 150-152) as corresponding to the 
layman's 'freehand' attempts to fit a line to a scatter of 
data. Least squares calculates the best fitting line as the
line for which the sum of the squares of deviations of the
predicted values from the observed values is a minimum. Kennedy 
(1985 p 96) suggests that this method is widely used because of 
its ability to maximise the R squared. Because the OLS 
estimator minimizes the sum of the squared residuals (or 
'unexplained' variations), it maximises R squared. R squared 
represents the proportion of the variation in the dependent 
variable 'explained' by the independent variables, and is 
known as the co-efficient of determination.
There is no generally accepted answer to the question of what 
is a high R squared. However Ames and Reiter (1961) indicate 
that in dealing with time-series data, very high R squareds are 
not unusual. This data is not, of course, time series, and 
Maddala (1988) reports that the use of dummy variables of 0 and 
1 result in low R squares. A 'low' R squared, will therefore 
not be surprising in this analysis.
In examining the combination of independent variables, it would 
be possible to increase the R squared statistic simply by 
adding further variables, and the converse effect is, of 
course, to apparently decrease the R squared statistic simply 
by removing independent variables from the analysis. 
Correcting the R squared statistic for degrees of freedom 
solves this problem. The R squared statistic adjusted to 
account for the loss in degrees of freedom due to the addition 
of more explanatory variables, or the 'adjusted R squared' (RA) 
is therefore used in this analysis to determine the 
significance of the inclusion or exclusion of variables.
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6.2.4. Limited dependent variables
The dependent variable in this analysis is in the form of a 
dichotomous limited dependent variable, which is necessary 
because of the qualitative nature of the variable. The 
dependent variable has been set up, as indicated by Maddala, as 
0 1 dummy variable and regressed on the independent variables. 
However, as can be seen in Figure 6.1., the use of the dummy 
variable can give rise to having estimated probabilities 
outside the 0 - 1  range. This could be avoided by converting 
estimated probabilities lying outside the 0 - 1  range to either 
0 or 1 as appropriate using the linear probability model. 
However Kennedy (1985) suggests that this can lead to 
inaccuracies because outcomes are sometimes predicted with 
certainty when it is quite possible that they may not occur. 
(This is supported by the work of Cragg and Uhler (1970 pp 386  
406) and McFadden (1974 pp 303 - 325), whose work suggests 
that the logit and probit give very good results and that both 
are better than the linear probability model.)
The alternative is to use a model which will squeeze the 
estimated probabilities inside the 0 - 1 interval without
actually creating probability estimates of 0 or 1, as indicated 
by the broken line on Figure 6.1. Two models have been 
utilised in this study to supplement the OLS model, the probit 
model which uses the cumulative normal function and the logit
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yFigure 6.1. The linear probability model
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model which uses the logistic function. Both models have been 
estimated via a maximum likelihood technique. This technique 
is undertaken by interpreting a linear function of the 
independent variables as an index (called the 'disclosure 
potential'). If this 'disclosure potential' index for an 
enterprise exceeds that enterprise's critical value of this 
index, that enterprise will disclose. Some individual 
enterprises need little encouragement to disclose so they will 
have low critical values; others disclose only under extremely 
favourable circumstances and so have high critical values. In 
the probit model these critical values are assumed to be 
distributed normally among the enterprises studied. The 
liklihood of each enterprise to disclose is computed and then 
the liklihood function for the entire sample is formed by 
multiplying together all the expressions for the likelihoods 
for the enterprises. (For a more detailed general explanation 
of the probit model, see Finney (1971)).
In the logit model, the individual enterprise critical values 
are distributed as a hyperbolic-secant-square distribution, the 
cumulative distribution of which is the logistic function. (For 
a more detailed general explanation of the logit model, see 
McCullagh and Nelder (1988)).
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6 . 3 .  ANALYSIS OF R SQUARED AND ADJUSTED R SQUARED
The dependent variable was firstly regressed with the 
independent variables which emerged from the previous analysis 
as important in the Irish paradigm (5.7.3.) i.e. atscore, 
control, partenv and skill.
As can be seen from Table 6.1., the resultant R squared is .51 
with an adjusted R squared of .49. This means that 49% of the 
propensity to disclose can be attributed to those variables. 
This, in the light of an expected low R squared for limited 
dependent variables, can be regarded as high. Indeed, the 
relationship may be regarded as very high, in the light of 
Triandis' (1971) conclusion that in most psychological
studies, correlations of .30 are rather typical". The 
independent variables with significant T-statistic results may 
be seen as "Atscore" and "Partenv".
In order to test the reliability of the R squared statistic, 
logit and probit models were run on the data. In order to 
ensure a satisfactory R squared result, the problem of the 
explained variable y taking only two values needs to be dealt 
with. The predicted values y are probabilities and the actual 
values of y are either 0 or 1. Logit and Probit models deal 
with qualitative data reflecting a choice between one
alternative and another. In the case of this study, the choice 
is 'disclosure' or 'non-disclosure'. The logit and probit 
models quantify the relationship of the probability to the 
characteristics. A probability is a number between zero and 
one, so the specification needs to embody this restriction. 
The logit model does this by using the functional form,
Prob[y = 0] = 1/(1 + exp(b0 + blxl + b2x2 + ...))
The probit model uses the functional form,
Prob[y = 0] = 1 - P(b0 + blxl + b2x2 + ...))
Where P(X) is the cumulative normal distribution, that is, P(X) 
is the probability that a random variable with a normal 
distribution, zero mean, and unit variance does not exceed X.
As may be seen from Table 6.1., the logit and probit models use 
the maximum likelihood method for the estimation of the 
parameters in the multiple linear regression model, giving a 
result as 'log likelihood' and not as R squared. In order to 
consider the results of these models in conjunction with the 
least squares method, which produces an R squared statistic, it 
is necessary to convert the 'log likelihood' result into an 
R-squared result.
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TABLE 6 . 1 .
DEPENDENT VARIABLE DISCLOSE, INDEPENDENT VARIABLES s ATSCORE,
CONTROL PARTENV AND SKILL
COEFF T-STAT 2-TAIL SIG
LS
Atscore .07 6.87 .000
Control .03 .66 .509
Partenv -.64 -2.93 .005
Skill .02 .84 .405
R-squared
Adjusted r-squared 
F-statistic
= .51 
= .49 
= 19.29 p= .002
LOG IT
Atscore .65 3.92 .000
Control .15 .35 .724
Partenv -.70 -2.67 .010
Skill .19 .88 .382
Log likelihood = -23 .38
R-squared conversions Count R-squared .85, Squared correlations 
.76, McFaddens R-squared: .47.
PROBIT
Atscore .38 4.17 .000
Control .10 .42 .677
Partenv -.41 -2.76 .008
Skill . 11 .86 .395
Log likelihood = -23.17
R-squared conversions Count R-squared: 
correlation: .76, McFaddens R-squared: .48
.83, Squared
There are several R squared-type measures that have been 
suggested for models with qualitative dependent variables. For 
the purposes of this study, three measures based on the 
likelihood ratios were applied.
6.3.1. Count R squared
This method, suggested by Maddala (1988), is based on the 
assumption that R squared can be thought of in terms of the 
proportion of correct preditions resulting from the model. 
Since in this case, the dependent variable is a 0 or 1 variable 
yi is computed and the ith observation is classified as 
belonging to group 1 if yi > 0.5 and classified as belonging to 
group 2 if yi < 0.5. The number of correct predictions can
Athen be counted. The predicted variable yi, which is a 
zero-one variable can be defined such that:
A0 if yi < 0.5
1 if yi > 0.5
Count R squared can then be defined as:
Count R1* = number of correct predictions
total number of observations
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This is a useful measure and Maddala (1988) suggests that it is 
worth reporting in all problems.
Essentially this measure is based on an examination of the 
predicted explanatory variables and a comparison of the 
prediction with the actual independent variable. Logit and 
probit compute, for each respondent in the survey, based on the 
combination of the explanatory variables, whether the 
enterprise is likely to disclose or not. For each enterprise, 
the model will produce a result somewhere between 0 and 1. It 
is assumed that if the result for a particular enterprise is 
less than .5, then the prediction is that it does not disclose, 
if the result is more than .5, the prediction is that it does 
disclose. For each observation the predicted result is 
compared with the actual result (which will be either 0 if the 
enterprise does not disclose, or 1 if it does disclose), and 
the number of correct observations is counted. The correct 
number is expressed as a fraction of the total number of 
observations, resulting in a Count R squared.
6.3.2. Squared Correlation
R squared may also be taken to equal the square correlation of
Aa simple coefficient (Ri) between between y^. and y..
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6.3.3. McFaddens H squared
McFadden (1974) defines R squared ass
McFaddens R*= 1 - log Lur
log Lr
where Lur is the maximum of the likelihood function when 
maximized with respect to all the parameters; and where Lr is 
the maximum when maximized with the restriction Bi = 0 for i
l,2,...k. This measure examines the likelihood of the constant 
alone predicting the dependent variable and compares it with 
the liklihood when the explanatory variables are included.
Each of these conversion methods was used for each step and the 
results will be considered in the next section.
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6.4. RESULTS OF REGRESSION
6.4.1. Determination of independent variable with highest 
explanatory power
As may be seen on Table 6.1., when the dependent variable is 
regressed on the independent variables: Atscore, Control,
Partenv and Skill, the R squared is 0.51 with an adjusted R 
squared of 0.49. This R squared is quite high for a limited 
dependent variable. Examination of the t-statistic indicates 
that the individually significant independent variables, that 
is, those with a result in excess of 2.0, are Atscore (the 
attitude of the accountant) and Partenv (the participatory 
environment of the enterprise). A negative t-statistic appears 
for Partenv. This is because the scoring ranged from 1 to 6, 
with 6 being the least participatory and 1 the most 
participatory.
The use of logit and probit results in Log likelihood of -23.22 
and -22.96 respectively. The logit and probit models confirm a 
t-statistic in excess of 2.0 for Atscore and Partenv.
The clear significance of Atscore and Partenv leads to the next 
step which is an examination of the regression of disclosure/ 
non-disclosure with those two variables.
6.4.2. Examination of the model using Atscore and Partenv
It may be seen from Table 6.2. that the regression of Atscore 
and Partenv against the dependent variable results in an 
R-squared of .51 (adjusted: .50), with increased or similar
t-statistics in all cases. Converting the log likelihood for 
both logit and probit results in a Count R-squared of .89 with 
a Squared Correlation of .76 and McFaddens R-squared of .50. 
This combination of variables may be seen as significant and 
gives the best result using least squares, logit and probit.
TABLE 6.2.
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: DISCLOSE, INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: ATSCORE AND PARTENV
COEFF T-STAT 2-TAIL SIG
LS
Atscore .07 7.15 .000
Partenv -.06 -2.82 .000
R-squared = .51
Adjusted R-squared = .50
F-statistic = 36.75 p= .0005
LOGIT
Atscore 
Partenv
Log likelihood
R-squared conversions Count R- 
.76, McFaddens R-squared:.50
PROBIT
Atscore
Partenv
Log likelihood
.65 4.00 .ooo
-.65 -2.61 .000
= -23.87
quared .89, Squared Correlation:
.38 4.28 .000
-.38 -2.74 .008
= -23.66
R-squared conversions Count R-squared:
Correlation: .76, McFaddens R-squared: .50
.89, Squared
In order to consider the R squared for all three models, the R 
squared values referred to in 6.3. were computed. These can 
also be seen in Table 6.2. and in other tables.
Using Count R squared a result of .89 for logit and .89 for 
probit can be observed. These results are not directly 
comparable with the R squared of .51, as Count R squared is not 
as discriminating. For example a predicted value of .50 is 
taken to mean "disclose" while a predicted value of .44 is 
taken to mean "not disclose"; and a result of .99 is taken as 
the same result as .51. Nevertheless, it is a useful statistic 
as interest is mainly directed on the dichotomous result, and 
not on the position of the respondent on a graduating scale of 
disclosure. Therefore the result may be interpreted as good. 
It can be taken to indicate that the model with the independent 
variables Atscore and Partenv is 89% likely successfully to 
predict disclosure or non-disclosure.
The results of the Squared Correlation are equally 
satisfactory, with a result of .76 and .76 for logit and probit 
models respectively. Again, it can be seen that the use of 
logit and probit are yielding higher R- squared, and appear to 
be consistent with each other.
The results of McFadden's R squared are interesting for their 
confirmation of the relative increase in the R-squared result, 
to .50.
6.4.3. Although the model with Partenv and Atscore appears to 
be the model which best explains the dependent variable 
(disclosure or non-disclosure), in order to confirm that the 
inclusion of other variables will not improve the results, the 
other variables were included in the model to examine the 
results. The section which follows describes the steps which 
were taken to eliminate the possibility that the other 
variables which were significant in the univariate analysis 
should be included in the multivariate model.
6.4.3.1. Examination of model with "Atscore" as independent
variable
As may be seen from Table 6.3., the attitude of the accountant 
(Atscore) produces a t-statistic of 7.15 using least square 
(LS). However, the adjusted R squared is .45, which is lower 
than the R-squared of .50 shown in Table 6.2. Logit and probit 
show the log likelihood as -28.66 and -28.72 respectively with 
the R squared conversions of these results of .87, .75 and .47. 
It is clear, therefore that this independent variable is an 
important element in the model, but not as important as the
combination of Atscore and Partenv. Its importance can be 
tested by removing "Atscore" from the model shown in Table
6.1.. The effect of this removal is seen in Table 6.4. Using 
LS, the R-squared declines to 0.19, and the adjusted R-squared 
is 0.15. "Partenv" remains as a significant element in the 
model, with a t-Statistic of -3.6. Logit and Probit confirm 
this result with t-statistics of -3.23 and -3.40 respectively.
6.4.3.2. Inclusion of "Skill" in the model
The results of the regression including Skill as an independent 
variable may be seen in Table 6.5. There no change in the 
adjusted R-squared. There is a slight disimporvement in the 
Count R-squared results for Logit and Probit, and in McFaddens 
R-squared, but otherwise the inclusion of Skill in the model 
has no effect.
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TABLE 6.3.
DEPENDENT VARIABLE DISCLOSE; INDEPENDENT VARIABLE ATSCORE
COEFF T-STAT 2-TAIL SIG.
LS
Atscore .08 7 . 1 5  . 0 0 0
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
F-statistic
. 4 6
. 4 5
5 9 . 6 9 p= . 0 0 0 5
LOGIT
Atscore , 58 4.0 .000
Log likelihood = -28.66
R-squared conversions ; Count R-squareds 
Correlation .74, McFaddens R-squared:.47
.87, Squared
PROBIT
Atscore . 3 2 4. 72 .000
Log likelihood = -28.715
R-squared conversions Count R-squared: .87, Squared 
Correlation: .75, McFaddens R-squared: .47
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TABLE 6.4.
DEPENDENT VARIABLE DISCLOSE: INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: CONTROL, SKILL
AND PARTENV
COEFF T-STAT 2-TAIL SIG.
Control
Skill
Partenv
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared 
F-statistic
.03 .44 .67
.04 1.6 .115
-.10 -3.6 .001
. 19 
. 15
5.32 p= .1465
LOGIT
Partenv -.47 - 3.23 .002
Skill .21 1.59 .116
Control . 12 .40 .686
Log likelihood = -43.11
R-squared conversion:Count R-squared: .44, Squared correlation
.39, McFaddens R-squared:.12
PROBIT
Partenv -.28 -3.40 .001
Skill .13 1.59 .116
Control .07 .35 .727
Log likelihood = -43.17
R-squared conversion : Count R-squared:.43, Squared correlation:
.39, McFaddens R-squared: .11
TABLE 6.5.
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: DISCLOSE, INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: ATSCORE,
PARTENV AND SKILL
COEFF T-STAT 2-TAIL SIG
LS
Atscore .07 6.88 .000
Partenv -.06 r-COCMl .006
Skill .017 . 83 .410
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared 
F-statistic
= .52 
= .50 
= 24.62 p= .001
LOGIT
Atscore .65 3.92 .000
Partenv -.68 -2 .67 .010
Skill . 20 .90 .370
Log likelihood = -23..45
R-squared conversions Count R-squared: .87, Squared correlation 
.76. McFaddens R-squared: .47
PROBIT
Atscore .38 4. 17 .000
Partenv -.39 -2 .77 .007
Skill . 11 .88 .384
Log likelihood = -23.26
R-squared conversions Count R-squared: 
correlation: .76, McFaddens R-squared: .48
.87, Squared
6.4.3.3. Inclusion of "Control" in the model
Including Control in the model, similarly, has little effect on
the results of the regression as may be seen in Table 6.6.
TABLE 6.6
DEPENDENT VARIABLE DISCLOSE, INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: ATSCORE, 
CONTROL AND PARTENV
COEFF T-STAT 2-TAIL SIG
LS
Atscore .07 7.13 .000
Control .03 .65 .519
Partenv -.06 COCOCN1 .005
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared 
F-statistic
= .51 
= .49 
= 24.43 P:
LOGIT
Atscore .65 3.99 .000
Control .17 .41 .683
Partenv -.67 -2.61 .010
Log likelihood = -23.79
p= .0005
R-squared conversions Count R-squared: .89, Squared correlation 
.76, McFaddens R-squared:.47
PROBIT
Atscore . 38 4.27 .000
Control . 11 .46 .647
Partenv -.39 -2.73 .008
Log likelihood = -23.55
R-squared conversions Count R-squared: .89, Squared
correlation: .76, McFaddens R-squared: .47
6.4.3.4. Other combinations
All other combinations of independent variables were examined, 
but the result was either a disimprovement in the resulting 
model, or no improvement to the model constructed from the 
variables Atscore and Partenv. It may be concluded that the 
independent variables, control, and skill do not contribute 
significantly to prediction in the model.
Using the model, a final check to ensure the validity of the
univariate tests of significance as a screening for variables
for model building was undertaken. Each of the four variables
(and combinations thereof) referred to in 5.7.3.6. - 5.7.3.9.
were also examined. None of these variables (or combinations
thereof) was significant in the model or improved the adjusted
*
R squared.
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6.4.4. The internal validity of the model
In Chapter 5, resulting from univariate analysis, 4 
characteristics emerged as significant in explaining 
disclosure/non-disclosure. The model which has been described 
in this chapter includes two factors as significant in
combination in explaining disclosure/non-disclosure. The model 
is described in 6.4.2. and relevant statistics for the model 
are given in Table 6.2.
6.4.5.1. The first factor which has emerged as significant is 
that of the existence of a participatory environment in the 
disclosing enterprise. This result is consistent with the 
description of the Irish paradigm described in Chapter 3 
(3.4.2.I.), which referred to the 'local' characteristic of 
regarding disclosure as an integral part of participation by 
workers in their employing enterprise within the Irish
paradgim. This was evidenced by Government policy, by local 
legislation (i.e. the Worker Participation Acts) and by 
community responses. Additionally, this factor was
substantiated by the respondents to this survey. In other
words, where the enterprise has adopted a policy of allowing
employees to participate in the enterprise through share 
participation, board membership and/or other sub-board 
consultation, it is likely that that enterprise has a policy
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of disclosure of financial information to employees. The 
relationship appears as negative (Table 6.2.) due to the 
scoring frame used, which ranged from 1 - 6 ,  with 6 being least 
participatory and 1 being most participatory.
6.4.5.2. The second factor which has emerged as significant is 
the attitude of the financial accountant. This supports the 
associationistic influence within the Irish paradigm suggested 
in Chapter 3. It was suggested that, unlike our mainland 
European fellow-members of the EC, the development of the Irish 
paradigm of disclosure to employees would be less influenced by 
the 'State' and more influenced by the 'Association' of 
financial accountants. This model shows that the association 
of the financial accountant, the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in Ireland, has accurately reflected the positive 
attitude to disclosure to employees of its members. Financial 
accountants are positive to the disclosure of financial 
information to employees and there is a positive relationship 
between the attitude of the accountant and the disclosure of 
information. The accountants' attitudes, however are not 
intense, and that is consistent with this hypothesis, as the 
levels of disclosure, as indicated in Chapter 4, are not high. 
Based on this model, however, it would seem that an increase in 
the intensity of the attitude of the accountant would result in 
an increase in the levels of disclosure. The relationship in
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Table 6.2. appears as positive in this case as the score is 
structured so that the higher the attitude score, the more 
positive the attitude.
6.5. ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING MULTIPLE REGRESSION.
6.5.1. The principal assumptions of Multiple Regression 
analysis may be summarized as:
6.5.1.1. The values of the dependent variable are normally 
distributed;
6.5.1.2. The observed values of the independent variables are 
measured without error;
6.5.1.3. The relationships between the dependent variable and 
each of the independent variables are linear;
6.5.1.4. The variance in the dependent variable is constant for 
all values of the independent variables;
6.5.1.5. The error terms are independent;
6.5.1.6. Important variables appear explicitly in the function, 
and
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6.5.1.7. The independent variables do not show very high linear 
correlation.
6.5.2. The tests conducted to ensure that the above assumptions 
were not violated were as follows:
6.5.2.1. The dependent variable in this case is a limited 
dependent variable, and,as indicated by McFadden (1974), 
testing is not required for violation in this case as it is not 
possible for dummy variables to violate this assumption.
6.5.2.2. Koutsoyiannis (1977 p 179) suggests that the validity 
of the measurement assumption cannot be measured directly. As 
every effort was made to avoid any errors of measurement in the 
choice and execution of data collection methodologies, it is 
reasonable to assume that there is no gross violation of this 
assumption.
6.5.2.3. As recommended by the Draper and Smith (1981 pp 141 - 
162), the validity of these assumptions was examined by 
plotting standardised residuals, against predicted values of 
the dependent variable. These plots may be seen in Appendix 
K. A random distribution of residuals along the dummy
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variables indicates that these assumptions are met. Plots 
indicate that the residuals are distributed on what
approximates to a random basis in all cases of the model.
6.5.2.7. As the model was constructed using the stepwise
method, multicollinearity (i.e. high correlation between the 
independent variables in the model) did not occur. This is 
because at each step in the model building, the tolerance of 
each independent variable that was in the equation or was being 
considered for entry into the equation was examined. The
tolerance is the proportion of variance in an independent
variable not explained by other independent variables in the 
equation. A new variable was not entered if its own tolerance 
or the resulting tolerance of a variable already in the 
equation (which could be altered by the entry of a new 
variable) was less than .05.
6.6. TESTING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MODEL
The statistical significance of the model has been tested. The 
overall significance of the model was tested using the F-test 
to ascertain if the relationships proposed by the model were 
significant or could have been met by chance. As may be seen
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the probability associated with the F statistic is .0005 (See 
Table 5.2.). This clearly establishes the significance of the 
model.
It is, of course, possible that the overall model is 
statistically significant but that the individual independent 
variables within the model are not. However, aa the 
construction of this model has been effected using stepwise 
selection, this situation could not arise.
6.7. SUMMARY OF MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
Arising from the multi-variate analysis which has been 
described in this chapter and from the univariate analysis 
undertaken in Chapter 5, the following summarises the 
hypotheses which have been accepted and those which have been 
rejected:
6.7.1. Hypotheses accepted:
6.7.1.1. There is a significant relationship between the 
attitude of the enterprise's financial accountant, and the 
disclosure/non-disclosure pattern of financial information to 
employees in that enterprise.
6.7.1.2. There is a significant relationship between the 
extent of the existence of participation in an enterprise and 
the disclosure/non disclosure pattern of financial information 
to employees in that enterprise.
6.7.2. Hypotheses rejected:
6.7.2.1. There is a significant relationship between the 
ownership structure of an enterprise and the disclosure/non­
disclosure pattern of financial information to employees in 
that enterprise.
6.7.2.2. There is a significant relationship between the skill 
of the workforce in an enterprise and the disclosure/non­
disclosure pattern of financial information to employees in 
that enterprise.
6.7.2.3. There is a significant relationship between the age of 
the enterprise's financial accountant and the disclosure/non­
disclosure pattern of financial information to employees in 
that enterprise.
6.7.2.4. That there is a significant relationship between the
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extent of unionization in an enterprise and the disclosure/non­
disclosure pattern of financial information to employees in 
that enterprise.
6.7.2. 5. That there is a significant relationship between the 
length of establishment of the enterprise and the disclosure/ 
non-disclosure pattern of financial information to employees in 
that enterprise.
6.7.2.6. That there is a significant relationship between the 
extent to which employees of an enterprise demand information 
and the disclosure/non-disclosure pattern of financial 
information to employees in that enterprise.
6.7.2.7. That there is a significant relationship between the 
size of an enterprise's workforce and the disclosure/non­
disclosure pattern of financial information to employees in 
that enterprise.
6.8. INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS OF THE MODEL BUILDING
The interpretation of the results of the model building, 
together with conclusions from this study and proposals for 
further research will be considered in Chapter 7.
6.9. SUMMARY
This chapter follows from the process of screening variables 
described in Chapter 5. Variables which emerged as significant 
in Chapter 5 have been included in a model building process 
which has been described in this chapter.
Using disclosure/non-disclosure of financial information to 
employees as the limited dependent variable, a model was 
constructed to explain the disclosure/non-disclosure patterns 
in Irish enterprises. Variables which emerged as significant 
in Chapter 5 were the skill of the workforce, the attitude of 
the enterprise's financial accountant, the participatory 
environment and control. The model building described in this 
chapter indicates that the variables which, in combination, are 
significant in explaining disclosure patterns are the attitude 
of the enterprise's financial accountant and the existence of a 
participatory environment.
Because the dependent variable is a limited dependent variable, 
logit and probit were also used to build the model. The 
chapter described the final model using least squares, logit 
and probit.
CHAPTER SEVEN
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
7.1. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to review the manner in which 
the objectives stipulated in Chapter 1 have been achieved 
(7.2.), to summarize the findings of the study (7.3.), to draw 
conclusions from the study (7.4.) and to indicate areas of 
further research (7.5).
7.2. ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES
7.2.1. The objectives of this study were stated in Chapter 1 
(1.3.) as being:
To establish a justification for regarding the Irish employee 
as a legitimate user of financial information concerning his 
employing enterprise within the decision usefulness approach;
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To identify the major local characteristics of the Irish 
paradigm of disclosure of financial information to employees
insofar as it has developed to date.
To establish the current practice in major Irish enterprises 
regarding the disclosure of financial information to their 
employees.
To explain the pattern of disclosure/non-disclosure of 
financial information to employees by Irish enterprises, in 
terms of the local characteristics which are identified.
7.2.2. The mechanism engaged whereby the above objectives were 
achieved may be summarized as follows:
The principal elements of the decision making process entered 
into by the employees were examined and analysed in Chapter 2,
in order to assess the extent to which the employee, as a
decision maker, can be regarded as a user of financial 
information and to assess the extent to which the profile of 
the employee as a decision maker matches the profile of the 
shareholder as a decision maker.
The development of the Irish paradigm of disclosure was 
examined. Using Puxty et al.'s framework for influences on 
general financial reporting regulation, modified to include
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the facet of External Influence, the local characteristics of 
the Irish paradigm were identified, and hypotheses concerning 
the disclosure/non-disclosure patterns of Irish enterprises 
were proposed.
In order to establish the extent of disclosure and to test the 
hypotheses, data were collected from all enterprises in Ireland 
employing 500 persons or more. The data collection process was 
explained in Chapter 4. Mail questionnaires were sent to 
financial accountants in all enterprises identified as falling 
within the population frame.
Chapter 5 described the results of the data collection, and 
detailed the extent of disclosure of financial information to 
employees in Irish enterprises. Additionally the process 
whereby variables were tested for significance in their 
relationship to the disclosure/non-disclosure pattern was 
described. Those variables which proved to be significant were 
included in a multi-variate model constructed to explain the 
disclosure/non-disclosure pattern of financial information to 
employees in Ireland, which was described in Chapter 6.
7.3. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
The findings of this study may be summarized as follows:
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7.3.1. The Irish employee, because of the nature of the 
decision making in which he engages, may justifiably be 
regarded as a user of financial statements of his employing 
enterprise. The construct of the main decisions taken by the 
employee as a decision maker within the Decision Usefulness 
approach comprised: the employee as risk bearer, the employee 
as a recipient of income, the employee as property owner and 
the employee as stakeholder. Under each of these headings it 
was shown that the employee has critical decisions to make 
which necessitate access to financial information concerning 
his employing enterprise in order to optimize his decisions. 
Additionally the nature of the decisions was compared with the 
nature of comparable decisions made by the shareholder. It was 
shown that the profile of the employee as a decision maker 
matches the profile of the shareholder as a decision maker, and 
it was proposed that if the shareholder is entitled to receive 
financial information because of his role as a decision maker, 
then the employee is also so entitled.
7.3.2. The Irish paradigm of disclosure was described. The 
background to the development of the paradigm was sketched. The 
historical background to the development of the Irish paradigm, 
in particular the lack of 'pendulum' effect on legislation was 
noted. Also, reference was made to the lack of tradition of 
disclosure in times of national emergency, and to the tendency 
for Irish legislation to adopt and adapt other models (although
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this feature is not apparent in the development to date of 
legislation relating to disclosure to and participation by 
employees). Additionally the traditionally conservative 
complexion of Irish government and the secretive nature of the 
Irish business community indicate that progress is likely to be 
slow in Ireland and will probably be evolutionary rather than 
revolutionary.
It was concluded that the Irish paradigm of disclosure to 
employees (as defined in 3.2.), can be described as having 
mainly associationistic influences with some legalistic 
influences. The development of the Irish paradigm reflects the 
influence of two associations: the association of workers and
the association of preparers.
7.3.2.1. In the case of the association of workers, i.e. the 
Trade Union movement and its political ally the Labour party, 
it was suggested that much of the development of the Irish 
paradigm reflects the influence of the Labour party during 
periods when it shared power. The associationistic influence 
on disclosure of the Trade Union movement can only be detected 
in its efforts to open up the issue for discussion and in 
practical ways be seeking representation on such bodies as the 
Accountancy Award Scheme, but not in any systematic way.
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Additionally, there is no evidence of pressure from the workers 
influencing the disclosure patterns in the Irish enterprises 
surveyed.
The influence on legalism of the Trade Union movement is
evidenced by the Worker Participation (State Enterprises)
legislation referred to in Chapter 3. However, within the
Irish paradigm, the legalistic influence has been evident in 
semi-state and state bodies, but not at all in private 
enterprises. Government is reluctant to mandate disclosure for 
private enterprises (as referred to in 3.4.I.3.), and in the 
current climate of privatization, it seems likely that such 
legalism influence as there is may very well decline as 
enterprises which currently come under the legislation are 
privatized, and thereby removed from the net of Worker
Participation (State Enterprises) legislation.
Although it is difficult to predict the results of the Social 
Charter, it seems likely that the Irish government will favour 
minimal legislation which will take into account such voluntary 
practices as may have developed. There may be some 
considerable time lag, however, before this issue is even 
considered by the Irish legislature, as Ireland is not noted 
for its speedy enactment of EC Directives. This study has found 
that, although there is a high level of unionization within the
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enterprises covered by the study, the impact of pressure from 
the employees on disclosure/non-disclosure patterns has been 
slight.
Two possible explanations for this lack of pressure from the 
employees for financial information either directly or 
indirectly through their unions are suggested: firstly, it is
suggested that employees have difficulty in understanding the 
financial information which is given to them. In Ireland, 
there is little effort to produce employee specific 
information, and there is very little pre-disclosure education 
of employees in accounts interpretation (see 7.3.3.) 
Additionally, the published financial accounts are usually 
presented each year in a dull and uninspired manner. The 
financial statements are often printed on dull matt-finish grey 
paper in stark contrast to the high-gloss, coloured pages with 
pictures and diagrams which precede them. They are formatted 
in closely packed columns of figures accompanied by 
"explanatory" notes which are themselves closely printed and 
expressed, virtually throughout, in language which would 
require a technically up-to-date accountant to understand. 
Financial statements are very often issued many months after 
the last day of the period under review, and are prepared to 
comply with the minimum disclosure requirements of the 
Companies Acts. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that 
employees do not exert pressure on the financial accountant for
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financial information to be disclosed to them, when the 
financial statements they would receive would be out of date, 
highly complex and couched in technical language and may not 
address all the issues pertinent to their decision making.
Secondly, it is may be that employees (and indeed, not only 
employees), in the current environment of business scandal, 
mistrust the financial information. These two points open up 
areas for further research which are referred to in 7.5.
7.3.2.2. In the case of the association of preparers it has 
been established that the main association of financial 
accountants in Ireland, the ICAI, supports the view of the 
employee as a joint primary user of financial information 
concerning his employing enterprise, although it has taken no 
steps in issuing guidance on the information to be disclosed or 
the manner in which it should or could be disclosed. This study 
has established that the preparer is also positive in his 
attitude, although not intensely so, and that he has taken 
some steps in disclosing financial information to employees. 
Among the significant factors explaining the disclosure/non­
disclosure pattern (referred to in 7.3.4. below) ia the 
attitude of the preparer. A strengthening of the attitude of 
the accountant is associated with greater disclosure. It may be 
concluded, therefore, that an increase in the attitude of the
accountant is likely to contribute to the development of 
disclosure within the Irish paradigm. This is referred to in 
sec. 7.4.
7.3.3. In the major Irish employing enterprises which were the 
subject of this study, there is already a degree of disclosure 
of financial information to employees. 50% of the enterprises 
employing 500 persons or more disclose some form of financial 
information to their employees, even though they are not 
required to do so by law. Within that 50%, the extent of 
disclosure is mixed, and it is rarely accompanied by 
pre-disclosure education. A small number of companies disclose 
extensive information and such disclosure is usually 
accompanied by pre-disclosure education. However, in the main, 
the extent of disclosure is narrow, and the media used are 
unimaginative.
This indicates the beginning of an interest in such disclosure 
by Irish managements, but it is interesting to note the low 
scores achieved on the scale of information disclosed which 
would lead one to believe that although there is not 
substantial opposition to disclosure to employees, there are 
certainly few signs of extensive disclosure to employees, and 
few signs of innovative experiments in disclosure mechanisms 
and formats.
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7.3.4. Following the univariate and multivariate analyses of 
the data collected, referred to in Chapters 5 and 6, it may be 
concluded from this study that there is a significant 
relationship between the attitude of the enterprise's financial 
accountant and the disclosure/non-disclosure pattern of 
financial information to employees in that enterprise. 
Additionally, there is a significant relationship between the 
extent of the existence of participation in an enterprise and 
the disclosure/non-disclosure pattern of financial information 
to employees in that enterprise. Further expansion of 
disclosure to employees, it may be concluded, would probably 
result from an enhancement both of worker participation within 
an enterprise and of the attitude of the financial accountant.
7.4. RECOMMENDATIONS ARISING FROM THIS STUDY
The recommendations arising from this study may be summarized 
as follows:
7.4.1. Recognition of the employee as a user entitled to 
financial statements
It has been suggested in this dissertation that the legal 
presumption that the shareholder is the only user to whom the
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financial statements are directed is inappropriate and 
outdated. This legal presumption is evidenced in the 
provisions of the Companies Acts which indicate that:
- the financial statements are designed to give a true and
fair view to the shareholders (S. 148 CA 1963),
the books of account should be open to inspection by
the shareholders (Table A, S.127 CA 1963),
- the shareholders are entitled to attend the general
meetings of the company (Table A, SS. 133-136 CA 
1963), and
the auditor is required to report to the shareholders 
(S163 CA 1963, 2.S.193, CA 1990).
Additionally, there is an emerging notion that the financial 
statements should be directed to the shareholders as primary 
users because of. the decisions they have to make, and then to 
the employees as secondary users. This emerging suggestion is
apparent in the Statement of Principles of the ASB and is
reflected in the Report of the Financial Reporting Commission 
(1992 p 13). The case made in this study is for Irish
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employees as recipients of the financial statements of their 
employing enterprise based on their position as decision 
makers.
It is recommended that, both in legislation and in accounting 
regulation, the right of the employee as a decision maker to 
receive financial information about his employing enterprise be 
recognised. This point is discussed in Sec. 7.5.
7.4.2. Enhancement of the participatory environment
In the light of the significant relationship between disclosure 
and a philosophy within an enterprise of employee participation 
in decision making and in a consultative process through which 
the knowledge and insights of the workforce can find expression 
and application, it is recommended that disclosure within the 
Irish paradigm should not be regarded as an accounting end in 
itself, but that it should be seen as an integral part of a 
positive participation environment. If disclosure is to 
satisfy the decision usefulness function for employees, this 
study suggests that it should not be applied in isolation. It 
is recommended that in contributing to the decision needs of 
the employee, the preparer of financial information should seek 
to ensure that such information is disclosed within such a 
participatory environment. This, of course, is not the sole 
responsibility of the financial accountant and may, indeed,
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require statutory support - for example, an amendment to the 
Employee Participation Taxation legislation. However, as a 
member of a management team, the accountant of the future could 
play an important role in the creation of such a participatory 
environment within Irish enterprises.
7.4.3. Strengthening of the accountant's attitude
Arising from the findings of this study that the employee is a 
justified recipient of financial information and that the 
attitude of the financial accountant in an enterprise bears a 
significant relationship to the disclosure of financial 
information to employees, it is recommended that the 
accountant's attitude should be strengthened, by allowing him 
access to the training, and information which would expose him 
to the issue of the employee as a user of financial statements. 
A strengthening of his attitude would probably result in an 
increase in such disclosure, thereby contributing to the 
decision-usefulness function of financial reports by extending 
their usefulness to the employee group.
The financial accountant is in favour of disclosure to 
employees, and acknowledges the arguments in favour of their 
rights. Although the accountants are positive in their 
attitude, they do not display a very positive attitude. The 
more positive the attitude, the greater the likelihood of
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disclosure in the enterprise. This lack of intensity 
may be reflected in the apparent lack of imagination and energy 
applied to the accounting information currently disclosed to 
employees. The accountant feels reluctant to take the lead in 
an area which would traditionally be his domain. This 
conclusion is evidenced by the following:
7.4.3.1. A majority of those accountants who do not currently 
disclose information to employees indicated that they do not do 
so because the law does not require it. In other words, they 
are waiting for the legislators and standard setters to tell 
them how and what to disclose, rather than devising a means of 
disclosure which is best suited for their workforce based on 
their professional judgement and experience with that 
workforce.
7.4.3.2. A large majority of respondents felt that patterns of 
disclosure should be initiated by a committee within the 
company. So, although this is an area which would appear to be 
obviously in the realm of the accountant's function, the 
accountant is reticent and unwilling to project himself as the 
professional with the expertise and knowledge to lead the 
enterprise in this area.
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7.4.3.3. A majority of respondents were unfamiliar with the 
Vredeling Directive. The reason cited was that the accountants 
do not familiarise themselves with draft legislation until it 
becomes law. Again, this reticence indicates that the 
accountant will be happy to comply with the law when it is 
enacted but is not prepared to enter into any debate or 
consideration of the proposals at the discussion stage.
7.4.3.4. This is reinforced by the fact that there was little 
evidence of resistance to the SSAPs. Accountants surveyed were 
happy to accept the SSAPs once they are told that it is 
finalised. However at the Exposure Draft stage, Irish 
Accountants very rarely become involved in the decision making 
or debate that surrounds the drafting of the standard.
7.4.3.5. Amongst those accountants who do disclose information 
to employees, there was little evidence of imagination or 
innovation in the disclosure of information. Much of it was a 
simplified version of information prepared on traditional lines 
for the shareholders. This was clear from the employee reports 
and communication documents returned with the questionnaires 
and from the reports made available to the writer at interview.
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This writer suggests that the main reason which may be 
concluded from this study for this lack of enthusiasm in 
initiating and developing disclosure to employees lays in the 
manner in which the financial accountant is educated and 
trained. He is now trained to study the law and regulations of 
accounting with very little critical analysis of the 
underpinning concepts. This, of course, is exacerbated by the 
lack of a conceptual framework for the Profession, and by the 
increasing load of law and regulations. The accountant applies 
the law to situations as he finds them. The law and regulations 
tell him that the users of financial reports are the 
shareholders; the law and regulations dictate the format of the 
financial accounts. He complies with the law and regulations. 
When the law and regulations change, he complies with the new 
law and regulations, but does not contribute to the development 
of such law and regulation.
This phenomenon is illustrated by the reluctance of accountants 
to contribute to the standard setting process. This fact has 
become clear to the writer in her capacity as chairman of the 
Institute of Chartered Accountant's Accounting Review Committee 
(which is the committee to which the Council of the Institute 
delegates the responsibility for the promulgation of Accounting 
Standards in the Republic of Ireland). Although approximately
3 4 3 .
6,000 copies of each Exposure Draft are distributed to
qualified accountants for their comments and contributions, 
typically less than five replies are received.
The attitude type to which the attitude to disclosure of
financial information to employees belongs (see Chapter 4), and 
the lack of intensity of attitude determined by this study,
indicate that the attitude of the accountant is positive and
would be subject to the influence of authoritative figures, 
such as educators and trainers of the accountants. The 
indications of this study are that the accountants show 
evidence of having been educated and trained in a manner which 
lays more emphasis on the learning and assimilation of a 
considerable mountain of legislation and accounting regulation, 
than on the philosophies and ideas which underpin the 
development of accounting and which ought to be rigorously 
examined in assessing future developments in accounting. The 
respondents to the study appear happy to accept changing 
legislation and regulation, but unable to contemplate their 
potential role in innovating developments in accounting 
practice.
These findings are borne out by recent suggestions by writers 
such as Zeff (1989) who suggests that the huge number of 
accounting regulations and legal pronouncements on accounting 
issues is leading to a situation where the sheer volume of
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pronouncements, and the desire by educators to cover the
detailed requirements of the pronouncements, to the detriment 
of an academic consideration of the issues and conceptual 
underpinning involved are damaging accounting educations
"An implication for UK accounting educators is that the 
steady growth in the number of detailed and highly 
specific accounting pronouncements, together with an 
apparent movement by the UK profession to strengthen the 
system of securing compliance by companies and auditors, 
could well lead to a similar outcome to what has 
occurred in the USA. Textbooks and other teaching 
materials could begin to resemble codifications of 
recommended practice, and accounting education programs 
in tertiary institutions could become exercises in 
indoctrination."
The possibility of the detrimental effect of accounting 
regulation on accounting standards was predicted almost forty 
years ago by Baxter (1953):
"The recommendations .. are likely to weaken the 
training of accountants; the conversion of the subject 
into cut-and-dried rules, approved by authority and not 
to be lightly questioned, threatens to reduce the value 
of accounting as a subject of higher education almost to 
nil. "
Indeed the passage of time resulted in very little change in 
Baxter's view, appealing in 1982, for a return to a broadminded 
more flexible view of accounting judgements and away from the 
present prescriptive approach of accounting standards from 
which "..any deviation is .. bad".
Zeff also points to a trend in the USA, which he warns is
detectable in the UK (and presumably could be equally 
detectable in Ireland) for the University courses in accounting 
to be influenced by the maximization of exemptions available 
from Professional examinations, which tend to be based on a
mechanical study of regulations:
"Accounting faculty members have succumbed to .• 
pressures from Institute examiners on one hand and from 
students on the other. Faculty members who stray too 
far from the kind of instruction that students feel they 
need to pass the (professional) examinations come under 
pressure to emphasize mainstream accounting knowledge. 
Commercial publishers, who are the potential agents of 
change are fearful to innovate. As a result, financial 
accounting is taught as if it were in a strait-jacket. 
Students are indoctrinated in the rules of extant 
practice and are seldom exposed to the historical 
background or institutional framework that has shaped 
current practice."
If this is the case in Ireland, then there is small wonder that 
the financial accountants, whose own attitudes are influenced 
by their educators (as discussed in Chapter 4), find it 
difficult to adopt an innovative approach to the development of 
financial disclosure, when their educators do little to 
introduce them to ideas of social responsibility accounting, 
disclosure to employees and disclosure design, but spend time 
force-feeding students with a diet of statute and regulation.
It may be concluded, then, that the accountant's attitude can 
influence the extent of disclosure in Irish enterprises. The 
accountant's attitude is positive at present, but not intense. 
It would be possible for educators and trainers of accountants 
to strengthen the intensity of the accountant's attitude if 
they were to de-emphasise the teaching of regulation and 
re-emphasise the teaching of philosophies, concepts, historical 
development and communication devices.
Student accountants would then be exposed, at an early stage in 
their education, to issues such as the employee as a decision 
maker, the information needs of employees, the power attaching 
to such information, the social and economic consequences of 
such empowerment and pre-disclosure education of employees.
Within the development of the Irish paradigm, as discussed in 
Chapters 4 and 5, it will be important for the financial 
accountant to play a role in the development of disclosure of 
useful financial information to employees as an integral part 
of a participation policy. The financial accountant is the 
professional whose training should equip him with the skills 
necessary for such a contribution.
An accountant with a positive attitude to disclosure of 
financial information to employees has the capacity to increase 
the likihood of disclosure to employees. The educators of 
those financial accountants have the capacity to increase the 
intensity of an already positive attitude by increasing the 
amount of exposure to disclosure to employees at University, at 
education courses and at CPE courses. It is recommended, 
arising from this study, that the education of accountants, 
both pre- and post-qualification, should be expanded to 
incorporate exposure to ideas and techniques of disclosure and 
to the creation and stimulation of a participatory environment 
in the work place, with particular reference to the 
contribution that can be made by the accountant. A number of 
such issues are suggested in Appendix M.
7.5. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Arising from this study, which has established the right of 
the employee, as a decision maker, to financial information and 
has identified the role of the accountant in such disclosure, 
and the importance of modifications to the training and 
education of accountants to prepare them for the task of 
relevant disclosure, the following areas may be identified as 
future research projects:
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7 . 5. 1 . Establishment of the information needs of employees in 
Ireland,
7.5.2. Establishment of the extent to which such information
needs are being met by current disclosure,
7.5.3. The role of independent educators in pre-disclosure
education,
7.5.4. Appraisal of the quality and relevance of current
disclosure and disclosure media to employees,
7.5.5. Means of stimulating the participatory environment in
Irish enterprises,
7.5.6. Co-operative studies by communicators, human resource 
managers and accountants into imaginative disclosure media,
7.5.7. A examination of the impact of foreign control on the
disclosure of financial information to employees and
7.5.8. A testing of the extent to which employees trust
information provided to them by management; and the role of
the independent financial adviser.
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APPENDIX A
DOMINANT APPROACHES TO ACCOUNTING THEORY
CLASSICAL DECISION USEFULNESS
NORMATIVE 
DEDUCTIVISTS
POSITIVE
INDUCTIVISTS
Paton
Canning
Sweeney
MacNeal
Alexander
Edwards & Bell
Moonitz
Sprouse
Hatfield 
Gilman 
Littleman 
I jiri
DECISION
MODELS
Chambers 
ASOBAT * 
Sterling 
Sorter
INFORMATION
ECONOMICS
DECISION
MAKERS
S O C IA L  WELFARE 
A C C O U N T A B IL IT Y
Behavioural
Accounting
Efficient
Market
Researchers
Beaver
Benston
Kripke
Gonedes
* A Statement of Basic Accounting Theory, American Accounting Association, 
1966
Schematic adaptation of Statement on Accounting Theory and Theory Acceptance 
American Accounting Association, 1977
Adapted by Most, K. Accounting Theory (p. 73), Grid Publishing Inc. Dhio.
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USERS OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS IDENTIFIED BY PREVIOUS RESEARCH
APPENDIX B
B.1. SFACl
Suppliers of capital and their representatives or advisers
Owners
Lenders
Potential investors 
Creditors
Financial analysts and advisers
Brokers
Underwriters
Stock Exchanges
Suppliers of Labour and their representatives or advisers
Employees 
Labour Unions
Business Contacts
Suppliers
Customers
Trade Associations
Government Agencies
Taxing authorities 
Regulatory authorities 
Legislators
Others
Lawyers
Economists
Financial press and reporting agencies
B.2. SFAC4
Resource providers and their representatives or advisers
Members
Contributors
Grantors
Taxpayers
Lenders
Suppliers
Creditors
Employees
Financial analysts and advisers
Brokers
Underwriters
Trade Associations
Labour Unions
Constituents
Service beneficiaries
Governing and oversight bodies
Directors and trustees 
Regulatory authorities 
Legislators
Others
Taxing authorities
Lawyers
Economists
Financial press and reporting agencies
Researchers
Teachers and students
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B.3. THE CORPORATE REPORT
Equity investor group
Loan creditor group
Employee group
Analyst - Adviser group
Business contact Group
Government
Public
B.4. THE SANDILANDS REPORT
Shareholders
Investment analysts
The city (Stock Exchange etc.,)
Creditors and lenders 
Other companies 
Employees
The government and official bodies 
The general public
B.5. THE STAMP REPORT 
Shareholders
Creditors, long and short-term 
Analysts and Advisers 
Employees
Non-executive directors
Customers
Suppliers
Industry groups
Labour unions
Government departments and ministers 
Public
Regulatory agencies 
Other companies 
Standard setters 
Academic researchers
B.6. THE SOLOMONS REPORT
Present and potential investors
Present and potential creditors (including suppliers)
Present and potential employees, and those who may act for them in
bargaining situations 
Present and potential customers who are or may be tied to an enterprise 
by long-term supply contracts.
B.7. MAKING CORPORATE REPORTS VALUABLE
The equity investor group 
The loan creditor group 
The employee group 
The business contact group
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APPENDIX C
ID A :
Dun & Bradstreet
Commission of the 
European Community 
Commerce Library
OECD
Central Statistics 
Office
Irish Productivity 
Centre
"The ID A  use the list published by BUSINESS AND 
FIN A N C E  each year for their purposes." (R. Sexton)
"Dun and Bradstreet could search this information, 
but the cost would be approx. £450. This inform­
ation is obtained for Business and Finance and 
Aspect magazines. It could be extracted from
those journals." (Bill Moss)
"We do not keep information on organisations in 
Ireland." (L. Fagan).
No response
"We do not maintain any lists of organisations 
in any of our member countries, let alone the 
Republic of Ireland." (John P. Martin)
"We do not keep statistics on that kind of 
information" (A spokesman)
A list of companies employing 1000 + people and 
a second list of companies employing 500 - 1000 
people was supplied.
11RS A list of companies employing 500 or more people
was supplied.
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APPENDIX D
RESPONSE SCHEDULE
DATE DETAIL 1ST REQ. 2ND REQ. TEL. REP.
RESP. RESP. RESP.
RECVD. RECVD. RECVD.
16.5.88 Questionnaires sent
17.5.88
18.5.88 1
19.5.88 6
20.5.88 6
23.5.88 3
2E.5.88 6
25.5.88 4
26.5.88 5
27.5.88 3
30.5.88 1
31.5.88 2
1.6.88 4
2.6.88 3
3.6.88 2
7.6.88 1
8 . 6.88 1
9.6.88 2
10.6.88 1
13.6.88 0
14.6.88 0
15.6.88 0
16.6.88 Second req. sent 2
17.6.88
20 . 6.88 1
21.6.88 3
22.6.88 4
23.6.88 3
24.6.88 5
27.6.88 4
28.6.88 4
29.8.88 2
30.6.88 1
1.7.88 1
4.7.88 Telephone request 1 30
6.7.88 1
TOTAL RESPONSES 53 30 3 30*
% OF QUESTIONNAIRES SENT 45.69 25.86
398.
2.59
* On telephone request, it proved impossible to obtain a 
response from the final thirty respondents. The reasons cited 
were:
"Never complete questionnaires" 11 
"Too busy" 9
"Issue is too sensitive" 3
The remaining seven proved impossible to contact in spite of 
persistent efforts.
Overall, there was a response rate of 75%. When the invalid 
questionnaires were removed, the response rate was 72%. This 
was considered satisfactory, and a sound basis for analysis.
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APPENDIX E
COMMENTS OF RESPONDENTS ON THE ISSUE OF DISCLOSURE TO EMPLOYEES
1. "Financial information on its own is rather boring to staff. 
It should be part of a general communications programme which 
covers the commercial realities and provides a context for the 
financial information."
2. "Employee Reports should be part of an integrated information 
flow. Forecasts for future performance, capital expenditure 
plans, re-investment profile, government taxation and market 
analysis should be distributed."
3. "In the case of Ireland, in particular, many multinational 
companies maximise the tax advantage of locating here by means 
of transfer pricing - the disclosure of financial statements 
relating to such companies would give a very misleading picture 
to employees and unions. What should be disclosed is the 
performance of comparative business units in terms of labour 
efficiency, material utilisation and other parameters."
4. "Financial information should be presented to employees ONLY
at EXPLANATORY workshop sessions.
Otherwise there is a danger that figures will be misinterpreted
or that the report will only be partly reviewed. It is also
important that any questions that employees may have be covered 
at this."
5. "Information should cover more than financial results. Among 
other things, it should cover: Competitors, Products, Unions, 
Quality and Safety, and General Policies."
6. "In addition to the historic information disclosed employees 
should be aware of company policy and future company prospects."
7. "The company is committed to keeping the employees as fully 
informed as possible. It nevertheless tends to delay the AGM 
and publication of results until pay negotiations are completed. 
We still, therefore, need to make more progress in this area."
8. "Where competitor numbers are small, disclosure of 
information may effect your ability to compete. Small service 
sectors and specific manufacturers should be exempted."
9. "I consider it an essential function of good management that 
employees be given a reasonable disclosure of the financial 
information on the company. They are stakeholders in the
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business just as shareholders are. Personally, I have observed 
that in many companies where fairly comprehensive information is 
given to employees on the fortunes of the business a more 
cohesive and less adverserial spirit develops in the 
organisation."
10. "Disclosure of financial information is comparable with 
disclosure of any other base of information in my opinion - if 
it leads to mis-interpretation of its true position it's bad, 
whereas if it assists a better understanding of the true 
position it's good. I would be inclined to go on the basis that 
discretion and understanding of the recipient would be a major 
deciding factor and as such it would be dangerous to 
generalise."
11. "Once employees are given information this information 
becomes public knowledge. This may not be in the best interests 
of the company and consequently of its employees. I think 
employees should be given the maximum information - in so far as 
this information could effect their lives and careers - but not 
to a level where the company could suffer at the hands of 
competitors."
12. "Disclosure of financial information to employees is a very 
sensitive issue and needs to be handled with extreme care. The 
amount of disclosure which is in the best interests of the 
employees and the company will vary from company to company, 
with different levels of employees within companies and from 
time to time."
13. "The main problem is lack of trust. To communicate 
successfully with employees, confidence and trust are the 
essential ingredients. Therefore, it must be a skillful 
communications exercise so as to discount any fears that 
information is used for a subtle purpose."
14. "Companies might consider employing or appointing worker 
Directors as part of the information to employees process. 
There is also a need for companies to educate their employees to 
appreciate the circumstances of their business, both financial 
and other, and how this effects the employees."
15. "We have given very detailed information to our employees
for over 10 years and have only positive views on the matter."
APPENDIX F
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CHIEF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTANT
SECTION 1 -  RESPONDENT PROFILE
P l e a s e  i n d i c a t e ,  by c i r c l i n g  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  number:
1 . 1 .  T our a g e  r a n g e :
Y r s .
20 -  30 ..........................................................  1
31 -  4 0 ..........................................................  2
41 -  5 0 ..........................................................  3
51 -  6 0 ....................................................   4
61 -  6 5 ..........................................................  5
o v e r  6 5 .............................................................. 6
1 . 2 .  S e x
M a le ...................................................................  1
F e m a le ..............................................................  2
1 . 3 .  H i g h e s t  e d u c a t i o n a l  q u a l i f i c a t i o n :
L e a v in g  c e r t i f i c a t e ...........................  1
A c c o u n t in g  t e c h n i c i a n ...................... 2
P a r t l y  q u a l i f i e d  a c c o u n t a n t . . .  3
P r im a r y  d e g r e e ........................................  4
H ig h e r  d e g r e e ...........................................  5
Member o f  p r o f e s s i o n a l  b o d y . . .  6 
O th e r  ( p l e a s e  s p e c i f y ) ...................  7
/.no
1 .4 .  Number of y e a r s  in  p r e s e n t  jo b
0 -  5 y e a r s ...............................................  1
6 - 1 0  y e a r s ...............................................  2
11 -  15 y e a r s ................................................. 3
16 -  20 y e a r s ................................................. 4
21 -  30  y e a r s ................................................. 5
more th a n  30 y e a r s .................................  6
1 . 5 .  Number o f  y e a r s  e x p e r i e n c e  w i t h  a c c o u n t i n g  ( i n c l u d i n g  p e r i o d  in  
t r a i n i n g )
0 -  5 y e a r s ..........................................  1
6 - 1 0  y e a r s ..........................................  2
11 -  15 y e a r s ...........................................  3
16 -  20 y e a r s ........................................... 4
21 -  30  y e a r s ........................................... 5
more th a n  30 y e a r s ........................... 6
1 . 6 .  The e x t e n t  o f  any in v o l v e m e n t  i n  fo r m a l  n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i t h  em p lo y e e  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s
1 
2
3
4
5
E x t e n s i v e . . .  
C o n s i d e r a b l e
Some ................
M in im a l ...........
N o n e ...................
4 0 3
SECTION 2. -  COMPANY PROFILE
2 . 1 .  To w h ic h  s e c t o r  d o e s  y o u r  f i r m  b e lo n g ?
A g r i c u l t u r e  & F o r e s t r y .....................................................  1
M in in g  and q u a r r y i n g ........................................................  2
F ood , d r i n k  and t o b a c c o ................................................  3
R e t a i l .............................................................................................  4
W a r e h o u s in g ................................................................................  5
C oal & p e t r o le u m  p r o d u c t s ...........................................  6
C h e m ic a ls  & a l l i e d  i n d u s t r i e s ................................  7
M e ta l  m a n u f a c t u r e ................................................................  8
M e c h a n ic a l  e n g i n e e r i n g ...................................................  9
I n s t r u m e n t  e n g i n e e r i n g .........................................  10
E l e c t r i c a l  e n g i n e e r i n g .....................................................11
S h i p b u i l d i n g  and m a r in e  e n g i n e e r i n g ..................12
V e h i c l e s ..........................................................................................13
M e ta l  g o o d s  n o t  e l s e w h e r e  s p e c i f i e d ..................14
T e x t i l e s ......................................................................................... 15
L e a t h e r  and f u r ....................................................................... 16
C l o t h i n g  and f o o t w e a r ....................................................... 17
C em ent, b r i c k s  p o t t e r y ,  g l a s s  e t c ....................... 18
T im b er ,  f u r n i t u r e  and o t h e r  w o o d ..........................19
P a p e r ,  p r i n t i n g  and p u b l i s h i n g ............................... 20
O th er  m a n u f a c t u r i n g ............................................................ 21
C o n s t r u c t i o n ...............................................................................22
G as, e l e c t r i c i t y ,  t u r f ,  w a t e r ..................................23
T r a n s p o r t  and c o m m u n ic a t io n .......................................24
D i s t r i b u t i v e  t r a d e s ............................................................ 25
B a n k in g ,  in s u r a n c e  and f i n a n c e ............................... 26
P r o f e s s i o n a l  and s c i e n t i f i c  s e r v i c e s ............... 27
M i s c e l l a n e o u s  s e r v i c e s .................................................... 28
P u b l i c  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ....................................................... 29
2 . 2 .  I s  y o u r  f i r m :
U n i o n i s e d ..................................................................................  1
N o n - u n i o n i s e d ................................................................................  2
P a r t l y  u n i o n i s e d ........................................................................  3
3.
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2 . 2 .  Has your f i rm  been e s t a b l i s h e d :
L e s s  th a n  10 y e a r s ...............................  1
10 -  15 y e a r s ............................................. 2
16 -  20 y e a r s ............................................. 3
21 -  30 y e a r s ............................................  4
more th a n  30 y e a r s ...............................  5
2 . 3 .  I f  y o u r  f i r m  i s  p a r t  o f  a grou p  o f  c o m p a n ie s ,  i s  t h e  u l t i m a t e  
h o l d i n g  company:
I r i s h ...................................................... 1
F o r e i g n .    ........................................  2
N ot a p p l i c a b l e .............................. 3
2 . 4 .  Number o f  e m p lo y e e s  i n  y o u r  f i r m
0 -  5 0 0 .............................................  1
501 -  1 0 0 0 ........................................... 2
1001 -  1 5 0 0 ........................................... 3
1501 -  2 0 0 0 ..........................................  4
2001 -  2 5 0 0 .  . . . ................................ 5
more th a n  2 5 0 0 ...................................  6
2 . 5 .  A p p r o x im a t e ly  w h a t  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  t h e  e m p lo y e e s  in  y o u r  f i r m  a r e :  
( p l e a s e  t i c k  p e r c e n t a g e  ra n g e  f o r  e a c h  c a t e g o r y )
0 -  25Z 26 -  501 51 -  75% 75 -  1001
P r o f e s s i o n a l /
g r a d u a t e s
S k i l l e d
S e m i - s k i l l e d
U n s k i l l e d
4.
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SECTION 3 -  YOUR FIRM'S CURRENT DISCLOSURE PRACTICE
3 . 1 .  W h ich ,  i f  a n y ,  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  sch em es a r e  c u r r e n t l y  
o p e r a t i n g  f o r  y o u r  f i r m ' s  e m p lo y e e s :
An em p lo y e e  p r o f i t  s h a r i n g  sch em e ,
( t a x - a p p r o v e d ) .............................................
An e m p lo y e e  p r o f i t  s h a r i n g  sch em e ,
( n o t  t a x - a p p r o v e d ) ...................................
A s h a r e  o p t i o n  s c h e m e ..................................................
E m ployee p a r t i c i p a t i o n  on t h e  B o a r d ..............
Formal in v o l v e m e n t  in  d e c i s i o n  m a k i n g . . . .
None o f  t h e s e ........................................................................
O th er  ( p l e a s e  s p e c i f y )
3 . 2 .  To w h ic h  g r o u p /g r o u p s  o f  e m p lo y e e s  a r e  t h e  schem es a v a i l a b l e ?
3 . 3 .  D o e s  y o u r  f i r m  d i s c l o s e  f i n a n c i a l  i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  a l l  e m p l o y e e s / t h e i r  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ?
N o ........................................................................  1
Y e s .....................................................................  2
I f  NO, w h at i s  y o u r  f i r m ' s  m ain  r e a s o n ?
No l e g a l  r e q u i r e m e n t ........................................  1
C o s t  w o u ld  o u t w e ig h  b e n e f i t .....................  2
I n s u f f i c i e n t  demand from  e m p l o y e e s . . .  3 
P o s s i b l e  l e a k  o f  c o n f i d e n t i a l
i n f o r m a t i o n ..................................................  4
E f f e c t  on p a y  n e g o t i a t i o n s ........................  5
N e v e r  c o n s i d e r e d  i t ..........................................  6
I t  h a s  b een  t r i e d  and i t  f a i l e d   7
O th er  ( p l e a s e  s p e c i f y ) ................................... 8
IF  YOU ANSWERED "NO" IN QUESTION 3 . 2 . ,  PLEASE GO TO SECTION 4
IF  YOU ANSWERED "YES" IN QUESTION 3 . 2 . ,  PLEASE COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING
3 . 4 .  P l e a s e  d e s c r i b e ,  v e r y  b r i e f l y ,  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  i n f o r m a t i o n  y o u r  f i r m  
d i s c l o s e s  t o  i t s  e m p l o y e e s .
3 . 5 .  P l e a s e  d e s c r i b e ,  v e r y  b r i e f l y ,  t h e  form  o f  t r a i n i n g  in  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  
f i n a n c i a l  i n f o r m a t i o n  ( i f  a n y )  y o u r  f i r m  g i v e s  t o  t h e  e m p lo y e e s :
3 . 6 .  What i s  y o u r  f i r m ' s  m a in r e a s o n  f o r  d i s c l o s i n g  f i n a n c i a l  i n f o r m a t i o n  
t o  e m p l o y e e s  ? ( p l e a s e  c i r c l e  ONE num ber)
R e q u ir e d  t o  do s o  by an o v e r s e a s
p a r e n t  com pany...................................  1
To p r e - e m p t  a l e g a l l y  im p osed  s y s t e m .  2
To im p rove  i n d u s t r i a l  r e l a t i o n s .............. 3
To im p ro v e  p r o d u c t i v i t y ...................................  4
B e c a u s e  e m p lo y e e s  h a v e  a r i g h t
t o  i n f o r m a t i o n ...................................  5
To d i s p e l  r u m o u r s ..........................    6
To im p rove  t h e  s e n s e  o f  team  s p i r i t . .  7 
B e c a u s e  o f  p r e s s u r e  from  e m p l o y e e s . . .  8 
To h e l p  r e i n f o r c e  m a n a g em en t 's  v i e w s .  9 
O th e r  ( p l e a s e  s p e c i f y ) ....................................... 10
6 .
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SECTION 4.
YOUR PERSONAL VIEWS
NOTE: THIS SECTION RELATES TO YOUR OWN VIEWS. YOUR VIEWS MAY OR MAY NOT
COINCIDE WITH THE FIRM'S POLICY WHICH WAS CONSIDERED IN SECTION 3.
4 . 1 .  In r e l a t i o n  t o  ea ch  o f  t h e  s t a t e m e n t s  b e lo w ,  t i c k  t h e  column w h ich  b e s t  
r e f l e c t s  y o u r  p e r s o n a l  a t t i t u d e .
STRONGLY
AGREE
AGREE UNCERTAIN DISAGREE STRONGLY
DISAGREE
1. The f i n a n c i a l  a c c o u n t ­
a n t  s h o u ld  l i m i t  h i s  r o l e  
t o  t h e  p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  a 
t r u e  and f a i r  v i e w  t o  members 
u n t i l  t h e  la w  r e q u i r e s  o t h e r ­
w i s e .
2 .  E m p lo y ees  h a v e  a fu n d a ­
m e n t a l  s o c i a l  r i g h t  t o  
in f o r m a t i o n  a b o u t  th e  
o r g a n i s a t i o n  f o r  v h ic h  
t h e y  w ork.
3 .  The P r o f e s s i o n a l  B o d ie s  
s h o u l d  lo b b y  f o r  l e g ­
i s l a t i o n  r e q u i r i n g  th e  
d i s c l o s u r e  o f  f i n a n c i a l  
i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  em p lo y e e s
4 .  The m a j o r i t y  o f  emp­
l o y e e s  a r e  j u s t  n o t  
i n t e r e s t e d  in  f i n a n c i a l  
i n f o r m a t i o n .
5 .  E m p lo y ees  n e e d  f i n a n c i a l  
i n f o r m a t i o n  a b o u t  th e  
company w h ic h  em p lo y s  
them  i f  t h e y  a r e  t o  make 
v a l i d  em ploym ent d e c i s i o n s .
6.  D i s c l o s u r e  o f  f i n a n c i a l  
i n f o r m a t i o n  by i t s e l f  i s  n o t  
en o u g h .  I t  w i l l  o n ly  be 
s u c c e s s f u l  i f  i t  form s p a r t  
o f  an o v e r a l l  company p o l i c y  
o f  e m p lo y e e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n .
7 .
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¡TRONGLY
iGREE
AGREE UNCERTAIN DISAGREE STRONGLY
DISAGREE
r
7 .  The m a j o r i t y  o f  em p lo y ee s  
w o u ld  n o t  u n d er s ta n d  
f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s
8 .  D i s c l o s u r e  o f  f i n a n c i a l  
a c c o u n t s  t o  em p lo y ees  s h o u ld  
be a m a t t e r  f o r  i n t e r n a l  
n e g o t i a t i o n  w i t h i n  
c o m p a n ie s ,  and n o t  a 
m a t t e r  f o r  l e g i s l a t i o n .
9 .  In  t h e  f u t u r e ,  v i d e o  
p r e s e n t a t i o n s  w i l l  commonly  
s u p p le m e n t  t h e  w r i t t e n  
a n n u a l  c o r p o r a t e  r e p o r t .
1 0 .  D i s c l o s u r e  o f  f i n a n c i a l  
a c c o u n t s  t o  em p lo y ee s  i s  
u s e l e s s  w here most o f  th e  
w o r k fo r c e  i s  u n s k i l l e d .
1 1 .  I t  i s  im p o s s ib l e  t o  
k e e p  up t o  d a te  w i t h  t h e  
s t r e a m  o f  SSAPs t h a t  a re  
b e i n g  i s s u e d .
1 2 .  D i s c l o s u r e  o f  f i n a n c i a l  
i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  em p lo y ee s  i s  
a s u b j e c t  t o  w h ich  I have  
n o t  y e t  g i v e n  much t h o u g h t .
'
1 3 .  Com panies j u s t  c a n n o t  
a f f o r d  t h e  c o s t  o f  d i s c l o s i n g  
f i n a n c i a l  in f o r m a t io n  t o  
t h e i r  e m p lo y e e s .
14 . B u s i n e s s e s  w ould  be 
h e a l t h i e r  i f  em p lo y ee s  
w e r e  in fo r m e d  o f  th e  a f f a i r s  
o f  t h e  b u s i n e s s .
15 . In t h e  c u r r e n t  e n v i r o n ­
m ent o f  unem ploym ent, t h e r e  
i s  no n eed  t o  g i v e  f i n a n c i a l  
i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  e m p lo y e e s .
16 . I f  co m p a n ies  a re  t o  d i s ­
c l o s e  in f o r m a t io n  t o  em p loyee  
a l l  l e v e l s  o f  em ployee  s h o u ld  
r e c e i v e  t h e  same in f o r m a t io n .
' >
17 . The m edia  u sed  f o r  th e  
d i s s e m i n a t i o n  o f  f i n a n c i a l  
i n f o r m a t i o n  sh o u ld  v a r y  w i t h  
t h e  l e v e l s  o f  f i n a n c i a l  
e x p e r t i s e  o f  th e  em p lo y ee .
/. no
4 . 2 .  Do you  t h i n k  t h a t  t h e  d i s c l o s u r e  o f  f i n a n c i a l  i n f o r m a t io n  t o  em p loyees  
w i l l  become g e n e r a l  p r a c t i c e :
In  th e  n e x t  f i v e  y e a r s ........................................  1
In  th e  n e x t  t e n  y e a r s ........................................... 2
In  th e  n e x t  t w e n ty  y e a r s ...................................  3
N e v e r .....................................................................................  4
D o n 't  know......................................................................... 5
4 . 3 .  Who, do you  f e e l  o u g h t  t o  be r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  d e s i g n i n g  and p r e p a r in g  th e  
f i n a n c i a l  i n f o r m a t io n  t o  be in c lu d e d  in  an a n n u a l em p loyee  r e p o r t?
No in f o r m a t io n  s h o u ld  be g i v e n . . . . .  1
The F i n a n c i a l  A c c o u n t a n t ..........................  2
The P e r s o n n e l  M anager..................................  3
The C om m unications O f f i c e r .....................  4
The P u b l i c  R e l a t i o n s  O f f i c e r ................  5
D i v i s i o n a l  M a n a g ers .......................................  6
The M a rk et in g  M anager ..................................  7
A Comm ittee o f  t h e  a b o v e ..........................  8
O ther  ( p l e a s e  s p e c i f y ) ...............................  9
4 . 4 .  I f  d i s c l o s u r e  i s  i n e v i t a b l e ,  who do you  t h i n k  s h o u ld  be p r i m a r i l y  
r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  i n i t i a t i n g  t h e  g e n e r a l  d i s c l o s u r e  o f  f i n a n c i a l  in f o r m a t io n  t o  
e m p lo y e e s ?
The EEC........................................................................  1
The G overnm ent......................................................  2
The E m p l o y e e s / t h e i r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  3
I n d i v i d u a l  B oards o f  D i r e c t o r s   4
I n d i v i d u a l  Company A c c o u n t a n t s   5
The P r o f e s s i o n a l  A c co u n ta n cy  B o d ie s  6 
O ther  ( p l e a s e  s p e c i f y ) ...............................  7
4 . 5 .  In  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  V r e d e l in g  EEC D i r e c t i v e ,  a r e  you:
Unaware o f  i t ....................................................  1
Aware, b u t  u n su r e  o f  i t s  c o n t e n t . .  2 
F a m i l i a r  w i t h  t h e  g e n e r a l  t e r m s . . .  3 
F u l l y  c o n v e r s a n t  w i t h  t h e  t e r m s . . .  4
4 . 6 .  I f  you  a r e  n o t  f a m i l i a r  w i t h  t h i s  D i r e c t i v e ,  do you f e e l  i t  i s  
m a i n l y  b e c a u s e :
I t  has n o t  b een  p u b l i c i s e d .....................  1
You f a m i l i a r i s e  y o u r s e l f  w i th
D i r e c t i v e s  when t h e y  become l a w . . 2 
You f e e l  i t  w i l l  n e v e r  be e n a c t e d . .  3 
You have no i n t e r e s t  in  t h a t  a r e a . . 4 
I t  i s  n o t  r e l e v a n t  t o  you r w o r k . . . .  5
4 . 7 .  I f  you a r e  f a m i l i a r  w i t h  t h i s  d i r e c t i v e ,  w hat im pact do you t h in k
i t  w i l l  have  on y o u r  company:
M a jo r ...................................................................  1
C o n s i d e r a b l e .................................................  2
M o d e r a te   .......................................... 3
M in o r ..................   4
N o n e ......................................................................  5
4 . 8 .  I f  t h e r e  a r e  any o t h e r  comments you  w ould  l i k e  t o  make on any a s p e c t  
o f  t h e  i s s u e  o f  d i s c l o s u r e  o f  f i n a n c i a l  in f o r m a t io n  t o  e m p lo y e e s ,  
yo u r  v i e w s  would be g r e a t l y  a p p r e c i a t e d .  P l e a s e  u s e  th e  sp a c e  b e lo w  f o r  
s u c h  com ments.
5. FEEDBACK
5 . 1 .  Would you  be i n t e r e s t e d  i n  r e c e i v i n g  a summary o f  t h e  f i n d i n g s  o f  
t h i s  s u r v e y ?
7es............................. 1
No.............................. 2
I f  y e s ,  p l e a s e  g i v e  name and a d d r e s s  t o  w h ich  summary s h o u ld  be s e n t :
NAME.. .  
ADDRESS
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR HELP IN FILLING UP THIS QUESTIONNAIRE
APPENDIX G.I.
COVERING LETTER SENT WITH QUESTIONNAIRE
Dear
I am currently conducting research for a higher degree thesis into the subject 
of "DISCLOSURE OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION TO EMPLOYEES IN IRELAND". I am 
registered at Dublin City University. As part of this research I am anxious 
to determine the current disclosure practice in major companies in Ireland and 
also to seek the opinions of the Chief Financial Accountants in those 
companies.
I should be most grateful if you would assist me with this work by completing 
the enclosed questionnaire and returning it to me in the envelope provided.
It should take you approximately 20 minutes to complete.
The returned questionnaires will be treated with the utmost confidence, and 
the findings will be reported in such a way as to make it impossible to trace 
individual responses back to particular individuals or companies.
If you would be interested in hearing the overall results of the survey, would 
you please indicate this in the last section of the questionnaire. If there 
is any question you feel you do not wish to answer, please indicate this in 
the margin and go to the next question.
Many thanks in anticipation of your help.
Yours sincerely,
Patricia C. Barker 
Lecturer in Accounting
412.
APPENDIX G.2. 
SECOND REQUEST LETTER
Dear
I wrote to you three weeks ago enclosing a questionnaire on the subject of 
"DISCLOSURE OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION TO EMPLOYEES IN IRELAND".
I understand that you must be extremely busy, and am sorry to approach you 
again on this matter; but in order to get as complete a picture as possible 
of current practice and attitudes, it is important that the response rate is 
as high as possible.
I should, therefore, be most grateful if you would complete the questionnaire 
and return it to me. It should take you approximately twenty minutes to 
complete.
In case you have mislaid the original questionnaire, I enclose a fresh copy 
and another stamped envelope.
If you have returned the questionnaire and this request has crossed with it in 
the post, thank you for your help, and please ignore this request.
Yours sincerely,
Patricia C. Barker 
Lecturer in Accounting.
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APPENDIX H
DESCRIPTION OF INDEXATION OF DISCLOSURE CONTINUUM SCORING TO EMPLOYEES
SCORE
No disclosure 0
Reference to right of employees to access published
information 0
Summary profit and loss account and balance sheet 1
Same information as shareholders 2
Summary profit/sales/employee costs 3
Summarized results and production and marketing inform. 4 
Quarterly costings, results and budgets 5
Monthly variance analysis 6
Annual video and accounts 7
Annual employee reports 7
Half yearly results 8
Monthly summary of results 9
Monthly divisional results 10
Special employee reports with monthly meetings 11
Results annually and monthly with discussions of
future plans 12
Detailed weekly and cumulative divisional information 13
414.
APPENDIX I
DESCRIPTION OF INDEXATION OF CONTINUUM OF PRE-DISCLOSURE EDUCATION
PDE course/video for all employees 4
PDE for all employee representatives 3
PDE down to junior management 2
PDE for senior management 1
No PDE 0
415.
   1991 Syllabi - ICAI
CONTXHT
1 .  p r e p a r a t i o n  o f  F i n a n c i a l  A c c o u n t«  and 33AJ>i
APPENDIX J
Knowledge Level 
1 2 3
Company Accounts
A c c o u n t in g  and d i a c l o a u r e  r e q u ir e m e n t a  o f  t h e  
Com paniea A c ta  
P r e p a r a t i o n  and p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  f i n a n c i a l  a t a t e m e n t s  
The i s s u e ,  r e - p u r c h a a e  and r e d e m p t io n  o f  a h a rea  
The p u r c h a s e  and a a l e  o f  a  l i m i t e d  com pany
S t a t e m e n t a  o f  S ta n d a r d  A c c o u n t in g  P r a c t i c e
An u n d e r a t a n d in g  o f  t h e  r a t i o n a l e  and a b a a i c  a b i l i t y  t o  
a p p ly  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  a ta n d a r d a  t o  p r a c t i c a l  a i t u a t i o n a i  
D i a c l o a u r e  o f  a c c o u n t i n g  p o l i c i e a  
Z a r n in g a  p e r  s h a r e
The a c c o u n t i n g  t r e a t m e n t  o f  G overnm ent g r a n t s  
E x t r a o r d i n a r y  i t e m s  and p r i o r  y e a r  a d j u a t m e n t s  
S t o c k s  and w ork i n  p r o g r e a a
S t a t e m e n t a  o f  a o u r c e  and a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  fu n d s  
A c c o u n t in g  f o r  d e p r e c i a t i o n  
A c c o u n t in g  f o r  r e s e a r c h  and d e v e lo p m e n t  
A c c o u n t i n g  f o r  p e s t  b a l a n c e  s h e e t  e v e n t s  
A c c o u n t in g  f o r  c o n t i n g e n c i e s  
A c c o u n t in g  f o r  i n v e s t m e n t  p r o p e r t i e s
NOT*
The t e c h n i c a l  r e l e a s e s  and o t h e r  t e c h n i c a l  g u id a n c e  n o t e s  i s s u e d  by  t h e  
I n s t i t u t e  w h ic h  a r e  e x a m in a b le  w i l l  b e  s p e c i f i e d  e a c h  y e a r  in  t h e  
S y l l a b u s  I n f o r m a t i o n  L e a f l e t .
A n a l y s i s  and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
A n a l y s i s  and I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  and  
t h e  d r a f t i n g  and p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  r e p o r t s  t h e r e o n  -  an  
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t h e  u s e  and s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  a c c o u n t i n g  
r a t i o s  w i l l  b e  e x p e c t e d .
C ash  f l o w  S t a t e m e n t s
C o n s t r u c t i o n  and I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  b a s i c  c a s h  f lo w  
s t a t e m e n t s  w i t h  e m p h a s i s  on r e c o n c i l i n g  movements,  
i n  c a s h  b a l a n c e e
o o ü  ÌJUTT Knowladqa U v « l
1 a 3
1 . F i n a n c i a l  S ta te m e n t s  and 3 SAP a 
Company A c c o u n ts
A c c o u n t i n g  and d i a c l o a u r s  r e q u ir e m e n t s  o f  t h e  
C om paniaa  A çta  
P r a p a r a t i o n  and p r a a e n t a t io n  o f  f i n a n c i a l  ■ t a q t a a a n t a  
Tha i a a u e ,  r a -p u r c h a a e  and ra d a m p tio n  o f  a h a r a s  
The p u r c h a a a  and a a la  o f  a l i m i t e d  com pany
A d van ce  C o r p o r a t io n  Tax -  b o o k - k e e p in g  a n t r i a a  
f i n a n c i a l  in f o r m a t io n  ia a u a d  w i t h  f i n a n c i a l  a t a t e m a n ta
S ta t a m a n t a  o f  S tan dard  A c c o u n t in g  P r a c t i c e  and E x p o su r e  D r a f ta
An u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  th a  r a t i o n a l a  f o r  a l l  c u r r a n t  S ta ta m a n ta ,  
E x p o s u r e  O r a f ta  and a p a c i f i a d  T a c h n i c a l  P a la a a a a  ( • ) ,  and an  
a b i l i t y  t o  a p p ly  them t o  p r a c t i c a l  a i t u a t i o n a  and t o  naw and  
d a v a l o p i n g  a ra a a  o f  a c c o u n t in g
• Tha T a c h n i c a l  R a la a a a a  and o t h a r  t a c h n i c a l  g u id a n e *  n o ta a  
ia a u a d  by th a  I n a t i t u t a  o f  w h ich  a r a  a x a m in a b la  w i l l  ba 
a p a c i f i a d  a a ch  y a a r  in  th a  S y l l a b u a  I n f o r m a t i o n  L a a f l a t .
2 .  C o n s o l i d a t e d  f i n a n c i a l  S ta t e m e n t « ,  M erger«  and  A c q u i s i t i o n *  
C o n s o l i d a t e d  f i n a n c i a l  a ta ta m a n ta
P r e p a r a t i o n  and p r a a e n t a t i o n  o f  f i n a n c i a l  a t a t a m e n t a  
f o r  g r o u p a  o f  com paniaa  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  a a s o c i a t e d  
c o m p a n i e s  ( i n c l u d i n g  o v e r a a a a  s u b s i d i a r i e e  and t h a  
p r o b le m s  o f  c u r r a n c y  c o n v e r s i o n )
C roup s o u r c e  and a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  fu n d s
M e r g e r s  a n d  a c q u i s i t i o n s
A c c o u n t i n g  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  t r e a t m e n t  o f  
p r e - a c q u i s i t i o n  p r o f i t s  and g o o d w i l l  
B o o k - k e e p i n g  e n t r i e s  and p r a p a r a t i o n  o f  a c c o u n t s  
D e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  f a i r  v a l u e  on a c q u i s i t i o n ,  and  
c a l c u l a t i o n  o f  a c q u i a i t i o n  a d j u s t m e n t s  
P r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  r e l a t e d  d i a c l o a u r a a  i n  n o t e e  
t o  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s
- 2 -
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3 .  S p e c i a l i s e d  A c c o u n t in g  T o p ic s
Banking and financial Ssrvlcss
Accounting for trsasury products, including 
B i l l s  of Exchangs 
Accounting for complsx capital iaauss
O th s r  S p e c l a l l s s d  A c c o u n t in g  T o p ic s
E lt tm sn t i  o f  o t h s r  s p e c i a l  a c c o u n t s ,  e x a m in a b le  i n  t h s
two s a r l i s r  p a p e rs  on t h s  F i n a n c i a l  A c c o u n t in g  s y l l a b u s ,  
c o u l d  b s  c a p a b le  o f  b s i n g  in c l u d e d  a s  p a r t  o f  a q u s s t i o n
w h s r s  s u c h  would r s p r s s s n t  a r s l s v a n t  a s p e c t  o f  t h s
q u e s t i o n
4 .  A n a l y s i s  and I n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  I n c  cos M easurem ent and  
C a p i t a l  M a in ten a n ce
A n a l y s i s  and I n t s r p r e t a t l o n
A n a l y s i s  and i n t a r p r s t a t i o n  o f  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t s a e n t s  and  
t h s  d r a f t i n g  and p r a s s n t a t i o n  o f  r a p o r t s  t h s r s o n  (a n  
u n d s r s t a n d i n g  o f  t h s  u s s  and s i g n i f i c a n c s  o f  a c c o u n t i n g  
r a t i o s  w i l l  b s  s x p e c t s d ) .
Incom e H easuram ent and C a p i t a l  M a ln ts n a n c s
An u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  and an a b i l i t y  t o  a d d r s s s  t h s  
p r a c t i c a l  p r o b l s a s  o f  a c c o u n t i n g  i n  an s n v i r o n a s n t  
o f  c h a n g in g  p r i c s s
1
-  3 -
APPENDIX K - STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS AGAINST PREDICTED VALUES FOR Y
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MTB > plot cl5 c49
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MTB > plot cl5 c50
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MTB > plot cl5 c51
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APPENDIX L - TEST FOR MULTICOLLINIARITY BETWEEN VARIABLES
426.
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MTB > plot cl3 c41
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APPENDIX M
SOME PROPOSALS FOR EXPANSION OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING OF ACCOUNTANTS
Arising from this study, some practical issues suggest themselves for 
inclusion on the syllabi of degree and professional programmes for 
Financial Accountants. They would include the following:
M.l. CONCEPTUAL ISSUES
The communication process; Theories of communication 
The power attaching to information 
Theories of selective information
The corporate social responsibility of business enterprises 
The accountant's professional and societal responsibility to employees 
The information needs of employees 
The information needs of Trades Unions
M.2. CONTENT OF EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOYMENT REPORTS
Employment statistics:
Numbers employed, with details of gender, age and skill 
Geographic location of employees
Cost of wages, salaries and personnel related expenditure 
Policies on disabled employees, and on women; affirmative action
programmes, pension funding, communication with employees, training 
and promotions; production statistics by segment, including budget and 
actual
Future expansion and contraction plans, including plans for employment, 
redeployment, redundancies and retraining 
Other segmental information Details of management and organization 
structure
M.3. METHODS OF PRESENTING FINANCIAL INFORMATION
Value added statements
Pieties
Bar charts
Pie charts
Cartoons
Video presentations 
Oral presentations
Use of colour and texture in design 
Fog index
M.4. PRE-DISCLOSURE EDUCATION 
The need for such education
Understanding the inability to comprehend numeric representations 
Understandable explanation of jargon used in accounting 
Explanation of concepts underpinning financial accounting 
The role of the independent, disinterested accountant
4 2 8 .
APPENDIX N
SUMMARY OF DESCRIPTIONS OF PRE-DISCLOSURE EDUCATION GIVEN BY RESPONDENTS
1. Courses available in syllabus of training courses to give an 
explanation of annual accounts for senior management.
2. General training programmes have financial content.
3. In a bank, it is assumed that employees understand accounts.
4. Employees are given an explanation of the employee report by 
their managers.
5. Employees are encouraged to study, inter alia, financial 
matters.
6. Training courses for management levels, but not below.
7. Our information is carefully presented to avoid jargon, so 
none is necessary.
8. Senior and semi-senior employees are sent to IMI courses.
9. Internal training courses at understanding accounts generally, 
and on our accounts in particular are pitched at admin/clerical 
staff and technical supervisory staff.
10. Explanations are given to workers if requested at meetings.
11. In house training includes financial modules
12. In house courses
13. Courses for members of the joint participation council.
14. IPC courses for all employees.
15. Management courses for senior staff include finance.
16. We use simple English.
17. Weekly information is explained in detail as it is issued.
18. A video is presented annually on financial results. All 
employees are shown the video and the accountants are available 
to answer questions.
SUMMARY
None
Senior management 
Not necessary 
All employees
No. % 
56 76
4 6
4 6
10 13
74 100
429.

